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THEORIZING AND ANALYZING CITIZENSHIP IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES

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I argue that sociologists have directed insufficient attention to the study of citizenship. When citizenship is studied, sociologists tend to concentrate on just one facet: rights. I elaborate four conceptual facets of citizenship. I link two—citizenship as rights and belonging—to theoretical elaborations of multiculturalism. Considering multiculturalism as a state discourse and set of policies, rather than a political or normative theory, I outline linkages between multiculturalism and two additional facets of citizenship: legal status and participation. Over the last 15 years, the idea of multiculturalism has come under withering criticism, especially in Europe, in part because it is claimed that multiculturalism undermines common citizenship. Yet countries with more multicultural policies and a stronger discourse of pluralism and recognition are places where immigrants are more likely to become citizens, more trusting of political institutions, and more attached to the national identity. There is also little evidence that multicultural policies fuel majority backlash, and some modest evidence that such policies enlarge conceptions of inclusive membership. By studying claims-making and the equality of immigrant-origin groups, we see that the participatory aspect of citizenship needs to take center stage in future work in political sociology, social theory, social movements, immigration, and race/ethnicity.

In early 2014, Republican leaders in the U.S. Congress seemed to nudge open the door to legalization for the country's 11 to 12 million undocumented residents (Constable 2014). It was unclear, however, whether the principles for immigration reform outlined by House Speaker John Boehner would bar newly legalized immigrants from citizenship, an idea that had been floated the summer before by politicians such as Senator Ted Cruz from Texas (Root and Aguilar 2013). For immigrant advocates, the idea of legalization without the possibility of citizenship raised the specter of two-tiered membership, reminiscent of the invidious exclusions that barred Asian immigrants from U.S. citizenship during the first half of the 20th century. But legislative pragmatists argued that half of a loaf is better than none and, in any case, the value of citizenship might be overblown. As legal scholar Peter Spiro contends, "The real prize is legal residency, not citizenship" (2008:159).

Surprisingly, sociologists are ill-placed to evaluate this contention. Political philosophers and legal theorists have long engaged in normative debates over citizenship. The sociological literature, however, is sparse, whether in political sociology or immigration. Christian Joppke notes that it is "astonishing" how citizenship is peripheral to classical social theory (2010:9). Citizenship, in its most basic form, is a status of legal and political membership in a state. Based on this status, individuals might hold

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certain rights and benefits, participate in politics, and feel like they belong to a larger sociopolitical entity, although, as I discuss below, the relationship between status, rights, participation, and belonging is neither automatic nor necessarily overlapping. Given the centrality of inequality to the discipline of sociology, the absence of a robust sociology of citizenship is puzzling, to say the least (see also Somers 2008; Kivisto and Faist 2009).

The lack of attention to citizenship might stem from the view that the egalitarian promise of Western citizenship rings hollow for many people and groups. Once gained, legal citizenship status did not provide African Americans with the right to vote, equal educational opportunities, good jobs, or protection from lynching in the first 60 years of the 20th century. It does not protect them from targeted policing and police brutality today. In the face of income inequality not seen in a century, citizenship does little to help middle- or working-class Americans secure a decent standard of living or foster solidarity such that the top 1 percent of income earners share their wealth with fellow citizens.

In practical terms, however, citizenship matters, especially for those who do not have this status in the place where they live. Thus, while some observers note a decline in the importance of citizenship within a more global world and an ascension of human rights norms, the advantages of citizenship remain significant, especially in the United States. These advantages include protection from deportation, the ability to travel with a U.S. passport, broader rights in the judicial system, greater access to social benefits, eligibility for certain jobs or occupations barred to noncitizens, the ability to sponsor immigrant parents or minor children to the United States outside the annual immigration quotas, greater access to educational loans and scholarships, and the ability to vote and run for office, to name but some.

Beyond an instrumental accounting of benefits that are linked to citizenship, sociologists also need to pay attention to the normative claims embedded in citizenship. The broad concept of common political membership, as well as the component parts of legal status, rights, political engagement, and sense of belonging, provide legitimacy and the ability to make claims about equality and inclusion. This is especially important in societies characterized by diversity, whether cultural, ethno-racial, or religious. When it comes to claims-making and the equality of immigrant-origin groups, the participatory aspects of citizenship need to take center stage. To the extent that sociologists have considered citizenship, their approach has often centered almost exclusively on one facet, that of rights. Citizenship as participation and the ability to influence political decision-making not only provides defensive protections to minorities, but also is a way to enact change. For example, the U.S. debate on immigration reform, even if often stalled, would not be taking place without the social movement activism of DREAMers—unauthorized young people pushing for a path to citizenship—and the belief that Barack Obama won re-election in 2012 in part because of the Latino vote. Citizenship acts can precede status.

The egalitarian potential of citizenship is especially compelling, I contend, for countries that adopt a conception of multicultural citizenship. Understood as the

recognition and accommodation of difference, multiculturalism has come under withering criticism over the last 15 years, especially in Europe. Heads of government, including Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and former French President Nicholas Sarkozy, all announced the failure of state-supported multiculturalism and even suggested that multiculturalism is dangerous for Western liberal democracies. Such political posturing, although reflecting (and likely enflaming) a particular public sentiment, lacks empirical foundation. If anything, social science research indicates that multicultural policies appear to have some modest positive effects on sociopolitical integration for first-generation immigrants, and likely little direct effect, positive or negative, on those in the second generation. On a societal level, in places where minority and majority residents see multiculturalism as part of a common national project, it is easier to generate notions of citizenship that include those of immigrant origins, making them legitimate members of the polity and participants in decision making.

In what follows, I first elaborate four conceptual facets of citizenship, and I link two—rights and belonging—directly to theoretical elaborations of multiculturalism. I then turn to multiculturalism as a state discourse and policy, and I outline linkages between multiculturalism and the two remaining facets of citizenship: status and participation. Empirically, I show that countries with more multicultural policies and a stronger discourse of pluralism and recognition are places where immigrants are more likely to become citizens, more trusting of political institutions, and more attached to a national identity. There is also little evidence that multicultural policies fuel broad-based majority backlash, and some modest evidence that they enlarge conceptions of inclusive citizenship, thereby widening the circle of membership. I end by providing some evidence that when residents of immigrant origins live in a country of multicultural citizenship, they are able to shape political discourse and policy to be more inclusive of diversity. While some might find this analysis traditional—it rests on the reality of sovereign states and the continued importance of citizenship as a mechanism of social and political closure—it reflects the reality that broader appeals to human rights or cosmopolitan membership have limited purchase for those of immigrant origin in our contemporary period.

CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZENSHIP: STATUS, RIGHTS, PARTICIPATION, AND BELONGING

International migration reveals how the egalitarian promise of citizenship in liberal democracies exists within circumscribed boundaries. These boundaries are territorial—the legal borders of a sovereign state—and delimited by the state's power to police who can access rights and benefits based on citizenship status. Through its control over territory, status, and rights within its jurisdiction, states distinguish between those inside the circle of membership and those outside of it. Indeed, Christian Joppke makes the strong claim that citizenship is, first and foremost, about state membership in a political body that “trumps all others through providing elementary

security and protection” (2010:3); citizenship is only secondarily—but also importantly—about equality. Whether protection or equality, those who have citizenship—those inside the membership circle—gain such benefits, while noncitizens have no such guarantees. Internal inclusion draws its significance from external exclusions, a distinction felt particularly strongly by immigrants who cross nation-state borders (Brubaker 1992; Bosniak 2006).

The centrality of the state for conceptualizing citizenship is not a new idea for political sociologists; indeed, it is a premise of the field. Nevertheless, the dual nature of internal inclusionary promise and external exclusion is not sufficiently appreciated in key sociological interventions on citizenship. T. H. Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), the lone “canon” on citizenship in sociology, is a narrative of internal inclusion through the successive extensions of civil, political, and social rights. However, as others have noted, this is a story of citizenship expansion for white working-class men in Great Britain (e.g., Yuval-Davis 1997; Mann 2001). The narrative of inclusion is “an unhelpful point of entry . . . because, from the vantage point of immigration . . . citizenship functions above all as a device of external exclusion” (Joppke 2010:14). In a similar manner, Margaret Somers’s (2008) call to resurrect citizenship studies in sociology puts to the side the question of immigration. In exploring how substantive citizenship is undermined by marketized social relations and valuations of worth, Somers calls for citizenship to be understood as a public good of social inclusion, but she elides the questions of to whom states should or do extend status and rights, and why they make these decisions.

Studies of citizenship must consequently make status—that is, whether a state designates someone as a citizen or not—a central object of study. At the same time, the content of citizenship is more multifaceted than just legal membership in a political and territorial community. Citizenship can be disaggregated into four dimensions, which might or might not overlap: legal status, rights, political engagement, and a sense of belonging (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008:154). Each facet has a distinct set of historical roots. In the Western tradition, citizenship was born as a participatory model in the Athenian city-state, where political engagement in the public sphere was the highest form of activity (Aristotle 1992).¹ An alternate Western tradition, developed from Romans’ need to incorporate disparate peoples within the Empire, produced a juridical conception of citizenship as legal status with attendant privileges. Centuries later, Lockean notions of consent and contract, which paved the way for liberalism’s language of individual rights, became a central part of citizenship. In the 19th century, the rise of nationalism across Europe added notions of national belonging to state-based membership.

There is a common assumption, at least among the public, that the dimensions of citizenship are co-terminous, namely, that with citizenship status, one acquires rights, gains access to the political system, and feels membership in a state and solidarity with others who share one’s citizenship. But any foray into history shows that status, rights, political engagement, and belonging do not necessarily go together. In 19th-century America, women were citizens, but could not vote. Conversely, white male immigrants

who declared their intention to acquire citizenship through naturalization could vote in over half of U.S. states and territories (Bloemraad 2006a). Although the 14th Amendment to the Constitution guaranteed the federal citizenship of black Americans following the Civil War, this did not ensure rights to social benefits, quality schooling, a jury of peers, or the ability to participate in politics. In the contemporary period, migrants might not be citizens, but they can hold certain rights, including the right to vote in local and regional elections in some countries. Immigrants might also feel a sense of belonging in the country where they live, regardless of citizenship status, as well as to the one they left behind, and to a diasporic community around the globe. In short, if citizenship is a boundary demarcation between those “inside” and “outside” the membership circle, that boundary is not a single wall, but rather a series of fences that can be more or less inclusive, and which can overlap or cut across each other.

Sociologists have often focused on the rights dimension, either to criticize “second-class” citizenship when some citizens do not enjoy the same rights as others or more recently, to point out that rights can be held without citizenship status (Soysal 1994). In Europe, social rights have been of central interest. Marshall (1950) asked whether citizenship could be reconciled with the inherent inequalities of market economies. His answer, a mix of historical analysis and social democratic ideals, suggested that it was possible. According to him, economic transformations gave rise to civil rights, which then lead to the extension of political rights in the 19th century and, after the working class used those political rights, produced social rights in the 20th century. Social rights would, Marshall hoped, ensure formal and substantive equality. The citizen in this formulation, while benefiting from greater equality with others, became largely a bearer of rights rather than a participant in democratic governance (Kivisto and Faist 2009:3). The Marshallian view also carries implications for the polity: Equal citizenship rights (rather than Athenian-style participation) help produce collective solidarity, a perceived foundation for a redistributive welfare state.

CONCEPTUALIZING AND EVALUATING MULTICULTURALISM THROUGH THE LENS OF CITIZENSHIP

Themes of solidarity, national citizenship, and social rights have been reprised in recent years as scholars debate the effects of diversity and multiculturalism on the welfare state (e.g., Miller 1995). Do diversity and multiculturalism undermine common citizenship? The term multiculturalism can have multiple meanings: it can be a descriptive term for demographic pluralism, a set of normative claims in political philosophy, or a range of policies and public discourse that recognize and accommodate pluralism (Bloemraad and Wright 2014). Here I focus on immigrant-generated diversity since immigration has fueled the most heated academic and political debate over multiculturalism. Multicultural pluralism can, however, also stem from the coexistence of longstanding minority groups (e.g., ethno-linguistic communities in Canada and Switzerland or ethno-religious communities in India and Malaysia); from majority–minority relations with aboriginal or indigenous groups; or through diversity gener-

ated by involuntary migration, notably through slavery or colonization. Strikingly, the “backlash” against multiculturalism identified by various analysts (e.g., Joppke 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) revolves almost entirely around immigration; a similar backlash is not in evidence for indigenous peoples such as the Inuit in Canada or subnational minorities like Catalans in Spain. It is possible that group rights and calls for cultural recognition are less under assault for these latter groups since they often argue for rights based on self-determination and sovereignty rather than multiculturalism. In what follows, I consider citizenship and multiculturalism in a context of global migration. I start with political philosophy, linking theorizing on multiculturalism to citizenship as rights and belonging. I then move to empirical work that draws substantive links between multicultural policy and citizenship as status and participation.

Conceptualizing Multiculturalism as Citizenship through Rights and Belonging

One way to understand multiculturalism theory is to see it as a fourth step in a Mashallian progression of rights. Individual civil, political, and social rights promote equality, but these rights are insufficient, according to multicultural theorists. The tenets of classical Western liberalism suggest that governments should be blind to particularities of ethnicity, religion, or cultural background and extend identical and equal protections to all individuals, irrespective of background. States should not, for example, provide public funding for cultural minorities since cultural practices are a private concern (Barry 2002). But as Will Kymlicka (1995, 2001) has argued, cultural neutrality in public institutions is impossible despite rights guarantees. For instance, the designation of national holidays that mandate closing government offices and businesses are usually based on majority religious traditions (e.g., Christmas), creating inequality in treatment and unequal recognition of minority religious holidays. Or, even if a country does not declare an official language, government institutions are run in one particular language or, at best, a few languages, placing minorities who do not speak the majority language at a disadvantage. For someone working in the liberal tradition, such as Kymlicka, minority groups may protect their culture, religion, and language against majority practices and laws on the grounds that cultural membership is integral to individual freedom and self-respect (see also Modood 2013).² In this way, normative claims for multicultural rights expands a rights-based notion of citizenship: full citizenship requires multicultural recognition and rights.

Alternatively, a communitarian critique of classic rights-based liberalism underscores that humans are born into particular social and cultural communities that provide meaning and identity (Taylor 1994; Parekh 2006). Individual agency is meaningless without recognition of the groups that socialize people and provide community. In this formulation, multiculturalism is directly linked to a citizenship of belonging. Given the centrality of diverse cultural communities for people living within the state, these communities must be recognized and accommodated. It is posited that when the state recognizes and accommodates their specificity, minorities’ attachment to their cultural, ethnic, or religious groups can co-exist with their loyalty

to the larger polity (Taylor 1994). Indeed, multicultural accommodations not only produce nested identities, but perhaps also generate even stronger attachments to the state.

There is some evidence that nested identities do occur in contexts of multiculturalism. A key criticism of multiculturalism is that such policies and discourses encourage minorities to retain separate identities and reify differences between groups rather than promote a common identity (Gitlin 1995; Miller 1995; Huntington 2004). Qualitative policy analysis as well as more quantitative indices regularly conclude that Canada is one of the most multicultural countries among Western liberal democracies, more so than the United States, if we consider state support for accommodation and recognition of ethno-cultural minorities (Bloemraad 2006b; Banting and Kymlicka 2013). If multiculturalism reifies ethnic attachments and undermines a common national identity, we should see these effects most strongly in Canada, a country that has also grappled with the threat of Quebec independence for over 40 years.

Indeed, asked how important their ethnicity was to their sense of who they are, respondents to opinion surveys in more multicultural Canada indicate a higher salience of ethnicity than in the United States, among both immigrant and native-born Canadians (Wright and Bloemraad 2012:84–5). A stronger state discourse and policy context of multiculturalism might consequently reinforce ethno-cultural identities. However, stronger ethnic identity does not come at the cost of identification with Canada. Asked how important “the nation” was to their personal identities, reported national identification was higher in absolute terms among non-white immigrants in Canada than among those in the United States and equal across the two countries after socioeconomic controls.³ Such self-reported dual identifications corroborate the claim of theorists who argue that multicultural recognition and accommodation policies promote feelings of national belonging. This suggests that multiculturalism can actually enhance citizenship as a sense of belonging.

What of the native-born majority? Ideally, multiculturalism should also increase majority residents’ sense of solidarity with immigrant-origin minorities. Yet observers raise concerns about popular backlash against multiculturalism, which could undermine common citizenship (Joppke 2004; Buruma 2006). The distinction between meanings of multiculturalism is important here. Popular backlash might stem from frustration over accommodating diversity in institutions, law, and policy, but backlash might also stem from demographic diversity, that is, the sheer presence of immigrants. A key question is whether multicultural policies ameliorate or exacerbate majority group members’ possible negative reactions to demographic diversity.

At the level of political rhetoric, clearly some mainstream political parties and those on the far-right have worked to make multiculturalism a dirty word in public discourse. However, empirical research on public opinion suggests that if we consider actual policies, there is no negative effect of multicultural policies on attitudes important to common citizenship. Majority residents living in places with more multicultural policies in Europe do not have more negative views on whether immigrants are bad for the economy, undermine the country’s cultural life, or make the country a worse place

to live (Hooghe and de Vroome forthcoming). Indeed, some data point to a positive correlation between multicultural policy and attitudes toward immigrants, especially for those with more education (Hooghe and de Vroome forthcoming), while a negative relationship, if any, seems to cluster among people who are the most strongly opposed to immigration in the first place (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014). This is not to say that demographic diversity elicits no concern among the majority, but rather that the presence of multicultural policies (and greater economic equality) appears to mitigate or reverse the erosion of social trust or of civic and political participation in a context of rising diversity (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; see also Crepaz 2006).

The Canadian case is again instructive. Canada came out of World War II with little interest in racial diversity and a tragically poor record in providing a home to Jewish and Asian-origin minorities. Laws and practice had kept most non-white people from migrating, Jewish refugees had been refused landing rights, Aboriginal peoples were denied the vote, and Canadians expressed concerns—up to the highest office in the land—about racial mixing. In 1947, the Prime Minister of Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King, vowed to limit “Oriental” migration so as not to “make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population.” Yet over the next half century, Canadian national identity was transformed. A new, multicultural vision of the nation developed out of desires to distinguish Canada from Great Britain and the United States; the wish to live up to the human rights ideals of the United Nations; the need to deal with Québécois nationalism; and the activism of non-British, non-French Canadians who promoted a different vision of the country (Winter 2011; Triadafilopoulos 2012; Bloemraad 2015). In the process of re-defining the national identity, multiculturalism became a touchstone for majority Canadians’ self-identity, especially in Anglophone Canada. In the 21st century, 56 percent of the Canadian public believes that multiculturalism is “very important” to Canadian identity, more than the 47 percent who say the same for hockey (Bloemraad 2012). Those who express the most patriotism are also most likely to support immigration and multiculturalism (Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012; Berry 2013). Thus, in some places and times, multiculturalism works in tandem with expanded notions of national membership and inclusive citizenship.

Evaluating Multiculturalism through Citizenship as Status and Participation

The political theory of multiculturalism has direct connections to two facets of citizenship—rights and belonging—and we find some empirical support for the contention that multiculturalism can bolster these aspects of citizenship to create greater inclusion. Social science research also suggests that the adoption of multicultural policies and public discourse carries consequences for the two other dimensions of citizenship—status and participation.

A variety of indices measure the degree to which countries adopt multicultural policies (Helbling 2013; Koopmans 2013). One of the most widely used is the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP), constructed by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, which measures eight types of policies across 21 Western nations at three time points (1980, 2000, and 2010). These policies, meant to serve as indicators of “some level of public

recognition and support for minorities to express their distinct identities and practices” (Banting and Kymlicka 2013:582), score a country on whether they have an official affirmation of multiculturalism, have multiculturalism in school curriculum, include ethnic representation/sensitivity in public media and licensing, offer exemptions from dress codes in public laws, accept dual citizenship, fund ethnic organizations to support cultural activities, fund bilingual and mother-tongue instruction, and have an affirmative action policy for immigrant groups.⁴ According to MCP, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland are among the least multicultural countries, while Australia, Canada, and Sweden rank as having adopted the broadest range of multicultural policies.

Surprisingly, given political rhetoric and academic claims of popular and political backlash against multiculturalism, we find evidence of an expansion in multicultural policies. Policies of cultural pluralism expanded in 12 countries from 2000 to 2010, remained stable in nine, and decreased in only three nations: Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; see also Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Bloemraad and Wright 2014). Among the three countries that retreated from multiculturalism, only the Dutch case is dramatic; Denmark and Italy had few multicultural policies to begin with. Thus, while the Dutch case has become a touchstone for a narrative of backlash, it does not represent the general trend. Analysis of policy indicates resilience or even expansion of multiculturalism over time, even as the word multiculturalism has fallen out of favor.

Understood as policy and public discourse, multiculturalism appears to favor immigrants’ acquisition of citizenship status. The empirical evidence suggests a strong correlation between the adoption of more multiculturalism policies and higher levels of citizenship among immigrants. Estimates by Liebig and Von Haaren (2010:27–8) indicate that 89 percent of working age immigrants living in Canada for at least 10 years had adopted Canadian citizenship by 2007, a larger share than among any other country studied. The top three countries in naturalization—Canada, Sweden (82 percent) and Australia (81 percent)—are also the three countries with the highest MCP scores. Conversely, countries with low MCP scores, such as Switzerland and Germany, have among the lowest levels of citizenship acquisition, 35 percent and 37 percent respectively. Indeed, there exists a very strong correlation of 0.70 ($p < 0.01$) between MCP and citizenship level in 2010 at the country level (Bloemraad and Wright 2014:S309). This might reflect lower barriers to citizenship status among countries that embrace multiculturalism, as well as more support and encouragement for immigrants to acquire citizenship.

There is also some weaker evidence tying multiculturalism to political participation, the fourth facet of citizenship. Data on public claims-making suggest that immigrant-origin minorities who live in countries with more multicultural policies are more likely to engage in nonviolent political activities than those in more monocultural societies, and that activism in the former is directed more at the country of residence rather than the homeland (Koopmans et al. 2005:128, 137). Using an alternative measure of political participation, one that summarizes six political activities ranging

from contacting a public official to signing a petition, Wright and Bloemraad find no statistically significant relationship, positive or negative, between multicultural policy context and political behaviors for first- or second-generation residents of immigrant origins in Europe (2012:87; see also Bloemraad and Wright 2014). Analysis of trust in and attachment to political institutions—important given worries that immigrants bring illiberal, undemocratic values that they are unlikely to shed in a context of multiculturalism—also shows no statistically significant relationship between multicultural policies and trust or attachment in Europe (Bloemraad and Wright 2014). In North America, we find substantially higher political trust in more multicultural Canada than in the United States among first-generation immigrants, a distinction that strengthens with socioeconomic controls (Wright and Bloemraad 2012:85). Examining the North American-born second generation, there is decline in reported trust among the second generation in Canada, bringing attitudes much closer to the third and later generations in that country, while the cross-national difference with the United States disappears in the second generation (Bloemraad and Wright 2014). In sum, whether one considers political participation or political trust, there is no evidence of a negative effect from multicultural policies and some evidence for a positive effect, but only in the first generation. For the second generation, the pattern is one of integration to the majority's level of political trust or engagement, irrespective of multiculturalism. An open question is whether multicultural policies increase all residents' trust and attachment, irrespective of origins, since measures of political and general social trust tend to be somewhat higher in more multicultural countries. This would be a useful avenue for future sociological work.

In considering multiculturalism as policy and public discourse, it is worth underscoring that the history of multicultural policy evolution did not arise from the preference of majority voters or extensive lobbying by immigrant-origin groups. Rather, among early adopters—Canada (1971), Australia (1973), and Sweden (1975)—multicultural discourse and policy were often elite-driven by domestic actors, such as politicians, civil servants, academics, and key civil society leaders, including some from (often European-origin) ethnic communities.⁵ Usually—but not always—promoted by center-left or social democratic political actors, multicultural policy and discourse was favored as a pluralistic integration strategy that negated prior assimilation or racial purity orientations.⁶ In Canada, the Prime Minister outlined the government's new policy of multiculturalism in a speech to the House of Commons in 1971. The speech challenged the country's traditional English–French duality and claimed that “there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other” and it argued for minorities’ “full participation” in Canadian society. In Australia, a multicultural society was part of a model of immigrant settlement centered on equal opportunity and a “voluntary bond” of unity (Koleth 2010). In Sweden, multicultural policies sought to eliminate socioeconomic inequality and reject the pre-war focus on the “purity” of the Swedish population. As a result, Swedish immigrant and minority policy in 1975 initiated a special “freedom of culture objective” to help immigrants and their children retain their language and culture (Borevi 2013b:149). Each story of

policy adoption also has important country-specific elements, related to indigenous peoples, fears of separatism, and development of the welfare state. Once initiated, subsequent pressure by immigrant-origin communities pushed policy evolution, for example, in directing greater attention to anti-racism initiatives as migration shifted to non-European countries. Multicultural policy and discourse subsequently spread to other liberal democracies.

But if the origins of multicultural policy—and citizenship law—did not arise primarily from minorities' political activism, there is evidence that in the 21st century, those of immigrant origins stand a much better chance of advancing projects of full citizenship and equality when they use political voice. The legitimacy and power of such a voice is arguably stronger when they also hold citizenship.

MOVING FORWARD: TAKING PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP SERIOUSLY

I have outlined theoretical and empirical links between multiculturalism and citizenship. But does citizenship really matter? Both history and current sociological research show that citizenship is no panacea that erases inequality and ensures inclusion. Yet the reality of inequality does not mean that the inverse proposition—namely, that citizenship does not matter—logically follows. The reason for this lies, in part, with citizenship as political participation, an area sociologists have not studied or theorized sufficiently.

In his authoritative analysis of citizenship and immigration, Christian Joppke identifies only three facets of citizenship—status, rights and identity—excluding the notion of political participation. As he acknowledges, this omission appears paradoxical, given a definition of citizenship as membership in a political community. Yet he argues that contemporary citizenship is more about passive rights-holding than “the Athenian citizenship of active participation in the political community” (2010:146). Echoing legal theorist Peter Spiro, Joppke suggests that immigrants' concerns are “more mundane and belly-centered” than focused on “loftier goals of political participation” (2010:146–47). We are back to assertions by legislative pragmatists that immigration reform in the United States can entail legalization without citizenship.

Yet without political voice—whether through the right to vote, which is often tied to citizenship status, or through the legitimacy of making claims from a position of citizenship—immigrant-origin minorities face a hard time defending against legislative attacks or advancing projects to enhance equity. Political decisions about citizenship status, rights, and participation (or about multicultural policy and discourse) were not necessarily linked to immigrants' political activism in the past, but this is less true in the contemporary period. Many scholars argue that the foundation stones of citizenship regimes were crafted during state-building and constructions of national identity in the 19th century (Brubaker 1992) or in response to the demands of settlement or colonial empires (or lack thereof) (Janoski 2010). However, starting in the 1990s, citizenship laws and policies have changed more rapidly as a result of jockeying between political parties of the right and left that articulate different ideologies of inclusion

(Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Goodman 2014). An analysis of the extension of rights to immigrants across 10 European countries from 1980 to 2008 found that one of the best predictors of rights expansion was growth in the immigrant electorate (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). As citizenship, immigration policy, and multiculturalism become more politicized, having and using political voice becomes much more important.

Those who lack citizenship, and even legal status, can engage in the participatory dimension of citizenship and, in doing so, make claims of membership through citizenship acts. In 2006, millions of immigrants and their allies participated in marches and boycotts in the United States to defeat H.R. 4437, a bill passed by the House of Representatives that would have increased funding for border control and made undocumented status a crime (Bloemraad, Voss, and Lee 2011). It was an impressive political mobilization and victory in the short term. In the long term, however, deportations rose in the waning days of the Bush presidency, and increased further under the Obama administration, while the goal of comprehensive immigration reform and legalization remain elusive. Critically, legislation for legalization—or other laws related to immigration and citizenship—must pass the U.S. Congress. Despite citizenship-like acts by noncitizens, elected officials and would-be politicians have few incentives to respond to noncitizens, given the latter's lack of a vote in the United States. Less than half of foreign-born residents hold citizenship in the United States, about 46 percent, according to 2013 estimates from the Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2014).⁷

The Canadian case offers a counterpoint. Inclusive citizenship and multicultural policies have had stronger “lock-in” effects, due in part to the high proportion of naturalized immigrants. In the late 1980s, the populist Reform Party advocated eliminating multiculturalism and restricting non-European migration. Echoing the political discourse of 40 years before, and of some far-right parties in contemporary Europe, the Canadian Reform Party contended that immigration policy should not “be explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada” (Bloemraad 2012:13). By 2011, however, key activists from the old Reform Party, now part of a new right-of-center Conservative Party, reached out to immigrant-origin Canadians, including those termed “visible minorities” (or non-white) in order to win the federal election. Indeed, of all the members of Parliament elected to office that year, more than 1 in 10 were foreign born. Arguably such a high degree of political integration comes from Canada's successful mix of multicultural citizenship. It remains to be seen whether this combination can also be created in other immigrant-receiving countries; the research reviewed here suggests that this is the case in some nations. It is now up to sociologists to further advance our knowledge by more seriously theorizing and studying citizenship within a context of diversity.

NOTES

¹This public sphere was, however, restricted to men, with participatory citizenship excluding women, those without property, slaves, and newcomers to Athens (Pocock 1995).

- ²Kymlicka's liberalism also requires that groups not constrain individual members' actions, including the right to exit the group or alter group practices.
- ³The second generation—the North American-born children of immigrants—in both countries report more identification with the nation than the foreign-born first generation (Bloemraad and Wright 2014:S306).
- ⁴MCP is highly correlated with another cultural pluralism index constructed by Koopmans and colleagues (2012). For further details on scoring the MCP index, see <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant.html>, last retrieved 4 October 2014.
- ⁵On Canada, see Triadafilopoulos (2012) and Winter (2011), on Australia, see Lopez (2000) and Kolet (2010), and on Sweden, see Borevi (2013a, 2013b).
- ⁶For evidence that right-of-center parties also supported multiculturalism, see Borevi (2013a), who writes that initial support for Swedish diversity policies in the 1960s came from the Conservatives. In Canada, expansion of multiculturalism in the 1980s was undertaken by the right-of-center Conservatives (Winter 2011; Triadafilopoulos 2012).
- ⁷Naturalization in the United States is low in part due to the large undocumented population, a group with no access to citizenship. Based on calculations using Department of Homeland Security figures (Rytina 2013), 58 percent of immigrants with permanent legal status and at least 5 years of residence in the United States (the minimum requirement for naturalization) had acquired U.S. citizenship in 2012. This still falls 20–25 percentage points short of levels in Canada. I have argued elsewhere that the gap is in part due to the lack of federal integration and multicultural policies in United States as compared to those in Canada (Bloemraad 2006b).

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