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Source: *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 535-570

Published by: Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2547393>

Accessed: 29-09-2017 20:20 UTC

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Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration¹

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This article aims to contribute to an understanding of contemporary American attitudes toward immigration. It extends work by Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) who analyzed data from a southern California survey in June 1983 about the impacts of undocumented migrants and illegal immigration. There has not been a follow-up study that evaluates more recent evidence to see how residents throughout the United States feel about overall levels of immigration (legal and undocumented). The paper uses data from a CBS News/*New York Times* poll conducted in June 1993. Respondents were asked whether they would like to see the level of immigration to the United States increased, decreased or kept the same. We test several hypotheses about factors influencing respondents' attitudes, including the importance of previously unexamined predictors. These new hypotheses relate to views about the health of the U.S. economy, feelings of social and political alienation, and isolationist sentiments concerning international economic issues and foreign relations. One important discovery is the close connection between possessing restrictionist immigration attitudes and having an isolationist perspective along a broader array of international issues.

California's Proposition 187 registered more than seven on the Richter scale of public opinion toward illegal immigration and radiated tremors that were felt throughout the rest of the United States and as far south as Mexico City. Passed by a 3–2 margin, Proposition 187 denies public K–12 and postsecondary education to undocumented immigrant school children and cuts off publicly funded non-emergency medical care, welfare benefits, and other social

¹Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Los Angeles, CA, August 5–9, 1995, and in seminars at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Population Division of the United Nations, and the Office of Population Research at Princeton University. We are grateful to these seminar participants, and to Michael Dark, Cynthia Harper, Miles Kahler, Franklin Wilson, the Editor of *IMR*, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Conversations with Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio led us to useful references. We also thank Maryann Belanger, Melanie Adams, Lynne Johnson, and Amy Worlton for capable technical assistance. Partial support for this research has been provided by a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and by NRSA Training Grant No. HD-071-63 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.

services to illegal migrants (State and Local Coalition on Immigration, 1994).² Aftershocks are still being recorded as more than a dozen other states are contemplating introducing similar measures (Sherwood, 1994; Ayres, 1994). Proposition 187 is but the latest episode in a resurgence of anti-immigrant sentiment that began in the United States in the 1970s. Public opinion data show that roughly two-thirds of Americans surveyed in the early 1980s thought that levels of immigration to the United States should be lowered, compared with fewer than 40 percent of respondents who expressed these views prior to 1970 (Simon and Alexander, 1993).

In light of the evidence that American attitudes toward immigration are hardening, it is surprising how little empirical work has been done to examine the bases of these attitudes. This gap is all the more remarkable because there exists a large literature on attitudes toward immigration that has yielded a number of testable hypotheses. The fact that these hypotheses are dispersed across different disciplines and have not been gathered in one place or tested on the same body of data is partly responsible for the failure to inspect immigration attitudes more carefully. In addition, existing hypotheses have not been examined using adequate statistical methodologies. What we generally have instead are media analyses that rest on marginal distributions of attitudes or cross-tabulations of the data. Our understanding of the demographic, socioeconomic and other attitudinal dimensions of public opinion toward U.S. immigration is limited as a consequence.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a systematic examination of factors associated with contemporary American attitudes toward immigration. It extends work by Espenshade and Calhoun (1993), who analyzed southern California respondents' views in June of 1983 about the impacts of undocumented migrants and illegal immigration. There has not been a follow-up study that looks at more recent evidence to see how residents throughout the United States feel about overall levels of immigration (both legal and undocumented). This paper uses data from a CBS News/*New York Times* poll conducted in June 1993 that asked respondents whether they would like to see the level of immigration to the United States increased, decreased, or kept the same. We test several hypotheses about factors influencing respondents' attitudes, including the importance of predictors that have not been previously examined. These new hypotheses relate to respondents' views about the health of the U.S. economy, their feelings of social and political alienation, and isolationist sentiments they may harbor concerning international economic issues and foreign relations. The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of related research, including recent trends in American attitudes toward U.S.

²In November 1995 a federal judge ruled large sections of Proposition 187 unconstitutional, citing individual rights and the fact that "the state is powerless to enact its own scheme to regulate immigration" (Ayers, 1995).

immigration. Next we discuss the hypotheses that guide our analysis. Then we describe the data and statistical procedures used to test the hypotheses. We conclude by presenting the empirical results and discussing their significance.

BACKGROUND

The current wave of restrictionist attitudes has deep roots in U.S. history.³ Although the United States is frequently referred to as “a nation of immigrants,” there have been persistent attempts by former immigrants to keep out newcomers ever since the founding of the new colonies. In “The Crux of the Immigration Question,” an article that appeared in the *North American Review* in 1914, Piatt Andrew commented, “Immigrants who came earlier and their descendants have always tried to keep this country for those who were already here and for their kin folk” (*quoted in* Simon, 1985:73). This “drawbridge” mentality typified the attitudes of New England Puritans and pilgrims toward Quakers, Episcopalians, and Catholics. The English exhibited similar sentiments toward the Irish and Germans, while the latter felt the same way about Italians, Jews, and Russians (Simon, 1985).

Restrictive immigration policies were first introduced in the decades following 1870, when negative beliefs about immigrants acquired prominence (Simon, 1985). An increase in immigration, especially by “new” immigrant groups from southern and eastern Europe, and an economic recession in the early 1880s combined to fuel disapproving attitudes toward immigrants. So, too, did the growing popularity of theories promoting Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. The discovery of gold in California in the late 1840s created an extensive demand for low-wage labor that was filled initially by Chinese male immigrants who first worked in the mines, later helped complete the Central Pacific railroad, and then moved into agriculture when railroad work disappeared. But a newly formed labor union led by Irish workers managed to convince Congress that Chinese immigrants were taking jobs away from native-born whites. The Chinese Exclusion Act, passed in 1882, had the effect of stopping almost all further Chinese immigration by the late 1880s. Japanese replaced Chinese immigrants in California agriculture, but their demands for higher wages coupled with a willingness to strike to enforce their demands eventually led to pressures to limit Japanese immigration. The 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan effectively terminated a flow that was not revived for fifty years (Muller and Espenshade, 1985; Bean, Vernez and Keely, 1989).

An organized restrictionist movement was well under way by 1890. Henry Cabot Lodge became a leader of anti-immigration forces in the U.S. Senate, and the Immigration Restriction League was formed in Boston in 1894 for the

³Portions of this section draw on material in Espenshade and Calhoun (1992).


purpose of limiting the number of foreigners who could come into the United States (Kaufman, 1982). An article by Kenneth Roberts in the *Saturday Evening Post* in 1920 was perhaps stereotypical of the prevailing anti-immigrant mood: "If the United States is the melting pot, something is wrong with the heating system, for an inconveniently large portion of the new immigration floats around in unsightly indigestible lumps" (*quoted in* Simon, 1985:83). The first quantitative restrictions on U.S. immigration were passed during the 1920s with the effect of imposing national-origin quotas that favored migrants from northern and western Europe.

The American public adopted a more liberal outlook on international migration following World War II, as evidenced by smaller proportions of survey respondents who felt that U.S. immigration should be reduced from current levels (Morris, 1985; Simon, 1985). This more tolerant attitude lasted throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s and was reflected in the 1965 amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act that eliminated a system of allocating immigrant visas on the basis of country of origin and substituted one largely dependent on principles of family reunification. Several factors spurred a relaxation of restrictionist pressures, including a growing acceptance of America's newfound role as a world superpower which entailed a responsibility to accept more refugees, an expanding postwar economy, and reduced religious and racial prejudice especially among the better-educated segments of the population (Harwood, 1986).

But this liberalization of public opinion did not last long, and a wave of "neorestrictionist" sentiment emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Two-thirds of respondents to an NBC survey in 1981 and to a Roper poll in 1982 said they wanted to reduce levels of legal immigration, a proportion twice as large as that detected in a 1965 Gallup survey (Harwood, 1986). More than three-fourths of the general public surveyed in a 1990 Roper poll believed that U.S. immigration should not be increased, and nearly one-half felt that the level should be lowered (*see* Kane *et al.*, 1984; Pear, 1986b; U.S. News and World Report, 1986; Day, 1990). Polls in high-profile immigration states are consistent with national trends. In a 1989 Texas poll of registered voters, three out of every five respondents felt that the United States was admitting too many legal immigrants, whereas only one in twenty considered the number too low. More than three-fourths of those polled favored an overall cap on legal immigration (Tarrance and Associates, 1989b). In a related survey of registered California voters taken the same year, one-half believed that too many legal immigrants are allowed to enter the United States. More than two-thirds of the sample supported an annual ceiling on legal immigration (Tarrance and Associates, 1989a).

Recent trends in immigration attitudes are graphed in Figure 1. The darker line corresponds to the fraction of survey respondents in a series of nationwide

Figure 1. Percent of American Public Who Want Immigration Decreased and Trend in U.S. Unemployment Rate



^aSource: 1946–1990, Simon and Alexander (1993); 1993, author's calculations from *New York Times*/CBS News Poll.

^bSource: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, various issues; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part I*. Washington, D.C.

polls who feel that levels of U.S. immigration should be reduced. The trend line is relatively flat until 1965 when it turns sharply upward. The annual U.S. unemployment rate is also shown in Figure 1. Apart from a few years surrounding 1960 when public opinion data are missing, the two series are highly correlated. Similar patterns in Canadian data have been noted by Palmer (1994). Using macrodata for the United States, Berry and Tischler (1978) showed that the intensity of feelings toward immigrants is closely linked to economic conditions and suggested that racial prejudice is stimulated in economic recessions. Palmer (1994) concluded that opposition to immigration rises and falls with the unemployment rate, whereas measures of ethnic intolerance exhibit a secular decline that is relatively insulated from economic conditions. Tienharä's (1974) analysis of Gallup poll data also showed that Canadians' opposition to immigration rises during periods of economic recession.

Concerns with the condition of the macroeconomy and growing anxieties over economic insecurity have been given as reasons for the rise in neorestrictionism in the United States (Espenshade, 1996). Individuals who fear job competition from immigrants tend to be those employed in low-skill low-wage occupations. But there is a broader segment of the population that is concerned about the possible negative implications of large-scale immigration for macroeconomic performance (Moehring, 1988). Half of those questioned in a 1986 national poll identified economic issues as "the biggest problem" immigrants

have caused. Typical of the kinds of problems mentioned are strains on jobs, resources, and housing; immigrants on welfare; and cheap labor (Day, 1990). The most common adjectives used to describe migrants are "poor" and "welfare-dependent" (Pear, 1986a). Levy (1987), Minarik (1988), and Williams (1988) have documented the stagnation in personal incomes and asset growth since 1973. This new era of diminished expectations may ultimately have lasting significance in shaping people's attitudes toward new immigrants (Harwood, 1986).

Anxieties over immigrants' cultural impacts may also help to account for the rise in neorestrictionism. One-third of respondents to a 1986 opinion survey cited negative cultural or personal traits of immigrants as "the biggest problem" associated with immigration. Three out of five persons noted negative characteristics about Latin American immigrants, and nearly half had negative views of Asian immigrants. Specific problems mentioned included crime, drugs, disease, unwillingness to assimilate or learn English, lack of education, ideological tensions, too many immigrants, and immigrants spoiling neighborhoods (Day, 1990).

Worries related to an increase in undocumented immigration have also been offered as an explanation for the rise in neorestrictionist tendencies. As Passel (1986:181) has observed, "One important characteristic that distinguishes contemporary immigration from previous waves of immigration is the presence of significant numbers of undocumented, or illegal, immigrants." After declining between the 1950s and 1960s, the number of undocumented aliens apprehended in the United States rose from 1.6 million in the decade from 1961–1970 to 11.9 million twenty years later (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994). A wide variety of problems is often blamed on illegal immigrants. Politicians are anxious that undocumented migrants will jeopardize mainstream American values by perpetuating their own "private cultures," and the general public worries that a new wave of illegal immigration will lead to more crime in the streets (Cornelius, 1982). Numerous economic ills have been attributed to undocumented workers, including the suspicion that they take jobs from Americans and depress wages (Harwood, 1983), contribute to higher unemployment (Reimers, 1985), and impose a fiscal burden on other taxpayers (Clark *et al.*, 1994). (See also Day, 1990; Keely, 1991; Bouvier and Gardner, 1986.)

The reasons that have been given for the rise in neorestrictionism – growing economic insecurity, concerns with migrants' undesirable cultural traits, and an increase in illegal immigration – represent interesting but untested hypotheses. The parallels between the proportion of Americans who say they would like immigration levels reduced and the unemployment rate suggest that economic conditions can account for much of the growing resistance to the status quo. But the rising volume of illegal immigration would track immigra-

tion attitudes almost as well. There are two approaches to understanding the trends in attitudes shown in Figure 1. A macro perspective that focuses on aggregate survey responses and correlates these with other aggregate indicators such as fluctuations in annual unemployment rates is one. The disadvantage of this macro approach, however, is that it overlooks the individual-level determinants of immigration attitudes, how respondents' characteristics are linked to these attitudes, and how changes in respondents' traits and the importance of these traits for immigration attitudes are related to the climate of neorestrictionism.

An alternative strategy is to make use of information on the opinions and characteristics of individual respondents. Surprisingly little work has been done on the microlevel determinants of Americans' attitudes toward U.S. immigration. Day's (1989, 1990) analysis is based on California data and on national samples of Hispanic or native-born respondents. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) focus on southern Californians' attitudes toward undocumented migrants. Hoskin and Mishler (1983) use data from a Gallup survey conducted in the spring of 1980 to assess the role of respondents' party affiliation, social class, age, and region of the country on their attitudes toward immigrants. Finally, Simon and Alexander (1993) review how the U.S. print media handled the issue of immigration between 1880 and 1990. Their work is largely a content analysis of magazines and newspaper editorials. No hypotheses are tested, and there is no new examination of any of the major public opinion polls on immigration. In short, we are still at the earliest stages of being able to account satisfactorily for the waning tolerance toward U.S. immigration.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section describes the hypotheses that guide our analysis. Some pertain to ways that respondents' characteristics are expected to be related to attitudes toward immigration. Others concern the importance of specific attitudes respondents may hold, either about immigrant impacts or about issues that at first glance may not appear to be closely tied to immigration.

Labor Market Competition

Some of the more frequent complaints about immigrants are that they take jobs away from native workers, contribute to higher unemployment, and reduce the wages and working conditions in selected occupations. Job holders at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are assumed to be most susceptible to these forms of labor market competition, because low-skill and low-wage native workers have occupational characteristics similar to those of today's new immigrants (Simon, 1987; Abowd and Freeman, 1991; Borjas and Freeman,

1992). Some researchers have found that education, income, and occupational prestige are positively correlated with receptivity to immigration (Hoskin and Mishler, 1983; Simon, 1985, 1987; Starr and Roberts, 1982; Day, 1989, 1990; Schissel, Wanner and Frideres, 1989). According to the labor market competition hypothesis, we expect respondents' income and education to be related to more tolerant attitudes toward immigration.

Cultural Affinity

Prior to 1950, most U.S. immigrants came from Europe, but the 1965 Amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act did away with country quotas and opened the way for more migrants from outside Europe. In the 1980s, five out of six U.S. immigrants were Latin American or Asian, and just ten percent were European (Bouvier and Gardner, 1986). Respondents who have close cultural and ethnic ties to their home countries and who have relatives whom they would like to bring to the United States are likely to support more open immigration policies (Day, 1989, 1990). Hispanics, for example, have been found to display more pro-immigrant views than non-Hispanics (Cain and Kiewiet, 1986; Miller, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1984; Harwood, 1983, 1985; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). According to the cultural affinity hypothesis, we expect Hispanic and Asian survey respondents to be less restrictive than non-Hispanic whites in their attitudes toward U.S. immigration policy. An alternative view has been proposed by de la Garza (1985) and de la Garza, Falcon and Garcia (1993) who argue that feelings of cultural affinity for Mexican immigrants are not particularly strong among Mexican Americans and that whatever differences exist between Latinos and Anglos are a function of ethnic differences related to where these individuals are located in American society and are not dependent on national origin.

Generalized Cost-Benefit Considerations

Our first two hypotheses postulate relationships between a respondent's demographic and other background characteristics and their views toward immigration. But opinion research has demonstrated that specific attitudes respondents hold can be determinants of broader views (Kinder and Sears, 1985; Citrin and Green, 1990). This suggests that respondents might prefer lower levels of immigration if they feel that immigrants take jobs away from native workers, that immigrants are more likely than natives to end up on welfare, or that most recent U.S. migrants are in the country illegally. In this sense, labor market competition may be viewed as a component of cost-benefit calculations, though the latter relate to a much broader set of material concerns. Conversely, respondents who feel that immigrants are likely to have favorable

economic or social repercussions are likely to be more supportive of liberal immigration policies.

Health of the Economy

The final three hypotheses have not been examined before and are being tested here for the first time. Many immigrants join the labor force when they come to the United States. The impact of this labor force growth is likely to be perceived as less burdensome when the U.S. economy is expanding, when jobs are plentiful, and when the prospects for continued economic growth are bright. We therefore expect that respondents who have the most optimistic assessments of the current and future state of the U.S. economy will also be the most receptive to current or even higher levels of immigration.

Social and Political Alienation

People who find that things are not going well in their lives often want to blame someone or something for their problems. Individuals who feel alienated from mainstream American social and political institutions may be least likely to want more immigrants. Such persons may be more likely to support Ross Perot (or Patrick Buchanan) as the champion of the disaffected voter. For others, whom Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has termed "the anxious class," their alienation may have an economic motivation, especially as they confront growing economic insecurity about their jobs and incomes arising from increasing international economic competitiveness. Many such individuals may seek to place the responsibility for their problems elsewhere, and increasingly the tendency is to blame politicians, the poor, and immigrants (Uchitelle, 1994).

Isolationism

The final hypothesis concerns the effects on immigration attitudes of an isolationist mentality versus a more global perspective. We suggest that people who see the world as an interconnected whole are likely to be more open-minded when it comes to evaluating international flows of goods, services, and capital. These same individuals are also more likely to appreciate the contributions that international labor flows make to the world economy. On the other hand, we hypothesize that persons who harbor protectionist sentiments, who feel that the United States has no responsibility to help other countries, and who insist on an "America first" posture are also the ones most likely to oppose higher levels of immigration (Espenshade, 1996). An isolationist mentality is capable of operating in many spheres, but the two that concern us here have to do with international economic affairs and with foreign relations.

DATA AND METHODS

Data to test these hypotheses come from a U.S. public opinion survey conducted by CBS News, *The New York Times*, and the Tokyo Broadcasting System in June 1993. CBS News and *The New York Times* have jointly been conducting national polls for at least twenty years, and they have asked similar questions about immigration attitudes for the past ten years. The sample universe comprises all adults aged eighteen and over (regardless of citizenship status) in households with a telephone. Households were contacted through random-digit-dialing procedures and a random adult in the household was selected for a telephone interview conducted in English during a four-day period. The response rate was between 65 and 70 percent of known households (Kagay, 1996).

The resulting sample consists of 1,363 adults who were asked a series of questions about the kind of job that President Clinton is doing, the condition of the U.S. economy, attitudes toward Japanese and other foreigners, opinions about immigrants, and respondents' demographic and socioeconomic background characteristics. Because it has been asked in numerous public opinion polls, and because it is the most policy-relevant of all the immigration items in the survey, we chose the following question to gauge American sentiment toward contemporary levels of U.S. immigration: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" After deleting observations where the respondent refused to answer the question or said they did not have an opinion, we were left with 1,262 cases for analysis. Weighted observations were used in the regression analysis. Weights were constructed to match the sample with the geographic region, race, sex, age, and educational characteristics of the adult U.S. population as reflected in data from the U.S. Census Bureau's monthly Current Population Survey.⁴

Some descriptive statistics about the data are shown in Table 1. Nearly two-thirds of survey respondents who had an opinion thought the level of U.S. immigration should be lowered.⁵ Roughly 30 percent of the sample felt that current immigration levels were satisfactory, and only 6 percent thought that immigration should be increased. To anticipate some of our later findings, we also show distributions for the four explanatory variables that are the most

⁴Because interviews were conducted in English, foreign-born individuals whose native tongue is not English and who migrated to the United States within a few years of the survey are likely to be somewhat underrepresented (Espenshade and Fu, n.d.). We know from other poll results that persons born outside the United States are likely to have more favorable attitudes toward immigrants and the volume of U.S. immigration than native-born individuals (Espenshade, 1995a).

⁵This corresponds to the last data point in Figure 1. To be consistent with earlier opinion surveys, the data point for 1993 is based on the proportion of all 1,363 survey participants who believed that immigration levels should be reduced.

influential predictors of immigrant attitudes. The regional breakdown of the total sample mirrors the distribution of the entire population. Conservatives outnumber liberals by nearly two to one, with moderates comprising the largest group in terms of political identification. Roughly one-third of survey participants believe that immigrants take jobs away from native workers, whereas more than half say that immigrants take jobs that Americans do not want. Half of those polled feel that immigrants cause problems for the United States, nearly one-third believe that immigrants contribute to this country, and seven percent volunteered the response that immigrants both contribute and cause problems.

The models we will be estimating are shown in Figure 2. The dependent variable is the response to the question about the desired level of U.S. immigration. We assume that these responses are influenced by survey participants' background characteristics and by how they feel about other issues, including the health of the U.S. economy, their sense of personal alienation, how isolationist their views are on economic and foreign policy matters, and the perceived consequences of immigration.

Because the dependent variable is measured on an ordinal scale, it would be inappropriate to apply least-squares linear regression methods to estimate the effects of the predictor variables. Investing the integers used to code the ordinal responses with either an interval or ratio-scale interpretation and then proceeding to fit a linear model to the data introduces a bias into the parameter estimates that can severely underestimate the relative impact of individual predictors (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975). Instead we use ordered-probit regression methods. Responses to the question about the desired level of immigration are coded 0 (decreased), 1 (kept the same), and 2 (increased). Positive (negative) regression coefficients mean that respondents with this characteristic are expected to prefer more (less) immigration than the reference group.⁶

RESULTS


We fit a total of seven models to the data. The first six use subgroups of the predictor variables to test the gross effects of respondents' 1) demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, 2) views about the health of the U.S. economy, 3) feelings of alienation, 4) isolationist outlooks as they pertain to international

⁶An ordered-probit model accounts for the relative ranking of responses without necessarily attaching any meaning to the absolute magnitudes of differences between numerical scores assigned to each response category. Ordered-probit techniques are an extension of the binary probit model and are generally superior to linear regression whenever the response data are measures on a discrete ordinal variable having more than two rank-ordered categories. The parameter estimates represent the impact of a one-unit change in each predictor variable on the mean of an underlying continuous latent standard-normal random variable representing an index for attitudes regarding U.S. Immigration. Threshold parameters, given by $0 < \delta_1 < \delta_2 < \dots$, are the values on an underlying attitude scale at which the observed responses change from one category to the next higher or lower category.

TABLE 1
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION BY RESPONSE VARIABLE AND FOUR PREDICTORS

| Category | Frequency | Percent |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Level of Immigration | | |
| Decreased | 814 | 64.5 |
| Kept the same | 368 | 29.2 |
| Increased | 80 | 6.3 |
| Region | | |
| New England | 90 | 7.1 |
| Middle Atlantic | 193 | 15.3 |
| Midwest | 312 | 24.7 |
| South | 417 | 33.0 |
| West | 250 | 19.8 |
| Politics | | |
| Liberal | 233 | 18.5 |
| Moderate | 584 | 46.3 |
| Conservative | 402 | 31.8 |
| Don't know/NA | 43 | 3.4 |
| Take American Jobs | | |
| Yes | 433 | 34.3 |
| No | 738 | 58.5 |
| Don't know/NA | 91 | 7.2 |
| Impact on U.S. | | |
| Contribute | 402 | 31.8 |
| Cause problems | 622 | 49.3 |
| Both | 91 | 7.2 |
| Other | 147 | 11.7 |
| Total | | |
| All | 1,262 | 100.0 |

Figure 2. Conceptual Framework for a Model of Determinants of Public Opinion about Desired Level of U.S. Immigration




economic matters, 5) isolationist sentiments related to foreign policy, and 6) perceptions of immigrant impacts. All of the predictor variables are then combined in a seventh and final model to examine the net influence of each hypothesized effect. Detailed regression results along with goodness-of-fit statistics are shown in Appendix Tables A1 through A8. To simplify the presentation, we have highlighted the main findings in a set of text figures (Figures 3–7). The figures correspond to the principal hypotheses, and each one displays two regression coefficients for each explanatory variable—the gross effect taken directly from Appendix Tables A1–A6 and the net effect from Appendix Table A8.

The role of demographic and background characteristics is shown in Figure 3. Education and income are expected by the labor market competition hypothesis to be positively associated with desired levels of immigration. The education effects are generally in the hypothesized direction, although not all are significant. Respondents with some college have more negative views than college graduates—the reference category for education, and the same is true for high school graduates for whom the negative gross effect is statistically significant. The anomalous group are respondents who failed to complete high school. Their views toward the desired level of immigration are more positive than those of college graduates, when controlling for all other covariates. Respondents whose annual family incomes are above \$15,000 generally express a preference for higher immigration levels than the poorest respondents who comprise the reference group. The negative net effect for the highest income group is unexpected, but it is not statistically significant.

In comparison to non-Hispanic whites (the omitted category for ethnic contrasts in Figure 3), Hispanic, black and Asian respondents are more likely to express pro-immigration views. Both the gross and net effects are significant for blacks, whereas neither is significant for Hispanics. Asians fall in between.⁷ These results lend partial support to the cultural affinity hypothesis, but with respect to Hispanic attitudes they conform to results in de la Garza (1985) and de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia (1993). The CBS News/*New York Times* poll did not ask Hispanic respondents to which national origin group they belonged, nor were questions asked about citizenship or place of birth. Yet recent research has shown that a monolithic or homogeneous “Hispanic community” does not exist. Many people prefer to identify instead in national origin terms such as Mexican American, Puerto Rican or Cuban. In the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), more respondents preferred to be called “American” than “Latino” (de la Garza *et al.*, 1992).

⁷The ethnic/racial composition of the 1,262 respondents is as follows: Hispanic ($N=56$), non-Hispanic white (1,064), non-Hispanic black (115), Asian (22), and not reported (5). After weighting, these groups comprised the following percentages of the total sample: Hispanics (5.6), non-Hispanic white (79.5), non-Hispanic black (12.8), Asian (1.7), and other not reported (0.3).

Figure 3. Gross and Net Effects of Respondents' Demographic and Socioeconomic Background Characteristics on Desired Level of U.S. Immigration^a



**p<0.01 *p<0.05

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

Moreover, immigration attitudes differ by national origin group, citizenship status, and region of the country. Data from the LNPS show that clear majorities of Puerto Rican and Cuban respondents disagreed with the statement that preference should be given to immigrants from Latin America in U.S. immigration law, whereas Mexican Americans were more evenly split. On the other hand, the likelihood of agreeing with the proposition was significantly higher for noncitizens than for citizens. More than 70 percent of each of the Latino-origin groups, but especially Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, agreed that there are too many immigrants coming to the United States. Noncitizens were more likely to support the statement than citizens (de la Garza *et al.*, 1992; de la Garza *et al.*, 1993). In a recent study of Latinos in New York, Florida, Texas and California, there were large differences in Latino national origin immigration attitudes across states. Mexican Americans in Texas are similar to Cubans, but in California, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are more similar (de la Garza, 1996).

In Figure 3, the fact that blacks are significantly more positive about immigration than whites is also of interest. This finding runs counter to other results (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993) and to the general perception that African Americans are one subgroup of the population that is likely to be apprehensive about higher immigration (Muller and Espenshade, 1985). It may be that the positive attitudes of blacks reflect a low concern about job


competition and perhaps a new affinity based on socioeconomic status. At the same time, blacks may have developed a new cultural affinity for black immigrants while attempting to reclaim their own African heritage.

Other noteworthy findings in Figure 3 pertain to political identification and to regional effects. Moderates are significantly less tolerant toward immigration than liberals, and conservatives have the most negative views. It is interesting that Republicans express more restrictive views than Democrats or Independents, even after political identification is controlled, but the effect is not significant. These results contradict findings by Day (1990:5), who concluded that immigration "is not an issue that divides people easily along partisan or ideological lines." Location of residence has a strong effect on immigration attitudes. Rural respondents express significantly more negative views than suburban or city dwellers, and survey participants from the northeastern part of the United States – especially from New England – have significantly more positive outlooks on immigration than residents in the other three census regions among whom there is no variation in attitudes on immigration. The reason for more tolerant attitudes among residents in the eastern United States could be that this part of the country has had a longer experience with immigrants than any other region.

Finally, our results indicate no consistent pattern with respect to respondents' ages. Participants aged 18–24 and 45–54 express more tolerance for immigration than other respondents among whom there is no age variation. These findings parallel those by Hoskin and Mishler (1983), who also discovered no clear relation with age in their U.S. data, but the findings are at odds with southern California respondents' attitudes toward undocumented immigration. In the California data there is a clearer age gradient with older respondents voicing the most negative opinions (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993).

The relation between respondents' perceptions of the health of the U.S. economy and their views about immigration is shown in Figure 4. We expect that persons with more optimistic economic assessments will exhibit more liberal views about immigration. The gross and net effects of each of the four predictor variables all have the expected sign, although just one is statistically significant. The first variable contrasts persons who think the economy is in very good condition with those who feel it is not in very good condition. The middle two effects concentrate on economic change and suggest that respondents who feel that the economy is maintaining the status quo, or especially that it is losing ground, have more negative views about immigration than participants who perceive the national economy to be getting better. Finally, individuals who feel that the United States will have a stronger economy than Japan or any other country in the twenty-first century exhibit slightly more positive views toward immigration. The effects of the four economic health

Figure 4. Gross and Net Effects of Respondents' Attitudes about Health of U.S. Economy on Desired Level of U.S. Immigration^a




** $p < 0.01$

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

variables are jointly significant when added to a model containing the nineteen demographic background factors in Figure 3 (see Appendix Table A7).

The effects of social and political alienation are shown in Figure 5. Our hypothesis leads us to expect that alienation will promote more negative immigration attitudes, possibly because the affected individuals are looking for someone else to blame. Figure 5 includes several indicators of social or political alienation, and with only two exceptions both the gross and net effects of the predictors have the anticipated sign. Respondents who are generally dissatisfied with the ways things are going in their own lives, who feel that President Clinton does not care about the needs and problems of people like themselves (gross effect), who are not registered to vote (net effect only), or who voted for Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential election prefer lower immigration levels. The significantly negative Perot effect is particularly striking and reinforces an interpretation that Perot is a candidate for politically disaffected voters. On the other hand, participants who feel that Clinton is in touch with what average people think or who have an unfavorable opinion about Ross Perot have somewhat more tolerant immigration attitudes. As shown in Appendix Table A7, the six alienation variables are jointly significant when they are added to a model containing the nineteen demographic background factors. In fact, the combined effects of the economy and alienation variables are jointly significant when added to a background characteristics model. However, when the econ-

Figure 5. Gross and Net Effects of Respondents' Feelings of Social and Political Alienation on Desired Level of U.S. Immigration^a




**p<0.01 *p<0.05

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

omy variables are added to a model with both the background and alienation variables, or when the alienation variables are added to a model containing both the background characteristics and the economy variables, the joint effects are insignificant.

We consider two isolationist models – one dealing with economic issues and the other with foreign relations. Because they are related, we show them both in Figure 6. The effects of predictors for economic issues are illustrated first. Individuals with a global perspective on international economic matters are likely to have more favorable assessments about international migration than persons harboring isolationist sentiments. Indicators of a global view might include seeing the advantages of international trade, favoring a reduction in protectionist tariffs on traded goods and services, and acknowledging that other countries may have technologies and products that are sometimes superior to those manufactured in the United States. Our expectations are generally confirmed in the data. People who favor a free trade zone with Canada and Mexico and who think that trading with Japan is basically good for the United States are more likely to have positive attitudes about immigration, as are respondents who own Japanese cars, who think Japanese and German cars are dollar for dollar a better value than American automobiles, and who believe that overall Japan makes products of higher quality than the United States or Germany.

Figure 6. Gross and Net Effects of Isolationist Mentality on Desired Level of U.S. Immigration^a



**p<0.01 *p<0.05

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

Foreign policy issues are illustrated in the lower half of Figure 6. Having unfriendly feelings toward other countries could be interpreted as one indicator of an isolationist outlook, whereas paying a lot of attention to international news could suggest the opposite. Our expectations about how these indicators are related to immigration attitudes are confirmed for Japan but not for Russia. In addition, Figure 6 contains numerous questions pertaining to the degree of responsibility the United States should feel for what goes on in other countries. These questions are perhaps better indicators of isolationism because they give respondents an opportunity to suggest that the United States should adopt a hands-off policy. Respondents who believe that the United States has a responsibility to give military assistance in trouble spots around the world when requested by its allies and who feel that the United States has a responsibility to give financial assistance to military peacekeeping efforts are more favorably disposed to immigration.


Our hypotheses are also confirmed by the gross effects of responses to questions about whether the United States should intervene in Bosnia and Somalia. Those who feel that the United States has no responsibility for the

fighting between Serbs and Bosnians or about the situation in Somalia are significantly more likely to believe that levels of U.S. immigration should be reduced. Likewise, respondents who are opposed to the United States contributing ground troops to a U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia and who oppose giving aid to help Russia reform its economy are also more negative in their views about desirable levels of immigration. The positive and significant coefficient on the variable "No USAF in Bosnia" may seem counterintuitive because it seems to suggest an isolationist position. But the question respondents were asked is, "If the United Nations peacekeeping forces are attacked in what used to be Yugoslavia, do you favor or oppose the United States using its Air Force to bomb targets there?" We interpret favorable responses to this question as indicating a "Rambo-type" mentality on the part of some respondents who feel that the United States should "show 'em who's boss." On the other hand, participants who oppose U.S. Air Force bombing might favor a more measured or restrained policy response, might be more liberal in their outlook, and might have more favorable attitudes toward immigration. By the same reasoning, respondents who feel that the United States should retaliate if U.N. peacekeepers are killed in Somalia could also be expected to have stronger anti-immigration views. The gross effect coefficient on this variable is positive, however, but not significant.

The net effects of the isolationist measures generally have the same signs as the gross effects, but many lose statistical significance in the presence of all other predictor variables. Nevertheless, as Appendix Table A7 shows, the isolationist variables as a group are jointly significant at the 0.001 level when they are added to a model containing the demographic background variables and variables accounting for the health of the U.S. economy and feelings of alienation. In other words, we have persuasive evidence that isolationism is an important determinant of American immigration attitudes.

Finally, we consider the influence of respondents' perceptions about the migrants themselves. Some of these perceptions relate to immigrants' labor market impacts, but most are indicators of a broader range of concerns fitting into an overall cost-benefit calculation of the consequences of U.S. immigration. These effects are shown in Figure 7. Respondents who believe that most recent immigrants are in the United States legally are significantly more likely (in terms of gross effects) to express pro-immigration attitudes. This finding is consistent with other research showing that undocumented immigration becomes an issue when it is related to national sovereignty, integrity of U.S. borders, and the public's general distaste for law breaking (Harwood, 1986; Moehring, 1988). Interestingly, nearly 70 percent of the respondents in our data believe that most new immigrants are in the country illegally, and just 17 percent feel they are here legally. However, research by Fix and Passel (1994) and by Espenshade (1995b) suggests that two-thirds of the annual growth in the number of foreign-born persons in the United States comes from legal

Figure 7. Gross and Net Effects of Specific Attitudes about Immigrants on Desired Level of U.S. Immigration^a



**p<0.01 *p<0.05

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

immigration. If the public's perceptions were correctly aligned with the findings from demographic research, aggregate American attitudes toward immigration would be less restrictive.

Survey participants who feel 1) that immigrants mostly take jobs that Americans do not want, 2) that today's new immigrants would be welcomed if some of them moved into the respondent's neighborhood, and 3) that most recent immigrants contribute to this country are significantly more likely to believe that the current level of U.S. immigration should be maintained or increased. At the same time, respondents who feel that most recent immigrants cause problems are significantly less likely to prefer higher levels of immigration. The net influence of whether recent immigrants take U.S. jobs and whether they contribute to the United States or cause problems remains significant when all other predictors are added to the model.

Other coefficients in Figure 7 generally have the expected sign, although they are not statistically significant. Respondents who believe that recent U.S. immigrants come mostly from Latin America or Asia are more likely to want immigration levels lowered, which confirms earlier findings that it is the newest waves of immigrants that arouse the greatest negative feelings. Perceptions that most new immigrants do not end up on welfare are positively associated with desired levels of immigration. Finally, believing that today's immigrants work as hard or harder than individuals born in the United States has a gross effect

that is no different from that of respondents who feel immigrants work less hard. When the eight variables in Figure 7 are added to a model that contains all the other variables we have discussed, the immigrant effects are jointly significant at the 0.001 level.

DISCUSSION

This paper tests six hypotheses about factors influencing contemporary American attitudes toward U.S. immigration: 1) a labor market competition hypothesis which predicts that persons at the bottom end of the education and income distribution are least likely to support higher immigration levels; 2) a cultural affinity hypothesis that anticipates that U.S. residents who have the closest cultural and ethnic ties to Hispanic and Asian immigrants – the majority of today's new immigrants – are likely to prefer higher immigration levels than non-Hispanic whites; 3) a utilitarian hypothesis emphasizing perceived costs and benefits of immigration, which predicts that negative views toward immigration are associated with anxieties over one's economic and social well-being; 4) a hypothesis focusing on the health of the economy according to which respondents who feel that the economy is in the best current condition and likely to grow rapidly in the future are most likely to prefer higher immigration levels; 5) a social and political alienation hypothesis which predicts that residents who are marginalized from mainstream social and political institutions are likely to blame immigrants for part of their problems and to want lower levels of immigration; and 6) a hypothesis related to economic and political isolationism which expects that respondents whose views are most consistent with an isolationist perspective will prefer lower levels of immigration than participants with a more global outlook.

Our empirical analysis has found support for each of these hypotheses. The net effects of individual predictor variables generally have the expected signs, and in many cases the coefficients are statistically significant. Persons with more income and education are more receptive to current or higher immigration levels. Minority respondents, especially Asians and African Americans, desire higher levels of immigration than non-Hispanic whites, which supports the cultural affinity hypothesis. On the other hand, Hispanics are not significantly more likely to want more immigrants than Anglos. Participants who feel that new immigrants do not take jobs from American workers but rather fill slots that native workers do not want and who believe that most immigrants contribute to the United States are more favorably disposed to immigration than individuals who believe immigrants are depriving natives of jobs and causing problems. Figure 7 includes a number of perceived immigrant characteristics that go well beyond labor market effects. Coefficients for these

variables have the expected signs, which provides additional support for a cost-benefit/utilitarian hypothesis.

We have also introduced several hypotheses that have not previously been examined. Respondents who believe the U.S. economy is getting worse have more negative attitudes toward immigration than those who feel the economy is improving. In addition, survey participants prefer higher immigration if they think the economy is in good condition and that the United States will be an economic superpower in the twenty-first century. A sense of alienation is an important determinant of immigration attitudes. Those who are most alienated – as evidenced, for example, by having a favorable view of Ross Perot or having voted for Perot – prefer lower levels of U.S. immigration than survey respondents who are not so disaffected. Finally, having an isolationist mentality has a negative influence on immigration attitudes. Those who think that trading with other countries is bad for the United States, who oppose NAFTA, and who feel that Japanese and German products are inferior to those manufactured in the United States generally desire lower levels of immigration. In addition, respondents who have unfriendly feelings toward Japan, who pay little attention to international news from Japan, and who feel that the United States has no responsibility to intervene diplomatically, financially or militarily in the affairs of other nations – even when asked to by its allies or by the United Nations – generally support lower levels of U.S. immigration. By sequentially combining groups of variables, we have shown that respondents' demographic characteristics, possessing an isolationist outlook, and the way survey participants perceive immigrant impacts are more important determinants of how Americans evaluate current levels of immigration than are feelings of alienation or judgments about the health of the U.S. economy. Illuminating the linkages between isolationist attitudes and restrictionist immigration sentiments is an especially important contribution of this study.

The implications for future research relate to understanding the reasons for the rise in neorestrictionism that was documented in Figure 1. Many factors influence how people feel about immigration, and we may not have captured all of them here. For example, Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) have suggested the importance of a symbolic politics model according to which challenges to important symbols of American nationality – the presence of immigrants who are unable to speak English, or failing to believe that persons of all races and backgrounds deserve to be treated equally – may evoke anti-immigrant attitudes. It is not possible to measure these features with the 1993 poll data. However, if our analysis includes most of the relevant factors, then the models we estimate are reasonably well specified. Under these circumstances one should be able to reproduce the aggregate distribution of responses to the question about the desired level of immigration from just two pieces of information: 1) the pattern of responses to the questions used as predictor

variables and 2) the set of regression coefficients linking the explanatory variables to the response variable. One can then look to temporal changes in either (or both) of these elements to account for the secular rise in the proportion of survey respondents who prefer lower levels of immigration.

Figure 1 shows that restrictionist sentiment is often subject to sharp vicissitudes and that the proportion of U.S. respondents who feel that levels of immigration should be reduced can change abruptly in the course of a few years. This fact yields an important clue about where to search for a deeper understanding of the secular increase in neorestrictionism. It is difficult for changes in the demographic composition of the U.S. population to account for the trends in attitudes, because such characteristics as region of residence, racial and ethnic background, and age and socioeconomic composition change only slowly. People's attitudes, however, are more malleable and subject to frequent swings. It is likely therefore that the explanation for the increase since the early 1970s in anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States lies in 1) changes in the way people feel about immigrants and their impacts, about the proper role for the United States to play in international economic and political affairs, about the strength of the U.S. economy, and about the extent of their alienation from American social and political institutions, and/or in 2) changes in the salience of each of the predictor variables as they relate to attitudes toward appropriate levels of U.S. immigration. Confining our analysis to a single public opinion survey is unlikely to shed any additional light on trends in neorestrictionism. What is needed are studies of other public opinion polls taken in the decades prior to 1993.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1

GROSS EFFECTS OF RESPONDENTS' DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS ON DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | Explanatory Variables (Continued) | Parameter Estimates ^b (Continued) |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---|---|
| Male | 0.038 (0.072) | Total family income \$15,000–\$30,000 | 0.312** (0.110) |
| New England states | 0.440** (0.135) | Total family income \$30,000–\$50,000 | 0.118 (0.117) |
| Middle Atlantic states | 0.179 (0.098) | Total family income \$50,000–\$75,000 | 0.298* (0.139) |
| Rural | -0.258** (0.095) | Total family income more than \$75,000 | 0.097 (0.175) |
| Not high school graduate | 0.093 (0.127) | Hispanic | 0.249 (0.150) |
| High school graduate | -0.226* (0.103) | Black | 0.324** (0.107) |
| Some college | -0.223 (0.115) | Asian | 0.645** (0.250) |
| Aged 18 to 24 years | 0.246* (0.101) | Moderate | -0.230** (0.088) |
| Aged 45 to 54 years | 0.230* (0.099) | Conservative | -0.381** (0.099) |
| | | Republican | -0.091 (0.082) |

Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary:

| | | | |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| δ_1 | 0.341 (0.150) | χ^2 (d.f.) | 105.19 ^c (19) |
| δ_2 | 1.513 (0.156) | $\chi^2_{0.05}$ (d.f.) | 30.15 ^d (19) |
| Log-likelihood | -998.713 | <i>N</i> | 1,262 |

** $p \leq 0.01$ * $p \leq 0.05$ ^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.^bStandard errors in parentheses.^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

TABLE A2
GROSS EFFECTS OF RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDES ABOUT HEALTH OF
U.S. ECONOMY ON DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | | |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| National economy is in very good condition | 0.394 | | |
| | (0.291) | | |
| Economy is staying the same | -0.141 | | |
| | (0.094) | | |
| Economy is getting worse | -0.303** | | |
| | (0.110) | | |
| U.S. will be world's number one economic power in twenty-first century | 0.125 | | |
| | (0.070) | | |
| Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary: | | | |
| δ_1 | 0.265 | χ^2 | 15.31 ^c |
| | (0.093) | (d.f.) | (4) |
| δ_2 | 1.374 | $\chi^2_{0.05}$ | 9.49 ^d |
| | (0.100) | (d.f.) | (4) |
| Log-likelihood | -1043.653 | <i>N</i> | 1,262 |

** $p \leq 0.01$ * $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

^bStandard errors in parentheses.

^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.

^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

TABLE A3
GROSS EFFECTS OF RESPONDENTS' FEELINGS OF
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ALIENATION ON DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | | |
|--|----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Dissatisfied with the way things are going in own life | -0.027 | | |
| | (0.081) | | |
| Bill Clinton does not care about needs and problems of people like them | -0.122 | | |
| | (0.086) | | |
| Bill Clinton is in touch with what average people think | 0.196* | | |
| | (0.078) | | |
| Not registered to vote | 0.069 | | |
| | (0.086) | | |
| Has unfavorable opinion about Ross Perot | 0.121 | | |
| | (0.076) | | |
| Voted for Perot in 1992 presidential election | -0.332** | | |
| | (0.117) | | |
| Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary: | | | |
| δ_1 | 0.418 | χ^2 | 33.43 ^c |
| | (0.075) | (d.f.) | (6) |
| δ_2 | 1.535 | $\chi^2_{0.05}$ | 12.60 ^d |
| | (0.086) | (d.f.) | (6) |
| Log-likelihood | -1034.59 | <i>N</i> | 1,262 |

** $p \leq 0.01$ * $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

^bStandard errors in parentheses.

^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.

^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

TABLE A4
 GROSS EFFECTS OF ISOLATIONIST MENTALITY VERSUS
 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION:
 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | Explanatory Variables (Continued) | Parameter Estimates ^b (Continued) |
|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| Has not read or heard anything about NAFTA | 0.040 (0.071) | Japan makes products of higher quality than U.S. or Germany | 0.063 (0.078) |
| NAFTA would be mostly good for the U.S. | 0.119 (0.070) | U.S. more advanced than Japan in high-tech developments | 0.498 (0.297) |
| Trading with Japan is good or indifferent for U.S. economy | 0.279** (0.072) | Japan more advanced than U.S. in high-tech developments | 0.437 (0.292) |
| Owens only Japanese car(s) | 0.117 (0.110) | U.S. and Japan equally advanced in high-tech developments | 0.621* (0.289) |
| Japanese and German cars are best value for the money | 0.144 (0.075) | U.S. will lead Japan in manufacturing technology in twenty-first century | -0.015 (0.088) |
| Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary: | | | |
| δ_1 | 1.222 (0.293) | χ^2 (d.f.) | 40.64 ^c (10) |
| δ_2 | 2.343 (0.298) | $\chi^2_{0.05}$ (d.f.) | 18.31 ^d (10) |
| Log-likelihood | -1030.985 | <i>N</i> | 1,262 |

** $p \leq 0.01$ * $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

^bStandard errors in parentheses.

^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.

^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

TABLE A5
GROSS EFFECTS OF ISOLATIONIST MENTALITY VERSUS
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION:
FOREIGN RELATIONS^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | Explanatory Variables (Continued) | Parameter Estimates ^b (Continued) |
|--|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Has unfriendly feelings toward Japan | -0.258** (0.092) | U.S. has no responsibility to intervene in Bosnia | -0.223** (0.085) |
| Has unfriendly feelings toward Russia | 0.130 (0.101) | No U.S. ground troops for U.N. Peacekeeping force in Bosnia | -0.088 (0.083) |
| Pays a lot of attention to news about Japan | 0.175 (0.108) | No U.S. Air Force bombing in Bosnia even if U.N. forces attacked | 0.256** (0.085) |
| Pays a lot of attention to news about Russia | -0.074 (0.107) | U.S. has no responsibility to intervene in Somalia | -0.193* (0.093) |
| U.S. has responsibility to give military assistance in world | 0.092 (0.086) | U.S. should retaliate if U.N. peace-keepers are killed in Somalia | 0.026 (0.075) |
| U.S. has responsibility to give financial help to world's peacekeeping efforts | 0.161* (0.079) | No economic aid to Russia to reform economy | -0.202** (0.075) |

Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary:

| | | | |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| δ_1 | 0.281 (0.116) | χ^2 (d.f.) | 82.23 ^c (12) |
| δ_2 | 1.423 (0.122) | $\chi^2_{0.05}$ (d.f.) | 21.03 ^d (12) |
| Log-likelihood | -1010.192 | <i>N</i> | 1,262 |

**p<0.01 *p<0.05

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

^bStandard errors in parentheses.

^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.

^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

TABLE A6
GROSS EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC ATTITUDES ABOUT IMMIGRANTS ON
DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | | |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Most recent immigrants are in U.S. legally | 0.276** (0.091) | 0.257** (0.091) | 0.204* (0.092) |
| Immigrants mostly take jobs Americans don't want | 0.423** (0.075) | 0.409** (0.076) | 0.345** (0.077) |
| Immigrants work as hard or harder than people born in U.S. | 0.079 (0.100) | 0.043 (0.101) | 0.000 (0.102) |
| Most new immigrants do not end up on welfare | 0.288** (0.076) | 0.245** (0.076) | 0.096 (0.081) |
| Most new U.S. immigrants come from Latin America or Asia | | -0.054 (0.075) | -0.079 (0.076) |
| Today's immigrants would be welcomed in my neighborhood | | 0.376** (0.080) | 0.283** (0.082) |
| Most recent immigrants to U.S. contribute to this country | | | 0.379** (0.105) |
| Most recent immigrants to U.S. cause problems | | | -0.199* (0.098) |
| Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary: | | | |
| δ_1 | 0.839 (0.094) | 1.006 (0.113) | 0.812 (0.136) |
| δ_2 | 1.986 (0.105) | 2.166 (0.123) | 2.002 (0.145) |
| χ^2 (d.f.) | 87.90 ^c (4) | 111.09 ^c (6) | 154.01 ^c (8) |
| $\chi^2_{0.05}$ (d.f.) | 9.49 ^d (4) | 12.60 ^d (6) | 15.51 ^d (8) |
| Log-likelihood | -1007.355 | -995.762 | -974.304 |
| <i>N</i> | 1,262 | 1,262 | 1,262 |

**p<0.01 *p<0.05

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

^bStandard errors in parentheses.

^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.

^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

TABLE A7

LIKELIHOOD-RATIO TESTS FOR NET EFFECTS OF VARIOUS INFLUENCES ON DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION: ORDERED-PROBIT REGRESSIONS

| Model ^a | Log-likelihood | Degrees of Freedom | Comments |
|--|----------------|--------------------|--|
| <i>D</i> | -998.71 | 19 | <i>D</i> is significant at .001. $\chi^2 = 105.19$ (19) |
| <i>D + E</i> | -992.19 | 23 | <i>E</i> is significant at .05 when added to <i>D</i> . $\chi^2 = 13.04$ (4) |
| <i>D + A</i> | -990.62 | 25 | <i>A</i> is significant at .05 when added to <i>D</i> . $\chi^2 = 16.18$ (6) |
| <i>D + E + A</i> | -987.24 | 29 | (a) <i>E + A</i> are jointly significant at .05. $\chi^2 = 22.94$ (10) (b) <i>E</i> is insignificant at .10 when added to <i>D + A</i> . $\chi^2 = 6.76$ (4) (c) <i>A</i> is insignificant at .10 when added to <i>D + E</i> . $\chi^2 = 9.90$ (6) |
| <i>D + E + A + I_s</i> | -944.43 | 51 | <i>I_s</i> is significant at .001 when added to <i>D + E + A</i> . $\chi^2 = 85.62$ (22) |
| <i>D + E + A + I_s + I_m</i> | -901.29 | 59 | <i>I_m</i> is significant at .001 when added to <i>D + E + A + I_s</i> . $\chi^2 = 86.28$ (8) |

^a*D* refers to 19 demographic and socioeconomic background variables in Table A1.

E refers to 4 economy variables in Table A2.

A refers to 6 alienation variables in Table A3.

I_s refers collectively to 22 isolation variables in Tables A4 and A5.

I_m refers to 8 immigration variables in model (3) in Table A6.

TABLE A8
NET EFFECTS OF COMBINED SET OF PREDICTOR VARIABLES ON
DESIRED LEVEL OF U.S. IMMIGRATION^a

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | Explanatory Variables (Continued) | Parameter Estimates ^b (Continued) |
|---|----------------------------------|--|--|
| I. Background Characteristics | | | |
| Male | 0.019 (0.082) | Total family income \$15,000–\$30,000 | 0.257* (0.118) |
| New England states | 0.431** (0.143) | Total family income \$30,000–\$50,000 | 0.043 (0.127) |
| Middle Atlantic states | 0.186 (0.106) | Total family income \$50,000–\$75,000 | 0.139 (0.149) |
| Rural | -0.208* (0.102) | Total family income more than \$75,000 | -0.101 (0.193) |
| Not a high school graduate | 0.331* (0.142) | Hispanic | 0.224 (0.163) |
| High school graduate | -0.002 (0.113) | Black | 0.243* (0.119) |
| Some college | -0.108 (0.123) | Asian | 0.464 (0.265) |
| Aged 18 to 24 years | 0.091 (0.113) | Moderate | -0.185* (0.094) |
| Aged 45 to 54 years | 0.161 (0.107) | Conservative | -0.310** (0.108) |
| | | Republican | -0.062 (0.089) |
| II. Health of U.S. Economy | | | |
| National economy is in very good condition | 0.362 (0.313) | Economy is getting worse | -0.112 (0.126) |
| Economy is staying the same | -0.084 (0.105) | U.S. will be world's number one economic power in twenty-first century | 0.092 (0.080) |
| III. Feelings of Alienation | | | |
| Dissatisfied with way things are going in their own life | -0.027 (0.092) | Not registered to vote | -0.055 (0.097) |
| Bill Clinton does not care about needs and problems of people like them | 0.058 (0.097) | Has unfavorable opinion about Ross Perot | 0.067 (0.084) |
| Bill Clinton is in touch with what average people think | 0.013 (0.087) | Voted for Perot in 1992 presidential election | -0.310* (0.129) |

TABLE A8 (CONTINUED)

| Explanatory Variables | Parameter Estimates ^b | Explanatory Variables (Continued) | Parameter Estimates ^b (Continued) |
|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| IV. Isolationism: Economic Relations | | | |
| Has not read or heard anything about NAFTA | 0.087 (0.084) | Japan makes products of higher quality than U.S. or Germany | 0.084 (0.085) |
| NAFTA would be mostly good for the U.S. | 0.058 (0.077) | U.S. is more advanced than Japan in high-tech developments | 0.135 (0.315) |
| Trading with Japan is good or indifferent for U.S. economy | 0.182* (0.082) | Japan is more advanced than U.S. in high-tech developments | 0.190 (0.307) |
| Owens only Japanese car(s) | 0.091 (0.120) | U.S. and Japan are equally advanced in high-tech developments | 0.372 (0.303) |
| Japanese and German cars are best value for the money | 0.093 (0.083) | U.S. will lead Japan in manufacturing technology in twenty-first century | -0.008 (0.095) |
| V. Isolationism: Foreign Relations | | | |
| Has unfriendly feelings toward Japan | -0.061 (0.104) | U.S. has no responsibility to intervene in Bosnia | -0.167 (0.092) |
| Has unfriendly feelings toward Russia | 0.102 (0.110) | No U.S. ground troops for U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia | -0.057 (0.089) |
| Pays a lot of attention to news about Japan | 0.083 (0.117) | No U.S. Air Force bombing in Bosnia even if U.N. forces attacked | 0.090 (0.094) |
| Pays a lot of attention to news about Russia | 0.009 (0.117) | U.S. has no responsibility to intervene in Somalia | -0.135 (0.102) |
| U.S. has responsibility to give military assistance in world's trouble spots when allies ask | 0.034 (0.091) | U.S. should retaliate if U.N. peacekeepers are killed in Somalia | -0.034 (0.082) |
| U.S. has responsibility to give financial help to world's peacekeeping efforts | 0.076 (0.087) | No economic aid to Russia to reform economy | -0.144 (0.082) |
| VI. Attitudes About Immigrants | | | |
| Most recent immigrants are in U.S. legally | 0.139 (0.099) | Most new U.S. immigrants come from Latin America or Asia | -0.037 (0.084) |
| Immigrants mostly take jobs Americans do not want | 0.363** (0.083) | Today's immigrants would be welcomed in my neighborhood | 0.156 (0.089) |
| Immigrants work as hard or harder than people born in U.S. | -0.076 (0.111) | Most recent immigrants to U.S. contribute to this country | 0.327** (0.112) |
| Most new immigrants do not end up on welfare | 0.068 (0.087) | Most recent immigrants to U.S. cause problems | -0.210* (0.106) |

TABLE A8 (CONTINUED)

| Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary: | | | |
|--|------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| δ_1 | 1.071 (0.377) | χ^2 (d.f.) | 300.04 ^c (59) |
| δ_2 | 2.375 (0.382) | $\chi^2_{0.05}$ (d.f.) | 77.37 ^d (59) |
| Log-likelihood | -901.285 | <i>N</i> | 1,262 |

** $p \leq 0.01$ * $p \leq 0.05$

^aThe dependent variable is the response to the question: "Should immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?" Responses are coded: 0=decreased; 1=kept the same; 2=increased.

^bStandard errors in parentheses.

^cChi-squared statistic for testing null hypothesis that true coefficients on predictor variables are jointly zero.

^dCritical value for 5 percent level of significance.

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