

Immigration policies

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Outline

- U.S. immigration policies
- The role of the state
- Policies not based on evidence
- Increase in border enforcement
 - Summary
- Proposed Southern border wall
- Simulation of U.S. point system
- Possible research projects



Importance of immigration

- The importance of international migration to current and future policy challenges faced by the United States can hardly be overstated
 - Migrants have been and will continue to be the primary driver of U.S. population growth throughout the 21st century
 - They are shaping critical policy questions pertaining to the changing demographic landscape of the urban future, as well as the overall population challenge of achieving an equitable society

Policies and society

- Immigration policy affects, and is affected by, many aspects of society, both within the United States, as well as across other countries
- E.g. economic growth, labor markets, demographics, health, education, criminal justice, national security, border security (Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Laissez-Faire, 1780–1875
- Qualitative Restrictions, 1875–1920
- Quantitative Restrictions, since 1921
 - Several changes to immigration law after 1980



U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Laissez-Faire, 1780–1875
 - Federal, state, and local governments, private employers, shipping companies and railroads, and churches promoted immigration to the United States
- Qualitative Restrictions, 1875–1920
 - Congress barred the entry of convicts and prostitutes in 1875
 - Immigration Act of 1882 for the first time prohibited immigration from China, which continued for most of the next 60 years
 - Immigrants from eastern and southern Europe aroused fear and hostility among Protestants and rural Americans
 - Laws instituted literacy tests beginning in 1897



U.S. immigration policies

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- Quantitative Restrictions, since 1921
 - In 1921, Congress imposed the first quantitative restrictions on immigration, limiting arrivals of the foreign-born persons of each nationality present in the U.S.
 - Quotas were applied only to the Eastern Hemisphere
 - In the 1960s, the civil rights movement highlighted government discrimination against nonwhites, which affected policies
 - Quantitative restrictions were placed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere



Immigration reforms, 1980–1990

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- 1980: U.S. adopted UN definition of refugee
 - Person outside her or his country of citizenship and unwilling to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution due to the person's race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion
- 1986: Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
 - Bargain between those who wanted to prevent more illegal migration
 - And those who wanted to legalize the status of illegal foreigners who had put down roots in the U.S.
- 1990: Congress enacted the Immigration Act (IMMACT)
 - Due to economic boom, more than doubled the number of immigrant visas available for foreigners requested by U.S. employers
 - Set the annual ceiling of 675,000 immigrants a year



Major laws in 1996

(Martin, Midgley 2006, 2010)

- **Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ATEDPA)**
 - It made easier to detain immigrants convicted of U.S. crimes without bail and to deport them after they had served their sentences
- **Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)**
 - It made most legal immigrants ineligible for federal welfare benefits
- **Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)**
 - It included measures to reduce illegal migration (e.g., border patrol)
 - It introduced a system by which employers could check whether newly hired workers were legally authorized to work in the U.S.
 - U.S. sponsors were required to have an income at least 125% the poverty line





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The role of the state

(Massey 1999)

- Theories of international migration have not emphasized the nation-state as an agent influencing the volume and composition of international migration
 - Attention has focused primarily on immigrant-receiving countries
 - Little has been written about the regulation of emigration in countries of origin
 - The state's role either in promoting or in limiting international migration is poorly understood and lacks adequate theoretical background



Efficacy of immigration restriction

(Massey 1999)

- Little research has been done outside North America to evaluate the efficacy of restrictive policies
- The efficacy of restriction is likely to vary substantially from country to country depending on five factors
 - Relative power and autonomy of state bureaucracy
 - Relative number of people seeking to immigrate
 - Degree to which political rights of citizens and noncitizens are constitutionally guaranteed
 - Relative independence of the judiciary
 - Existence and strength of an indigenous tradition of immigration



Types of state capacity

(Massey 1999)

- Continuum of state capacity to implement restrictive immigration policies
- **Centralized authoritarian governments**
 - Lack of an independent judiciary and a well-established regime of constitutional protections; no tradition on immigration; oil-exporting countries in Persian Gulf
- **Democratic states**
 - Strong and centralized bureaucracies; moderate demand for entry; little native tradition of immigration; Western Europe and East Asia
- **Countries that lack highly centralized state**
 - Strong traditions of individual liberty; long-standing cultures of immigration; United States, Canada and Australia




State capacity

TABLE 1 Conceptual classification of factors affecting state capacity to implement restrictive immigration policies

	Strength of bureaucracy	Demand for entry	Strength of constitutional protections	Independence of judiciary	Tradition of immigration	Continuum of state capacity
Relationship to state capacity:	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	
Kuwait	High	Moderate	Low	Low	Low	High
Singapore	High	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Low	
Britain	High	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Low	
Switzerland	High	Moderate	High	High	Low	
Germany	High	High	High	High	Low	
France	High	High	High	High	Moderate	
Argentina	Low	High	Moderate	Moderate	High	
Spain	Low	Moderate	High	High	Low	
Canada	High	High	High	High	High	
United States	Moderate	High	High	High	High	Low





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Policies not based on evidence

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- Even when policies respond to changes in immigration, they are usually not based on understanding the driving forces of international migration
- These policies are usually shaped by economic circumstances, political ideologies, and symbolic significance of immigrants presented by the media, politicians, and legislators



Policies shaped immigration

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- **Bracero Program**

- Temporary labor program that admitted short-term foreign workers in the country. Created in 1942. Expanded in 2nd half of 1950s. Terminated in 1968.


- Illegal immigration increased after this period, not because of an unexpected surge in Mexican migration

- The end of this labor program and limitations on the number of available permanent resident visas made it impossible to accommodate the previously established inflows of migrants



Mexican immigration to the U.S.

FIGURE 1 Mexican immigration to the United States in three categories, 1955–95



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Response to illegal migration


(Massey, Pren 2012)

- Increase in illegal migration until late 1970s shaped policy responses in the following years
- Politicians and political activists framed the Latino immigration as a threat to the country



Media & Mexican immigration

FIGURE 2 Frequency of pairing of the terms “flood,” “crisis,” or “invasion” with “Mexico” or “Mexican immigrants,” in four leading US newspapers (three-year moving average), 1965–1995



SOURCE: Proquest Historical Newspaper Files.

Immigration legislation

(Massey, Pren 2012)

- This process resulted on restrictionist immigration legislation and more rigorous enforcement policies
- The militarization of the border began in 1986 with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
- It increased by 50% the enforcement budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Other policies increased border enforcement in the following decades...



TABLE 1 Restrictive immigration legislation enacted by Congress affecting Latin Americans, 1965–2010

1965	Hart–Cellar Act Imposed first-ever annual cap of 120,000 visas for immigrants from Western Hemisphere
1976	Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act Put Western Hemisphere under preference system and country quotas
1978	Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act Combined separate hemispheric caps into single worldwide ceiling of 290,000
1980	Refugee Act Abolished refugee preference and reduced worldwide ceiling to 270,000
1986	Immigration Reform and Control Act Criminalized undocumented hiring and authorized expansion of Border Patrol
1990	Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act Sought to cap visas going to spouse and children of resident aliens
1996	Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Authorized expedited removal of noncitizens and deportation of aggravated felons
1996	Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Increased resources for border enforcement, narrowed criteria for asylum, and increased income threshold required to sponsor immigrants
1996	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act Declared documented and undocumented migrants ineligible for certain entitlements
1997	Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act Allowed registered asylum seekers from Central America (mostly Nicaraguans) in the US for at least 5 years since December 1, 1995 to obtain legal status; but prohibited legalization and ordered deportation for those who lacked a valid visa or who previously violated US immigration laws (mostly Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans)
2001	USA PATRIOT Act Created Department of Homeland Security, increased funding for surveillance and deportation of foreigners, and authorized deportation of noncitizens without due process
2004	National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act Funded new equipment, aircraft, Border Patrol agents, immigration investigators, and detention centers for border enforcement
2005	Real ID Act Sharply increased the data requirements, documentation, and verification procedures for state issuance of drivers licenses
2006	Secure Fence Act Authorized construction of additional fencing, vehicle barriers, checkpoints, lighting and funding for new cameras, satellites, and unmanned drones for border enforcement
2010	Border Security Act Funded hiring 3,000 more Border Patrol agents and increased BP budget by \$244 million




TABLE 2 Restrictive enforcement operations launched by the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Department of Homeland Security 1993–2010

1993	Operation Blockade Border Patrol's (BP) militarization of the El Paso Sector
1994	Operation Gatekeeper BP's militarization of the San Diego Sector
1998	Operation Rio Grande BP program to restrict the movement of migrants across the Texas and New Mexico border with Mexico
1999	Operation Safeguard BP's militarization of the Tucson Sector
2003	Operation Endgame Plan launched by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport all removable noncitizens and "suspected terrorists" living in the United States
2004	Operation Frontline Program launched by ICE to address "vulnerabilities in immigration and trade" by focusing on immigration violators who pose an "enhanced public safety or national security threat"
2004	Arizona Border Control Initiative Multi-agency effort supporting Homeland Security's anti-terrorism mission through the detection, arrest, and deterrence of all persons engaged in cross-border illicit activity
2004	Operation Stonegarden Federal grant program administered through the State Homeland Security Grant Program to provide funding to state and local agencies to improve immigration enforcement
2005	Secure Borders Initiative Comprehensive multi-year plan launched by ICE to secure America's borders and reduce illegal migration
2005	Operation Streamline Program mandating criminal charges for illegal migrants, including first-time offenders
2006	Operation Return to Sender Sweep of illegal immigrants by ICE to detain those deemed most dangerous, including convicted felons, gang members, and repeat illegal immigrants
2006	Operation Jump Start Program authorizing the deployment of National Guard troops along the US–Mexico border
2007	Secure Communities Program ICE program to identify and deport criminal noncitizens arrested by state and local authorities
2007	Operation Rapid REPAT Program to Remove Eligible Parolees Accepted for Transfer by allowing selected criminal noncitizens incarcerated in US prisons and jails to accept early release in exchange for voluntary deportation
2008	Operation Scheduled Departure ICE operation to facilitate the voluntary deportation of 457,000 eligible illegal migrants from selected cities
2010	Operation Copper Cactus Deployment of Arizona National Guard troops to assist BP in apprehension of illegal migrants



Apprehensions & illegal entries


FIGURE 3 Annual number of apprehensions and estimated illegal entries, 1955–1995



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Apprehensions & border patrol

FIGURE 4 Feedback loop between apprehensions and border enforcement, 1965–1995




Effect of illegal entries on conservative reaction via apprehensions: 0.848
 (0.905*0.937)

Indirect effect through enforcement feedbacks: 0.692
 (0.820*0.873*0.935*0.936 + 0.820*0.377*0.029*0.936 + 0.336*0.402*0.029*0.936 + 0.336*0.181*0.935*0.936)

Border enforcement


FIGURE 5 Intensity of border enforcement, 1955–1995



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Deportations


FIGURE 6 Annual deportations from the United States, 1955–2009



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.

Deportations & internal control

FIGURE 7 Feedback loop between deportations and internal enforcement, 1965–2009




Effect of 1993 terrorist attack
 On deportations: 0.236
 On conservative reaction: 0.063

Effect of 2001 terrorist attack
 On deportations: 0.615
 On conservative reaction: 0.159




Mexicans admitted out of quota

FIGURE 8 Percentage of Mexicans admitted outside the country quota as relatives of US citizens, 1990–2010



SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012).



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Increase in border enforcement

- Surge in border enforcement after 1986 (Massey 2015; Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)
 - Massive policy intervention
 - Undertaken for domestic political purposes
 - Not based on analysis of forces driving migration
- Politicians, pundits, and bureaucrats continue to call for more border enforcement
 - However, since 2008, net undocumented migration has been zero or negative


The contradictory U.S. policy

(Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Restrictions on work permits turn legal migrants into unauthorized migrants
 - However, family preference systems prevail, which encourage non-workers to migrate
- Increasing border controls affected the behavior of unauthorized migration from Mexico
 - Border enforcement discourages circularity
 - Undocumented immigrants are encouraged to stay
 - From a circular flow of male workers going to three states (CA, TX, IL)
 - To 11 million people living in settled families throughout the nation



Unauthorized Immigrants as Share of Foreign-Born by State, 2008



(US=30%)

- Highest % undocumented (45-80% of foreign-born)
- High % undocumented (35-45%)
- Lower % undocumented (25-35%)
- Lowest % undocumented (<25%)



Theories and outcomes

- Previous studies have used several theoretical frameworks and independent variables to estimate the level of migration
- These studies mainly used data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)
 - <https://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/>

(Massey, Denton 1993, Massey et al. 1994, Massey, Espinosa 1997, Massey 1999, Massey, Durand, Pren 2014, 2015, 2016, Massey, Gentsch 2014, Massey 2015)



TABLE 1
 VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION
 TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970–2010

Independent Variable	Definition
U.S. context:	
Border Patrol budget	Border Patrol budget (MMP/U.S. Department of Homeland Security)
Rate of employment growth	% change in employment over prior year (U.S. Current Population Survey 2014)
Residence/work visas (000)	No. legal entries with residence or work visas (U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics 2014)
U.S. minimum daily wage	Earnings in \$(2013) for eight hours of work at minimum wage (U.S. Department of Labor 2014)
Mexican context:	
Crude birthrate	Crude birthrate 15 years earlier (Mitchell 2007)
Rate of GDP growth	% change in Mexican GDP over prior year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2014)
Homicide rate	Homicides per 100,000 persons (Aguirre Botello 2011)
Mexican minimum daily wage	Mexico's minimum daily wage in \$(2013) (INEGI 2014)
Demographic background:	
Age	Age in years (MMP)
Female	1 = female, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Married	1 if married, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of minors in household	Number of children <18 (MMP)
Human capital:	
Labor force experience	Years of labor force experience (MMP)
Education	Years of schooling (MMP)
Cumulative U.S. experience	Months of prior U.S. experience (MMP)
Previous U.S. trips	Number of prior trips to United States (MMP)
Agricultural occupation	Reference category
Unskilled occupation	Unskilled manual occupation (MMP)
Skilled occupation	Skilled manual/professional/managerial occupation (MMP)



TABLE 1
 VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION
 TO THE UNITED STATES, 1970–2010

Independent Variable	Definition
Social capital:	
Parent a U.S. migrant	1 if parent ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of U.S. migrant siblings	Number of siblings ever migrated to United States before person-year (MMP)
Spouse a U.S. migrant	1 if spouse ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of U.S. migrant children	Number of children ever migrated to United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
No. of U.S.-born children	Number of children born in United States before person-year, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Proportion U.S. migrants in community	Proportion of persons in community age 15+ ever migrated to United States in person-year (MMP)
Physical capital:	
Land	1 if land owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Home	1 if home owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Business	1 if business owned, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Region of origin:	
Historical	1 if Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Community size:	
Large urban area	Reference category
Small city (10,000–99,999)	1 if 10,000–99,999 inhabitants, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Town (2,501–9,999)	1 if 2,501–9,999 inhabitants, 0 otherwise (MMP)
Rural village ($\leq 2,500$)	1 if $\leq 2,500$, 0 otherwise (MMP)

NOTE.—MMP = Mexican Migration Project.



Border Patrol budget

- The main predictor was the Border Patrol budget
- Compiled from the records of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and DHS
- Used as the indicator of the intensity of border enforcement (Massey, Durand et al. 2016)

Border Patrol budget in millions




FIG. 1.—Border Patrol budget in millions of 2013 dollars



Log of Border Patrol budget

- Border Patrol budget has increased exponentially after 1986
 - It is characterized by nonlinearity and a highly skewed distribution
 - It would generate problems of heteroscedasticity: non-explained portion of the model (residuals) would not have a random, homogenous distribution
- Use the natural log of Border Patrol budget
 - Linear trend across time
 - Normalizes the distribution
 - Improves the fit in six of eight models



Reverse causality

(Angelucci 2012, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Using Border Patrol budget presents a potential issue of endogeneity bias (reverse causality)
 - Border enforcement and undocumented migration may simultaneously be caused by a common underlying factor
 - Volume of undocumented migration might influence the intensity of border enforcement



Instrumental variable

(Angelucci 2012, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) budget: instrument to predict Border Patrol budget



- The DEA and Border Patrol budgets both rise over time in similar fashion, but for different reasons
 - Growth of the DEA is rooted in the politics of the war on crime and drugs
 - Growth of the Border Patrol's budget is grounded in manufactured hysteria over the “alien invasion” and the ensuing “war on immigrants”
- Independence of the two “wars” is indicated by their separate legislative histories



Steps of estimation

- Regressed the log of the Border Patrol budget on the DEA budget

$$R^2 = 0.97$$

$$\ln(\text{Border Patrol budget}) = 5.435 + 0.001037 * (\text{DEA budget})$$

- This equation was used to generate an instrumental version of the logged Border Patrol budget variable
 - This predicted value of Border Patrol budget was employed in all analyses to estimate the causal effect of U.S. border enforcement on migratory outcomes



Series of migratory outcomes

(Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

1. Whether undocumented migrants crossed at a traditional location
2. Whether crossed the border with a coyote
3. Cost of crossing the border with a coyote
4. Whether migrants were apprehended
5. Probability of ultimately achieving a successful entry
6. Risk of death during crossing
7. Probability of first undocumented migration
8. Likelihood of returning home once entry has been achieved
9. Size of undocumented population



TABLE 2
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT BORDER-CROSSING OUTCOMES

	TRADITIONAL CROSSING		USED A COYOTE		CROSSING COST (\$[2013])		APPREHENDED	
	β (1)	SE (2)	β (3)	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	β (7)	SE (8)
U.S. context:								
Log of Border Patrol instrument . . .	-.59***	.12	1.10***	.17	731.54***	53.03	.34**	.15
Rate of employment growth05**	.02	-.01	.02	.74	8.10	.05**	.02
Residence/work visas (000)00***	.00	.00*	.00	-.16**	.07	.00*	.00
U.S. minimum daily wage	-.02**	.01	.02**	.01	12.41***	3.38	.00	.01
Mexican context:								
Crude birthrate04**	.01	.02	.02	4.20	5.72	-.03*	.02
Rate of GDP growth	-.01*	.01	.01	.01	-5.64+	3.44	-.01	.01
Homicide rate05***	.01	.00	.01	-37.84***	4.93	-.02	.01
Mexican minimum daily wage01	.01	-.02	.02	3.16	5.85	.04**	.02
Demographic background:								
Age00	.01	.00	.02	-18.26**	6.31	-.01	.02
Age ²00*	.00	.00**	.00	.00	.08	.00	.00
Female32**	.15	.07	.17	-28.28	60.53	-.52**	.18
Married	-.05	.06	.08	.07	14.23	26.84	.00	.07
No. of minors in household	-.01	.01	.03**	.01	9.57*	5.53	.03*	.02
Human capital:								
Labor force experience02***	.01	.03***	.01	11.21***	2.33	-.02**	.01
Education02**	.01	-.01	.01	-8.32**	3.17	-.03***	.01
Cumulative U.S. experience00*	.00	.00***	.00	-.08	.30	.00	.00
No. of previous U.S. trips	-.01+	.01	-.06***	.01	-9.72**	3.43	-.04***	.01
Unskilled occupation	-.14**	.05	-.11*	.06	-24.16	22.58	.06	.06
Skilled occupation13	.10	.01	.13	87.04**	42.70	-.07	.12



TABLE 2
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT BORDER-CROSSING OUTCOMES

	TRADITIONAL CROSSING		USED A COYOTE		CROSSING COST (\$[2013])		APPREHENDED	
	β (1)	SE (2)	β (3)	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	β (7)	SE (8)
Social capital:								
Parent a U.S. migrant	-.02	.05	-.03	.06	14.15	22.44	.06	.06
No. of U.S. migrant siblings10***	.01	.04**	.02	-3.61	6.09	.02	.02
Spouse a U.S. migrant14*	.08	-.04	.10	18.27	35.34	-.19	.10
No. of U.S. migrant children13***	.03	.11**	.04	31.33***	13.13	.05	.04
No. of U.S.-born children06	.09	-.15	.10	-33.16	36.84	.16	.10
Proportion U.S. migrants in community02***	.00	.01***	.00	-3.47***	.87	.00	.00
Physical capital:								
Land	-.09	.06	-.25***	.08	-44.51	28.67	-.07	.08
Home	-.05	.05	-.14**	.06	-33.45	21.48	-.10+	.06
Business	-.18**	.07	-.12	.09	-55.32*	33.33	.20**	.09
Region of origin:								
Historical	-.36***	.06	-.10	.08	-110.72***	27.98	-.34***	.08
Community size:								
Small city (10,000-99,999)	-.73***	.09	.56***	.10	276.23***	37.89	.08	.11
Town (2,501-9,999)	-.59***	.09	.73***	.10	170.38***	37.86	.10	.11
Rural village (≤ 2500)	-.95***	.10	.84***	.11	301.30***	40.30	-.04	.11
Place of crossing:								
Sonora to Arizona		165.78***	29.95	-.11	.08
Southern Rio Grande to Texas		-59.99**	24.56	.13*	.07
Crossing context:								
Used coyote during crossing05	.07
Cost of coyote (hundreds of \$[2013])		-.01**	.00
Intercept	2.86**	1.42	-7.30***	1.88	-3,511.00***	631.96	-1.20	1.74
Likelihood ratio	991.62***		751.15***				194.39***	
Log likelihood					-65,796.00			
Wald	872.61***		646.98***				185.22***	
Sigma					810.76***	6.37		
No. of trips	11,558		10,737		8,106		8,097	

+ $P < .10$.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.

1. Traditional crossing




FIG. 2.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of crossing at a traditional location and probability predicted (*dashed line*) by Border Patrol budget.



2. Used a coyote




FIG. 3.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of crossing at with a coyote and probability predicted (*dashed line*) by Border Patrol budget.



3. Crossing cost




FIG. 4.—Observed trends (*solid line*) in coyote cost and cost predicted (*dashed line*) from Border Patrol budget and place of crossing.



4. Apprehended

5. Eventual entry




FIG. 5.—Observed probabilities of apprehension (*solid line*) on first attempt and eventual entry (*dotted line*) and apprehension probability predicted (*dashed line*) from trend in Border Patrol budget.



6. Number of deaths




FIG. 6.—Observed deaths (*solid line*) at the border and deaths predicted (*dashed line*) by trend in the Border Patrol budget.



7. First undocumented migration




FIG. 7.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of first undocumented migration and probabilities predicted from trends in Border Patrol budget (*dashed line*) and average age (*dotted line*).



TABLE 3
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT DEPARTURE AND RETURN ON FIRST AND LATER UNDOCUMENTED TRIPS TO THE UNITED STATES

	DEPART ON FIRST TRIP		RETURN FROM FIRST TRIP		DEPART ON LATER TRIP		RETURN FROM LATER TRIP	
	β (1)	SE (2)	β (3)	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	β (7)	SE (8)
U.S. context:								
Log of Border Patrol instrument07	.08	-.53**	.18	-1.56***	.14	-.26*	.14
Rate of employment growth04**	.01	-.06**	.03	-.02	.02	-.06**	.02
Residence/work visas (000)00**	.00	.00	.00	-.00***	.00	-.00***	.00
U.S. minimum daily wage01**	.01	.02**	.01	.03***	.01	.02**	.01
Mexican context:								
Crude birthrate01	.01	-.01	.02	-.05***	.01	-.02	.02
Rate of GDP growth02***	.01	.01	.01	-.01	.01	.01	.01
Homicide rate	-.01	.01	.05**	.02	.02*	.01	.01	.01
Mexican minimum daily wage	-.04***	.01	-.05**	.02	.02***	.01	-.03*	.02
Demographic background:								
Age19***	.01	.08***	.02	.07***	.01	.08***	.02
Age ²00***	.00	.00***	.00	.00***	.00	.00***	.00
Female	-.84***	.07	-.23	.15	-.38**	.13	-.52**	.18
Married	-.19***	.04	.53***	.08	.15**	.05	.36***	.08
No. of minors in household	-.04***	.01	-.03	.02	.04***	.01	-.01	.01
Human capital:								
Labor force experience00	.00	-.01	.01	-.01**	.00	.02**	.01
Education	-.01*	.00	-.03**	.01	-.04***	.01	-.03***	.01
Cumulative U.S. experience	-.02***	.00	-.01***	.00
No. of previous U.S. trips17***	.01	-.12***	.01
Unskilled occupation05	.03	-.21**	.07	-.21***	.04	.27***	.05
Skilled occupation	-.39***	.06	-.55**	.22	-.80***	.16	-.34	.21



TABLE 3
EQUATIONS ESTIMATED TO PREDICT DEPARTURE AND RETURN ON FIRST AND LATER UNDOCUMENTED TRIPS TO THE UNITED STATES

	DEPART ON FIRST TRIP		RETURN FROM FIRST TRIP		DEPART ON LATER TRIP		RETURN FROM LATER TRIP	
	β (1)	SE (2)	β (3)	SE (4)	β (5)	SE (6)	β (7)	SE (8)
Social capital:								
Parent a U.S. migrant37***	.05	-.16*	.09	.00	.04	-.23***	.06
No. of U.S. migrant siblings04***	.01	-.08**	.03	-.02	.01	-.05**	.02
Spouse a U.S. migrant	-.40**	.11	-1.11***	.15	-.86***	.07	-.93***	.12
No. of U.S. migrant children18***	.04	-.05	.06	-.23***	.02	.00	.03
No. of U.S.-born children	-2.05***	.27	. . .		-.44***	.06	-.48***	.13
Proportion U.S. migrants in community02***	.00	.00	.00	.01***	.00	-.01**	.00
Physical capital:								
Land	-.15**	.06	-.20*	.11	-.07	.06	-.08	.07
Home	-.32***	.04	.20**	.08	-.09**	.04	-.10*	.06
Business	-.42***	.06	.18	.11	.10	.07	.08	.09
Region of origin:								
Historical33***	.04	.11	.08	.37***	.07	-.17**	.08
Community size:								
Small city (10,000–99,999)58***	.05	.22**	.11	.62***	.09	.02	.12
Town (2,501–9,999)50***	.05	.01	.10	.60***	.09	.10	.12
Rural village (≤ 2500)70***	.06	.13	.11	.59***	.10	-.15	.13
Intercept	-8.12***	.96	.15	2.10	6.61***	1.46	.09	1.67
Likelihood ratio	5,037.28***		389.75***		6,996.45***		2,197.97***	
Wald	3,361.14***		344.37***		3,649.39***		1,286.25***	
Total no. of person-years	641,587		5,159		43,103		12,402	

+ $P < .10$.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.



8. Return after undocumented trip




FIG. 8.—Observed probability (*solid line*) of return within 12 months of first undocumented trip and probability predicted (*dashed line*) from Border Patrol budget.



9. Undocumented population





FIG. 9.—Simulated size of undocumented population under two scenarios: observed Border Patrol budget (*solid line*) and budget fixed at 1986 level (*dashed line*).





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Summary

(Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2016)

- Increasingly stringent border controls affected the behavior of unauthorized migrants from Mexico
- Transformed migration from a largely circular flow of male workers primarily going to three states (California, Texas, and Illinois)
- Into a population of 11 million people living in settled families throughout the nation



Migration importance in the U.S.

- In recent decades, the lack of a comprehensive federal immigration reform has resulted in the implementation of state policies
 - Restrict access to employment, education, housing, health care, and other services to unauthorized immigrants
 - But also other policies that have removed immigration status as a criterion for accessing certain benefits (e.g., in-state tuition, state driver's license, publicly subsidized health insurance) (Karoly and Perez-Arce 2016)

Public attitudes toward immigration

- Public attitudes/perceptions toward immigration and questions about the social and economic impacts of immigrants are linked
- The fortunes of immigrants, and their effects on the economy, political system, schools, and society shape public opinion on additional immigration
- Discourse typically links undocumented immigrants to terrorism
 - Terrorist attacks have not been committed by undocumented immigrants

Immigrants and terrorism


Lawful Entry or Residence	Carrying Concealed Explosives	Visa Overstay Violations	Undocumented Entry
World Trade Center 1993 Attackers	Would-be NYC Subway Bombers	Millennium Bomber	Some of the 9/11 Hijackers
Oklahoma City Bombers	Times Square Bomber	Shoe Bomber	
Anthrax Attacker	Fort Hood Shooter	Liquid-Explosives Bombers	
D.C. Snipers	Boston Marathon Bombers	Underwear Bomber	
Fort Dix Six	San Bernardino Shooters		

Source: Scott Savitz (RAND presentation, 2016).

Policies should consider attitudes

- Successful immigration policies need to address political issues and public attitudes/perceptions
 - Not only humanitarian and economic interests
- Full consideration of this complex issue requires
 - Understanding of changes in immigration landscape over time
 - Comprehensive immigration reform





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Proposed Southern border wall

- 44 million foreign-born people in 2018
 - 10.7 million undocumented immigrants
 - 4.5 million are visa overstayers
 - ~6 million persons entered without inspection (EWIs)
- Southern border wall would cost over \$21.6 billion
- Why would the Southern border wall not work?
 - Historical evidence
 - Visa overstayers
 - Selectivity of migration
- Foreign-born people have lower crime rates
- EWIs don't take jobs from locals



Historical evidence

- Virtually all the famous walls in the world did not or do not work
- China's Great Wall took almost 2,000 years to build at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives
 - Actually it consists of a series of walls
- China's walls did not keep out foreigners
 - Mongols entered China and ruled China in the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368)
 - The Manchu entered China and ruled China in the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911)



Visa overstayers

- The majority of undocumented immigrants enter the country with a valid visa
 - They overstay the time limit
 - They don't come through the Southern border
- A biometric entry/exit system would monitor people entering and exiting the U.S.
 - It would reduce the number of visa overstayers
- The Congress mandated an electronic entry-exit system more than 20 years ago
 - But it has not been implemented because of objections from the tourism industry and other groups

Selectivity of migration

- “Exceptional America” (Seymour Martin Lipset)
- International migrants are positively self-selected
- They are usually more highly (economically) motivated than the average population of their origin countries

Selectivity and Southern border

- Only the strongest and most advantaged people attempt crossing the Southern border
- A wall will make the journey to the U.S. more dangerous
 - Many migrants will fail
 - But eventually most will succeed
- A wall will cause immigrants to settle and stay in the U.S., and not return to their home countries
(Massey, Durand, Pren, 2016)



Crime and drugs

- Foreign-born people have considerably lower crime rates than do the U.S.-born
- Most illicit drugs don't enter the U.S. via EWIs
 - Most drugs smuggled into the U.S. do not arrive on the backs of those who cross undocumented
- In 2015, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reported
 - Mexican drug cartels bring most drugs over the southern border through ports of entry via trucks, passenger vehicles, and tractor-trailers



Crime data vs. public discourse


- Legal and undocumented international migrants to the U.S. are less likely to commit serious crimes and to be imprisoned, compared to the native U.S.-born population
- Yet, immigrants have been perceived as “threats” in political and public discourse



Crime

First and Second Generation Immigrant Offending Trajectories

Prevalence of each group involved in at least 1 crime in the previous 12 months



Source: Pew Research Center, 2013.


(<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/15/crime-rises-among-second-generation-immigrants-as-they-assimilate/>)



EWIs don't take jobs from locals

- EWIs don't take jobs from U.S.-born Americans
 - Almost all EWIs perform work Americans don't want to do
 - Little evidence that EWIs harm or suppress the employment or wages of local people
 - See lecture on migration and labor markets
- About half of EWIs pay taxes
 - In 2015, the IRS received more than 4 million tax returns from workers without Social Security numbers, and many of them are EWIs
 - They paid almost \$24 billion in income taxes
 - They won't get any of it back in Social Security and Medicare payments





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Simulation of U.S. point system

- A criticism of the U.S. immigration policy
 - Admissions are not based on a selection of the “best and brightest”
 - More high-skilled immigration is needed to raise educational attainment of the labor force
- This logic is not sustained when we consider
 - Educational mobility among children of immigrants
 - Relatively small number of immigrants compared with the population as a whole (Van Hook et al. 2020)



United States and Canada

- The U.S. system does not select immigrants primarily on their education or skills
 - Family ties to Americans
 - Fleeing political persecution
 - Winners of the “Green Card lottery”
 - Unauthorized workers
- Canadian’s point system
 - It gives priority to highly educated immigrants
 - ~60% of Canadian immigrants have a college degree
 - ~30% of U.S. immigrants have a college degree



Propositions for the U.S.

- U.S. Policymakers have debated implementing a point system as in Canada
- RAISE Act of 2017 would have
 - Eliminated certain family categories
 - Ended lottery program
 - Required employment-based immigrants to enter either
 - With a combination of high levels of education, English proficiency, and earnings
 - Or with extraordinary accomplishments or wealth



Some questions

- How much the educational attainment of the working-age population would change over the next few decades
 - If U.S. immigrants were as educated as Canadian immigrants?
 - If unauthorized immigration or family and diversity admission categories were eliminated?



Microsimulation model

- The model accounts for the ways Americans live their lives over time and across generations from 2015 to 2065
- It simulates immigration scenarios while assuming that other aspects of life in America will continue similar to current conditions
 - Educational mobility
 - Immigrant assimilation
 - Racial inequality



U.S. immigrant education

- Current policy
 - 52% of immigrants and their descendants age 25–64 would have a college degree by 2065
- Simulation under the Canadian model
 - Percentage would increase to 67% in the U.S.
- This should not be surprising because Canada explicitly selects immigrants on education



Unauthorized and categories

- Eliminating all unauthorized migration
 - Increase the share with a college degree by just 3%
- Eliminating family and diversity immigrants
 - Increase this share by 1%
- Family-based and diversity immigrants are nearly as educated as employment-based immigrants



Educational mobility

- Even if immigrants arrive with little education, their children tend to go much further in school
- Opposite occurs with high-skilled immigrants
 - 73% of immigrants and their descendants would have college degree in 2065 if they retained parents' education
 - It drops to 67% when we account for downward mobility
- Educational attainments of descendants of immigrants tend to drift toward the average attainments of the native population




Relative number of immigrants

- Does the U.S. receive enough immigrants to change the entire U.S. labor force?
 - Immigrants and their descendants makes up only 20% of the projected 2065 population
 - This proportion is too small to have an overall impact
 - Younger people, who tend to have more education, will replace older less-educated worker
 - Impacts of eliminating unauthorized immigration or the family reunification and diversity categories on the entire working-age population would be virtually zero

Limits of immigration

- Immigration shapes American society
 - Racial-ethnic composition and culture
- But impact on education composition is muted
 - Education is similar across existing classes of immigrants
 - Mobility among children of immigrants means that their education drifts toward population averages (upward and downward mobility)
 - Migration represents a small annual net flow relative to the total population





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Possible research projects

- Estimate models to evaluate the influence of several factors on the likelihood of legal and illegal immigration
 - Based on studies that assess the importance of several migration theories, including changes in policies and border enforcement actions (e.g., the Border Patrol budget as measured by DHS) (Massey, Denton 1993, Massey et al. 1994, Massey, Espinosa 1997, Massey 1999, Massey, Gentsch 2014, Massey 2015, Massey, Durand, Pren 2014, 2015, 2016)
- Add background information on immigrants
 - As available from interviews conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection with unaccompanied immigrant children (case study)



Big data

- Include data on the prevalence of social media conversation about immigration
 - Collected with a machine-learning approach: big data
 - Along borders and other locations that feature prominently in immigrant crossings
 - Sites on both sides of the border, and the relevant locations will be updated regularly based on information from interviews with immigrants
- Empirical migration models should be easily replicated to several contexts

Polarized policy debate



- Present discussions focus on **unauthorized immigrants** and range from deporting all such persons and building a wall along the southern border of the United States to granting full amnesty to those without criminal records
- Policy proposals regarding **legal immigration** include opening doors for all visa applicants, implementing a labor market driven points-based system as in Canada or, alternatively, implementing more restrictive country-based policies
- Although a polarized immigration debate makes for interesting political debates, sustainable policy solutions must address **comprehensive impacts of immigration**, taking diverse societal priorities and needs into account

Policy scenarios

- Develop **policy simulations** to inform policymakers on the impacts of various incremental immigration policy options, as well as comprehensive immigration reform
 - **Review of immigration research** to pinpoint which factors influence immigration, potential outcomes of specific policies, and which policy issues should be included in the scenarios
 - **Craft a conceptual model** to illustrate the causal links between policies and outcomes
 - How various factors affect immigration flow and, in turn, how immigration stock and flow can affect a range of different sectors (e.g., border security, education, health, employment, or labor)
 - Provide a set of policy simulations (**agent-based models**)
 - Varying immigration policy options to model how changes in one policy area could reverberate in distinct ways across multiple sectors: age distribution of the U.S. population, education systems, health services, labor markets, inequality, border security, national security, and the criminal justice system



Model international migration to the U.S.

First set of regressions




Calibration

Second set of regressions



Calibration



Conditional on being a migrant



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