

Migration and labor markets

Ernesto F. L. Amaral

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Migration (SOCL 647)



www.ernestoamaral.com

Outline

- Impact of immigration on the labor market
 - Borjas 2003
- Immigration and inequality
 - Card 2009, 2012
- Mariel boatlift: natural experiment
 - Clemens 2017
- Summary of economic effects of immigration
 - Waters, Pineau 2015
- Dealing with reverse causality (extra)
 - Amaral et al. 2016




Economic effects of immigration

- Immigration raises concerns that U.S.-born workers might experience negative impacts on earnings and employment
 - Mainly those with lower levels of education
 - These natives might experience an increasing competition for low-paying jobs with immigrants and refugees
- Does an increase in labor supply, due to immigration, have negative effects on labor outcomes of competing low-skilled native workers?
 - There are no definitive answers, because numerous and concurrent effects are related to economic outcomes
(Waters, Pineau 2015)

Report funded by the National Academies of Sciences (2015)

<https://www.nap.edu/catalog/21746/the-integration-of-immigrants-into-american-society>





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Impact of immigration

- Several studies have analyzed the impacts of immigration on labor market outcomes in recent decades
- Different approaches were implemented to compare employment opportunities between immigrants and natives across regions
- These studies reflect varying results, depending on the countries, methods, unit of analysis, and data utilized
- According to Borjas (2003), a 10% increase in labor supply (due to immigration) decreased wages of natives between 3% and 4%






FIGURE II

Scatter Diagram Relating Wages and Immigration, 1960–2000

TABLE III
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT SHARE ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF NATIVE
EDUCATION-EXPERIENCE GROUPS

Specification:	Dependent variable		
	Log annual earnings	Log weekly earnings	Fraction of time worked
1. Basic estimates	-0.919 (0.582)	-0.572 (0.162)	-0.529 (0.132)
2. Unweighted regression	-0.725 (0.463)	-0.546 (0.141)	-0.382 (0.103)
3. Includes women in labor force counts	-0.919 (0.661)	-0.637 (0.159)	-0.511 (0.148)
4. Includes log native labor force as regressor	-1.231 (0.384)	-0.552 (0.204)	-0.567 (0.116)

The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from regressions where the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a native education-experience group at a particular point in time. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within education-experience cells. All regressions have 160 observations and, except for those reported in row 2, are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-periodcell. All regression models include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects.

TABLE IV
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT SHARE ON NATIVE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES,
BY EDUCATION GROUP


Dependent variable:	High school dropouts	High school graduates	Some college	College graduates	At least high school graduates
1. Log annual earnings	-1.416 (0.313)	-2.225 (0.622)	-0.567 (0.421)	1.134 (0.436)	-1.184 (0.668)
2. Log weekly earnings	-0.947 (0.164)	-2.074 (0.510)	-1.096 (0.461)	0.610 (0.440)	-0.335 (0.612)
3. Fraction of time worked	-0.086 (0.073)	0.393 (0.251)	0.567 (0.385)	0.300 (0.499)	-1.040 (0.211)

The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share variable from regressions where the dependent variable is the mean labor market outcome for a native education-experience group at a particular point in time. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within experience cell (in the first four columns) and within education-experience cells (in the last column). All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the education-experience-periodcell. The regressions reported in the first four columns have 40 observations and include experience and period fixed effects. The regressions reported in the last column have 120 observations and include education, experience, and period fixed effects, as well as interactions between education and experience fixed effects, education and period fixed effects, and experience and period fixed effects.

TABLE IX
WAGE CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRANT INFLUX OF THE 1980S AND 1990S
(PREDICTED CHANGE IN LOG WEEKLY WAGE)

Years of experience	Education				
	High school dropouts	High school graduates	Some college	College graduates	All workers
1–5	–0.065	–0.021	0.004	–0.035	–0.024
6–10	–0.101	–0.027	0.001	–0.042	–0.029
11–15	–0.128	–0.036	–0.009	–0.059	–0.041
16–20	–0.136	–0.033	–0.011	–0.055	–0.039
21–25	–0.108	–0.025	–0.008	–0.049	–0.033
26–30	–0.087	–0.023	0.000	–0.049	–0.029
31–35	–0.066	–0.022	0.001	–0.050	–0.027
36–40	–0.044	–0.013	0.008	–0.056	–0.022
All workers	–0.089	–0.026	–0.003	–0.049	–0.032

The simulation uses the factor price elasticities reported in Table VIII to predict the wage effects of the immigrant influx that arrived between 1980 and 2000. The calculations assume that the capital stock is constant. The variable measuring the group-specific immigrant supply shock is defined as the number of immigrants arriving between 1980 and 2000 divided by a baseline population equal to the average size of the native workforce (over 1980–2000) plus the number of immigrants in 1980. The last column and the last row report weighted averages, where the weight is the size of the native workforce in 2000.



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Immigration and inequality

(Card 2009)

- Interest on immigration studies increased over the last three decades, because flows have surged
 - **Size:** approximately 1.25 million people per year between 2000–2005
 - **Composition:** at least 30% of new arrivals are undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America with low education and limited English skills
- These immigrants presumably compete for the same jobs held by the least-skilled native workers
- Card presents an overview and synthesis of research on the connection between immigration and wage inequality




FIGURE 1. IMMIGRANT PRESENCE AND DROPOUT SHARE

On average, each percentage point rise in the immigrant share is associated with a 0.2 percent rise in the relative share of high school dropouts

Source: Card 2009.

TABLE 3—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SAMPLES FROM 1980, 1990, 2000 CENSUS AND 2005/2006 ACS

		Mean years of		Employment rate (%)	Mean wage	Variance (log wage)	
		Education	Experience			Overall	Residual
Native men	1980	12.5	18.8	90.1	25.07	0.385	0.288
	1990	12.9	18.7	88.5	23.72	0.462	0.322
	2000	13.2	20.4	86.8	25.86	0.487	0.353
	2005/6	13.4	21.4	86.2	25.35	0.522	0.361
Native women	1980	12.2	19.6	65.4	16.75	0.317	0.269
	1990	12.8	19.4	74.7	17.05	0.382	0.295
	2000	13.3	20.7	77.1	19.51	0.408	0.313
	2005/6	13.5	21.8	76.8	19.74	0.456	0.335
Immigrant men	1980	11.6	19.1	87.5	24.49	0.444	0.321
	1990	11.4	18.0	86.5	21.73	0.517	0.347
	2000	11.6	18.8	86.5	23.21	0.557	0.390
	2005/6	12.0	19.9	90.6	21.45	0.544	0.352
Immigrant women	1980	11.0	20.6	60.0	17.15	0.343	0.291
	1990	11.2	19.9	65.0	16.94	0.414	0.318
	2000	11.7	20.0	64.8	19.27	0.484	0.367
	2005/6	12.2	20.9	67.2	18.58	0.515	0.356

Notes: Samples include persons age 18 or older with 1–45 years of potential experience. Wages are reported in 2007 dollars. Residual wage variance is based on linear prediction models, fit separately by year, gender, and immigrant status.

Immigrants are clustered at the high and low ends of the education distribution, so they tend to have higher residual inequality than natives (variance of log wage)

Two-group model

- Labor demand at the city or national level is consistent with labor inputs with only two skill groups (high school and college)
 - In a two-group model, what matters for the structure of wages is the relative fractions of immigrants and natives who are high school-equivalent and college-equivalent workers
 - Immigrants are only slightly under-represented in the college-equivalent group relative to natives (36% versus 41%)
- Immigrant arrivals have hardly distorted the relative fraction of college-equivalent workers and had little impact on the college-high school wage gap
 - Relative to the counterfactual of no immigrant presence in the economy



Wage inequality

- Over the past 25 years, the gap between the variance of wages in the entire workforce and among natives has widened
- Immigration can be said to have contributed to the rise of inequality in the workforce
- However, the effect is relatively small



TABLE 8—SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN VARIANCE OF LOG WAGES FOR ALL WORKERS AND NATIVES ONLY

	Variance of log hourly wages			Percent immigrants
	All workers	Natives	Immigrants	
Male workers				
1980	0.390	0.385	0.444	6.9
2005/2006	0.532	0.522	0.544	18.0
Change	0.142	0.137	0.100	11.1
Female workers				
1980	0.318	0.317	0.343	6.7
2005/2006	0.466	0.456	0.515	13.9
Change	0.148	0.139	0.172	7.2


Note: Samples include persons age 18 or older with 1–45 years of potential experience who have positive wage and salary earnings and no self-employment earnings.



No immigration effect on wages

- Overall, immigration has not had much effect on native wage inequality in the United States
- Immigration over the past decades has had
 - Minor effects on the mean wage differences between natives in different skill groups
 - Negligible effect on between-skill group wage variability





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Maribel boatlift: natural experiment

- For few months in 1980, 125,000 mostly low-skill immigrants entered Miami from Mariel Bay, Cuba
 - Fidel Castro briefly lifted Cuba's ban on emigration
- The workforce of Miami rose by 8%
 - Normal immigration to the US increases the nationwide workforce by about 0.3% per year

Source: Clemens, 2017.

[https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/6/23/15855342/immigrants-wages-trump-economics-mariel-boatlift-hispanic-cuban.](https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/6/23/15855342/immigrants-wages-trump-economics-mariel-boatlift-hispanic-cuban)



David Card (UC Berkeley)

- In 1990, David Card found no difference in wage or employment trends between Miami and other cities
 - This was true for workers even at the bottom of the skills ladder
 - Mariel immigration had essentially no effect on the wages or employment outcomes of non-Cuban workers in the Miami labor market




George Borjas (Harvard)

- In 2016, George Borjas (Harvard) found that this influx of immigrants in Miami
 - Dramatically reduced the wages of native workers
 - Immigration critics argued that the debate was settled




No sign of a dip in low-skill Miami wages after the huge arrival of low-skill Cubans in 1980



Source: Current Population Survey (CPS).





No sign of a dip in low-skill Miami wages for subgroups of workers



Source: Current Population Survey (CPS).



No sign of a dip in low-skill Miami wages even when divide workers on HS or less than HS



Source: Current Population Survey (CPS).



Sign of a dip in low-skill Miami wages only when throw out 91% of the data (Borjas)


Miami: Male, Non-Hispanic, 25–59, less than high school



Source: Current Population Survey (CPS).

Earnings year





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Summary of economic effects

- Immigration reduces the wage and labor supply of competing native workers (Borjas 2003, 2016)
 - Wages of natives decreased by almost 4% when there was a 10% increase in the labor supply of immigrants
- Immigration had a small effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree between 1990 and 2006 (Ottaviano, Peri 2012)
 - Immigration had a small positive effect on average native wages
 - But had a substantial negative effect on wages of previous immigrants in the long run



Different approaches


(Card 2012)

- Assumption about immigrants increase demand for more production in the labor market
 - If studies consider that companies will not invest more capital: negative effects of immigration on labor outcomes
 - If studies consider that companies will adjust production for increasing demand: effect of immigration is approximately zero
- Education groups
 - If four groups (dropouts, high school, some college, college)
 - Immigrant dropouts lower relative wages of native dropouts
 - If two groups (high-school equivalents, college equivalents)
 - Earnings have been largely unaffected by immigration
- Immigrants and natives with low levels of education
 - If equal competition is assumed: negative effects on wages
 - If natives having advantages is assumed (e.g. language proficiency, broader social networks): positive effects on outcomes of natives



The Long-Term Fiscal Impact of One Immigrant

Amount in U.S. dollars (thousands)



Source: J.P. Smith and B. Edmonston, eds., *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration* (1997): table 7-5.



Natives adapt to immigration

- Natives experience occupational upgrading and specialization, as an adjustment to immigration flows (Fogel, Peri 2015)
- While immigrants tend to concentrate on manual jobs, due to language and cultural limitations, natives leave their previous occupations to work on more complex jobs
- This pattern generates improvements in natives' wages and mobility, without negative effects on unemployment for unskilled natives


Immigration policies and natives

- Countries with larger immigrant competition experience a move of native workers to more sophisticated skills with higher incomes, which require higher education levels
(Cattaneo, Fiorio, Peri 2013)
- Natives engage in entrepreneurial activities in response to larger immigrant competition
- Open immigration policies tend to generate better career opportunities for natives, when combined with flexible labor markets (Peri 2014)

Immigration models

- Models should take into account skills of workers and capital to assess the effect of immigration on the wages of native workers in the long run
 - Reduced-form (e.g., only skills) does not give complete information about the wage effect of immigration
 - These partial estimates are only the effect of direct competition
 - Total wage effect is also determined by indirect complementarities among different types of immigrants and natives
- Immigration to the U.S. had a modest negative long-run effect on real wages of the least educated natives in 1990–2006
 - Effect was between -2.1% and $+1.7\%$





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Dealing with reverse causality

- Within the labor force (15–64 years of age)
 - Population is getting older and better educated in Mexico and Brazil with regional variation
 - Age and education increase earnings
- **Are there other effects of changing age and educational compositions on male earnings?**
 - Larger cohort-education size generally depresses earnings
 - There are less men with low education, but their earnings are not increasing
 - Secondary-school groups: increasing over time and experiencing negative correlations with earnings
 - Correlations are becoming less negative over the years



Micro-data

Variables	Brazil
Years	1970, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010
Minimum comparable areas	502 micro-regions
Earnings	Main occupation
Age	Youths (15–24) Young adults (25–34) Experienced adults (35–49) Older adults (50–64)
Education	Less than primary completed Primary completed Secondary completed University completed
Age-education	16 age-education groups

Aggregate-level data

- **Data** is aggregated by year, area, and age-education groups
 - Brazil: 5 years * 502 micro-regions * 16 age-education groups
- Cells with less than 25 people receiving income were excluded
 - Brazil: 32,201 observations remained
- **Only male population**
 - Labor force participation is not driven by level of earnings, fertility decline, and changes in educational attainment



Data setup


Year	Area	Age-education group	Log of mean earnings	Distr. of male pop.	P11	P12	P13	P14	...	P44	Num. of obs.
		G11–G44	$\log(Y_{git})$	P11–P44							
1970	110006	15–24 years & < primary	5.80	0.221	0.221	0	0	0	...	0	2,016
1970	110006	15–24 years & primary	6.02	0.102	0	0.102	0	0	...	0	927
1970	110006	15–24 years & secondary	6.57	0.007	0	0	0.007	0	...	0	62
1970	110006	15–24 years & university	7.58	0.001	0	0	0	0.001	...	0	11
...
1970	110006	50–64 years & university	7.91	0.002	0	0	0	0.002	15
...

Source: Amaral et al. 2015.


Fixed effects models

	Baseline model	Composition model	Migration model
Dependent variable			
Logarithm of the mean real monthly earnings by age-education group, area, and time	$\log(Y_{git})$	$\log(Y_{git})$	$\log(Y_{git})$
Independent variables			
16 age-education indicators * time	$(G_{11}-G_{44}) * \theta_t$	$(G_{11}-G_{44}) * \theta_t$	$(G_{11}-G_{44}) * \theta_t$
Distribution of male population into 16 age-education groups * time		$(P_{11}-P_{44}) * \theta_t$	$(P_{11}-P_{44}) * \theta_t$
Migration rates by age-education groups * time			$(M_{11}-M_{44}) * \theta_t$
Area-time fixed effects	α_{it}	α_{it}	α_{it}


Effects of age-education groups on earnings, Brazil, 2010 ($G_{11}-G_{44}$)



Effects of group proportions on earnings, Brazil ($P_{21}-P_{24}$)



Effects of group proportions on earnings, Brazil ($P_{31}-P_{34}$)



Internal migration

- Analysis at the **local level**
 - Need to consider the effects of internal migration on earnings
- Migration generates **spatial-economic equilibrium**
- **Without migration**
 - Sending areas would have even lower earnings
 - Receiving areas would have even higher earnings
- **Hypothesis**
 - Negative associations of proportions on earnings would be more negative when controlling for migration



Reverse causality

Migration \longleftrightarrow Earnings

- In-migration increases competition and affects earnings
- Availability of jobs and income levels influence migration
- An **exogenous measure of migration** was estimated
- **Migration data:** Brazil, 1991 and 2000
 - Municipality of residence five years before the census
- **Education data:** schooling groups divided into three categories
 - No further than the first phase of elementary school (0–4)
 - Second phase of elementary school (5–8)
 - At least some secondary school (9+)



Gravity models to deal with reverse causality

- Gravity models can be used to estimate exogenous measures of migration
 - Example: reverse causality between migration and earnings

Migration \longleftrightarrow **Earnings**

- Immigration increases competition and affects earnings
 - Availability of jobs and income levels influence migration
- Distances among areas
 - Used as an instrumental variable for predicting migration
 - Related to migration levels, but not to earnings

Distance \rightarrow **Migration** \rightarrow **Earnings**




Methodological steps for migration

1. **Level of migration:** between the 502 micro-regions
2. **Age pattern of migration:** between the five regions
3. **Modeling age pattern of migration:** smooth curves
4. **Integrating level and pattern:** exercise of standardization
5. **Force of migration:** a measure for each micro-region, year, and age-education group



Five regions & 502 micro-regions



1. Level of migration

- **Gravity models** take into account distances among areas as an instrumental variable for predicting migration
 - Distance is related to migration levels, but not to earnings

Distance → Migration → Earnings

- **Poisson regression** for each year and education group

$$M_{ij} = \exp(b_0 + b_1 \log P_i + b_2 \log P_j + b_3 \log d_{ij}) + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

- M_{ij} : migrants at the end of the period with **20–24 years** of age between micro-regions of origin and destination: $n=251,502$ (502×501)
- P_i : population at the beginning of the period with 15–19 years of age for micro-regions of origin
- P_j : population at the end of the period with 20–24 years of age for micro-regions of destination
- d_{ij} : distance between micro-regions



2. Age pattern of migration


- Estimation of migration patterns for all combinations of micro-regions and years would generate low rates
 - Migration patterns were estimated among the five **regions** in each year (1991 and 2000): $5*5*2=50$
- **Age-specific in-migration rates ($ASIMR_{x,ij}$)** consider populations (K) in regions of origin (i) and destination (j)
 - Denominator is an approximation for period person-years lived
 - Average of the starting and ending populations, multiplied by the length of the period

$$ASIMR_{x,ij} = \frac{\sum(K_{ij}^x)}{t * \sum \left[\frac{(K_{j.}^x + K_{.j}^x)}{2} + (K_j^x) \right]}$$



3. Modeling age pattern of migration


- Mathematical equation was used to smooth rates
(Raymer, Rogers, 2007; Rogers, Castro, 1981; Rogers, Jordan, 2004)



- Negative exponential curve in the first age groups
- Parabola in labor ages
- Constant term in post-labor ages
- Rates were modeled for men (15–64 years old)




Observed and estimated proportional rates, Northeast to Southeast, 1991 and 2000



4. Integrating level and pattern

- **Micro-region levels:** applied to **regional patterns**
- **Assumption:** micro-regional flows have the same patterns as the regional flows
- **Ratio** of migration level to migration pattern was calculated (20–24 years of age) for flows between micro-regions by year and education group
- Rates of other age groups from migration pattern were multiplied by this ratio




5. Force of migration

- An exogenous **force of migration** was estimated for each micro-region, year, and age-education group
- The exogenous measure of migration was included in the models as independent variables
- In general, the coefficients of group proportions became more negative than the previous estimates



Effects of group proportions on earnings, Brazil, 2000 ($G_{11}-G_{43}$)



Effects of migration rates on earnings

Age-education groups	Born in a different state		Less than five years in the municipality of residence		Residence five years before census		Adjusted migration (exogenous)	
	1991	2000	1991	2000	1991	2000	1991	2000
15–24 years	0.121	0.048	0.078	0.051	0.083	0.043	-0.095	-0.132
0–4 years of schooling								
15–24 years	0.103	-0.007	-0.034	-0.145	-0.035	-0.157	-0.224	-0.222
5–8 years of schooling								
15–24 years	0.080	0.017	0.133	0.099	0.106	0.134	-0.203	-0.012
9+ years of schooling								
25–34 years	0.136	0.068	-0.057	0.012	-0.058	0.000	-0.087	-0.100
0–4 years of schooling								
25–34 years	0.120	0.046	0.092	0.034	0.082	0.021	-0.141	-0.114
5–8 years of schooling								
25–34 years	0.087	0.032	0.041	0.168	0.051	0.178	0.005	-0.117
9+ years of schooling								
35–49 years	0.113	0.068	-0.082	-0.026	-0.083	-0.016	-0.120	-0.170
0–4 years of schooling								
35–49 years	0.109	0.061	0.012	0.083	0.013	0.085	0.139	-0.257
5–8 years of schooling								
35–49 years	0.078	0.055	0.059	0.021	0.054	0.024	0.274	-0.041
9+ years of schooling								
50–64 years	0.090	0.074	-0.074	0.004	-0.089	0.010	-0.100	-0.114
0–4 years of schooling								
50–64 years	0.014	0.031	0.057	0.036	0.048	0.029	-0.341	-0.091
5–8 years of schooling								
50–64 years	0.029	0.039	0.016	-0.021	0.016	-0.013	-0.012	0.074
9+ years of schooling								



Future studies

- Future studies could investigate the long-term effects of in-migration within the United States, which
 - Increases labor supply and competition in the labor markets
 - And raises demand for services and stimulates economic growth in receiving areas
- These analyses could also examine the economic adjustments experienced by labor markets with high levels of in-migration flows
 - Population streams affect economic opportunities, at the same time that businesses and workers adapt and take advantage of new labor configurations
- Short-term negative effects of migration flows on earnings might be overcome by investments for economic growth that would absorb the increasing working-age population

Job polarization & migration

- Job polarization, migration, and earnings in the U.S.
 - Job polarization, defined as the growth of employment at the tails of the occupational-skill distribution relative to the middle, has characterized the U.S. economy since around 1990
 - Increase in low-skill and high-skill jobs, which affects inequality
- Does job polarization in the United States, measured by levels of education and occupation, have an association with individual earnings of workers from a historical perspective?
- How have migration flows among local labor markets and commuting characteristics attenuated or exacerbated the national trends on income inequality?

Fertility & migration

- Opposite economic responses related to fertility could happen in areas with high out-migration rates
- This issue can be evaluated in terms of the connections between migration flows and fertility levels
- For instance, Brazil experienced a drop in total fertility rates from 6.28 children per women in 1960 to 1.90 in 2010, according to the Brazilian Census Bureau
- Fertility decline is happening even in rural areas and small municipalities




Fertility, migration & labor

- Migration flows from small to middle or big municipalities, conjugated with fertility decline in the U.S. and Brazil
 - Generate empty areas in different locations
 - Have negative socioeconomic consequences
- If migration flows adjust to the decline in fertility
 - Spatial distribution would move towards a faster stabilization process
- Spatial analyses could be performed to evaluate associations between migration, fertility and labor outcomes

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