

Explaining Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in the U.S.: Social Class, Cosmopolitanism, and Perceptions of Immigrants¹

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In the U.S., research on attitudes toward immigrants generally focuses on anti-immigrant sentiment. Yet, the 1996 General Social Survey indicates that half the population believes that immigrants favorably impact the U.S. economy and culture. Using these data, we analyze theories of both pro- and anti-immigrant sentiment. While we find some support for two theories of intergroup competition, our most important finding connects a cosmopolitan worldview with favorable perceptions of immigrants. We find that cosmopolitans – people who are highly educated, in white-collar occupations, who have lived abroad, and who reject ethnocentrism – are significantly more pro-immigrant than people without these characteristics.

Individuals' racial group identity, nativity, labor market position, and the values associated with those statuses strongly shape whether they perceive immigrants to be a threat or a benefit to U.S. society. Prior research in the U.S. has focused on anti-immigrant attitudes among those who had the most to lose from competition with immigrants, specifically blue-collar workers and minorities. However, throughout the last few decades barriers between nations and markets have been steadily dismantled and a new class of white-collar workers with a vested interest in global exchange has emerged. These workers typically trade in information and are known as symbolic analysts or knowledge workers. Pro-immigrant attitudes are more consistent with both the material interests and worldview of this group, suggesting that attitudes toward immigrants can be explained using not only formulations of group identity and labor market position but also measures of ideology and experience.

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In this research we investigate the demographic and social characteristics that shape perceptions of immigrants' impacts on U.S. society. We use data from the 1996 General Social Survey (Davis and Smith, 1996) to examine the influence of race and nativity, labor market position, and general worldview on perceptions of immigrants. We find that racial group identification is important in predicting perceptions among first- and second-generation immigrants, but less so among those without immigrant experience among immediate family members. Furthermore, we find that labor market competition with immigrants among blue-collar workers and low-skill service workers results in more negative perceptions of the impact of immigrants. Finally, our most important finding is that a cosmopolitan worldview, as measured by a white-collar occupation, having a university education, holding more liberal values, rejecting ethnocentrism, and having lived abroad, is strongly related to more favorable perceptions of immigrants. Since cosmopolitanism is associated with growing proportions of the population, this suggests that attitudes toward immigrants may become more favorable in the future.

In the following section we review three theories that explain variation in perceptions of immigrants. In the U.S., labor market competition and group threat theory have been the dominant explanations of such variation. However, research in other immigrant-receiving countries suggests that the theory of a cosmopolitan-parochial divide is also a viable explanation of these perceptions that merits testing in the U.S. In the next section we describe the sample and the variables and methods used in the analysis. Then we present our results from an OLS regression of a scale of perceptions of immigrants' impact on U.S. society on indicators of the major explanatory theories. In the final section we discuss our results.

GROUP THREAT, LABOR MARKET COMPETITION, AND COSMOPOLITANISM

Most research on attitudes toward immigrants in the U.S. use models of either racial or ethnic group threat or occupation-based labor market competition to explain negative views of immigrants (Citrin and Green, 1990; Quillian, 1995; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Esses *et al.*, 2001; Wilson, 2001). In Australia, new class theory has been used to explain support for immigration by identifying educational and occupational characteristics associated with a cosmopolitan worldview (Betts, 1988; Bean, 1995). In the following review of research, we first summarize group threat theory and labor market competition theory. Then we discuss how new class theory and the concept of cosmopolitanism

refine and extend class-based theories by introducing a value-based component of class omitted by the group threat and labor market competition theories.

Group threat theories have been widely used to explain racial prejudice and, more recently, anti-immigrant sentiment (Quillian, 1995; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Wilson, 2001). These theories date back to Blumer's (1958) research on racial group conflict. Blumer's ideas were later theoretically expanded in Bobo's (1983, 1988) realistic conflict theory, which proposes that dominant groups are in conflict with subordinate groups over issues of power, status, and scarce resources. This theory proposes that members of dominant groups subscribe to a zero-sum mentality and restrict access to resources by members of subordinate groups. In assessing attitudes toward immigrants, some researchers claim that whites are more anti-immigrant than non-whites because they have the most to lose as traditional power-holders in American society (Massey, 1995). Others point to hostilities toward immigrants within the African-American community as evidence of competition between disadvantaged groups (Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn, 1999; Rodriguez, 1999; Sanchez, 1999). Still others have not found race to be a significant determinant of attitudes toward immigration (Chandler and Tsai, 2001). This variability suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes are context dependent rather than fixed, and may depend on whether native-born blacks or whites feel their material interests are threatened by, or aligned with, the interests of the foreign-born in a given situation.

Most research on group threat theory has focused on racial conflict, particularly between blacks and whites (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983, 1988; Bobo and Kluegel, 1993). However a somewhat smaller body of literature, often based in other immigrant-receiving nations, focuses on group conflict between the native-born and foreign-born (Quillian, 1995; Wilson, 2001). Immigration scholars claim that negative attitudes toward immigrants are based on perceptions of specific social and economic threats to the dominant native-born group (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996). Studies conducted in Canada, the U.K., the U.S., Germany, and France all reveal common themes: that the native-born perceive that immigrants pose either a crime threat (Palmer, 1996), an economic threat (Simon, 1993; Quillian, 1995; Palmer, 1996; Simon and Lynch, 1999; Fetzer, 2000; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), or a cultural threat (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Chandler and Tsai, 2001). When current events or a given social position makes these threats more salient, an individual is more likely to view immigrants negatively.

Labor market competition is another dimension of group threat, focusing on immigrants' threat to the dominance of the native-born in a labor market

sector through lowered wages or replacement. Blue-collar and service workers are most threatened by competition from low-skill immigrant workers, while white-collar workers are less likely to be in direct competition with immigrants. Furthermore, owners or managers may benefit from immigrants' labor because immigrants with fewer skills or limited English proficiency are typically willing to work for lower wages than the native-born (Borjas, 1998). Labor market competition demonstrates the context-specific nature of group threat and illustrates how negative perceptions of immigrants form among groups with whom they compete.

In the U.S. considerably less theoretical attention has been paid to theories that explain positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Those who have done so have used either the concept of cosmopolitanism (Chandler and Tsai, 2001) or a very similar concept, a "global worldview" (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996), to explain support for immigration. The concept of cosmopolitanism derives from new class theory. This theory was advanced in the 1970s as an explanation of why many educated middle- and upper-class professionals embraced liberal politics in spite of their vested interest in maintaining the status quo (Bruce-Briggs, 1979). New class theory suggests that a power struggle exists between traditional power holders, business elites, and a rising new class of knowledge workers (Moynihan, 1972; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1977; Ladd, 1978; Gouldner, 1979). New class theory has been stymied by disagreement over how to identify its members (Brint, 1984). However, most scholars agree that membership is determined by education and occupation, though they have been more or less restrictive in how they operationalize membership. For example, some restrict membership to salaried professionals and managers with a college degree or more (Ladd, 1978) or professionals in scientific and technical occupations (Gouldner, 1979), while others define it broadly to include college graduates with degrees in the humanities and social sciences (Bruce-Briggs, 1979). Generally, the skills and occupations of new class members are concerned with the production of knowledge and processing of symbols (Reich, 1991). Despite these diverging definitions, elements of new class theory such as "cosmopolitanism" are useful to explain varying attitudes about immigration.

For example, Betts (1988) argues that Australian society is ideologically divided into two camps, the cosmopolitans, who have a more global worldview, and the parochials, who have a more local worldview. She uses educational attainment, specifically holding a university degree, as a means of operationalizing this division. Betts used Bruce-Briggs' (1979) definition of the new class to argue that college-educated individuals trained in the humanities and social sciences and employed largely in universities and the public sector

were the foremost supporters of Australia's relatively open immigration policy. However, this stance conflicted with the stance of the rest of the population that tended to favor more restricted immigration. She connects attitudes toward immigration to ideology by arguing that universities socialize students to think of their world in global terms, an ideology that she claims also supports the material interests of the knowledge workers who benefit from globalization. Additionally, Betts argues that cosmopolitans acquire status and prestige among their peers by demonstrating that they "think alike," meaning that they are tolerant of other cultures, are non-racist, and base their arguments on rational logic and reasoning. In this way cosmopolitans are differentiated from less educated persons and the majority of business elites, whom she labels parochials. More recently, Bean (1995) posited that the Australian cosmopolitan/parochial division, operationalized through both educational and occupational divisions, applied not only to attitudes toward immigration, but to international trade, national defense, national and ethnic identity, and multiculturalism. Updating Betts' argument, Bean posits that knowledge workers stand to gain more of the benefits of globalization, whereas working-class people fear the loss of employment and status as a result of increased global integration.

To our knowledge only two studies of U.S. data have made similar arguments, though they only consider attitudes toward immigration policy, not immigrants *per se*. Chandler and Tsai (2001) use a college degree as a crude measure of cosmopolitanism, which they find is positively related to support of immigration. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) use ethnocentrism, defined as the belief that the way something is done in other societies is inferior to the way it is done in one's own society, to predict attitudes toward immigration policy. Neither develops the concept of cosmopolitanism to the same degree as Betts (1988) and Bean (1995) have in the case of Australia.

In this study we incorporate several measures of cosmopolitanism and parochialism into our study of perceptions of immigrants' impacts on the U.S. economy and society. Bean (1995:32) succinctly defines the cosmopolitanism/parochialism divide by saying that "locals, or parochials, are more likely to identify with the nation and take an ethnocentric stance on public issues," whereas cosmopolitans "are more open to the virtues of other nations and to criticism of their own." Following the lead of our Australian colleagues we use education and occupation as measures of cosmopolitanism. However, while a college or advanced degree exposes individuals to a variety of cultures and perspectives, we argue that it is not the only means by which individuals acquire a cosmopolitan worldview. Borrowing from Allport's contact hypothesis (1954/1979), most commonly used to explain racial prejudice and tolerance,

we argue that living abroad can lead to a more cosmopolitan worldview when positive contact with people of other cultures, races, and ethnicities diminishes negative stereotypes and reinforces commonalities. Additionally, although she does not explicitly test these relationships, Betts' (1988) theoretical exposition suggests that cosmopolitans hold more liberal and more globally oriented views on various issues while parochials tend to be more politically conservative and more ethnocentric. Therefore, we operationalize cosmopolitanism with five measures: holding a college or higher degree, a white-collar job, a liberal political ideology, rejecting ethnocentrism, and having lived abroad.

DATA AND MEASURES

Using data from the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) carried out by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago (Davis and Smith, 1996), we constructed a scale of perceptions of how immigrants impact the U.S. economy and society and regress it on measures of group threat, labor market competition, and cosmopolitanism. In 1996, 1,367 people answered the subset of questions we use as the dependent variable in this study. We eliminated cases in which respondents did not answer one or more of the variables of interest, resulting in a sample size of 1,083.² The percentage of the sample eliminated on the basis of non-response to specific questions is included in the appendix.

The dependent variable is an additive scale that gauges respondent's perceptions of immigrants' impact on the national economy and society. The four items in the scale measure agreement or disagreement with the following statements: immigrants increase crime rates; immigrants are generally good for the nation's economy; immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America; and immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures. Respondents scored their agreement or disagreement on a scale of one to five with (1) indicating strong agreement and (5) indicating strong disagreement. We recoded the items so that higher scores consistently represent more favorable perceptions of immigrants. The individual questions are presented in Table 1 along with their means and standard deviations. The scale is highly reliable with a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.75. Since three is the mid-point

²The total proportion of missing cases, about 12 percent of the sample, is within reasonable limits for using listwise deletion (Rossi, Wright, and Anderson, 1983; Little, 1992). Nevertheless, by deleting missing values on the dependent variables we run the risk that the sample may somewhat favor individuals with stronger attitudes toward immigrants.

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Description	Mean	S.D.
Dependent Variables			
Additive scale	Scale of following four questions	12.37	3.13
Crime	Immigrants increase crime rates	3.03	0.03
Economy	Immigrants are generally good for the nation's economy	3.02	0.03
Jobs	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America	2.74	0.03
Ideas & culture	Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures	3.58	0.03
Independent Variables			
Age	Age of respondent	42.79	15.56
Male	Respondent is male	0.48	—
Northeast	Lives in the Northeast	0.19	—
South	Lives in the South	0.32	—
Midwest	Lives in the Midwest	0.26	—
West	Lives in the West	0.23	—
White native	White and not of immigrant origin	0.73	—
White immigrant	White and of immigrant origin	0.12	—
Non-white immigrant	Non-white and of immigrant origin	0.04	—
Non-white native	Non-white and not of immigrant origin	0.11	—
White-collar	Works in a white-collar occupation	0.57	—
Blue-collar	Works in a blue-collar occupation	0.24	—
Service	Works in a service occupation	0.16	—
Not working	Retired, student, unemployed, or keeps house	0.03	—
No (4yr) college	No college degree	0.73	—
College	College degree (4yr)	0.19	—
Graduate school	Graduate degree	0.08	—
Liberal	Liberal or extremely liberal	0.15	—
Neutral	Slightly liberal or conservative, middle of the road	0.65	—
Conservative	Conservative or extremely conservative	0.20	—
Ethnocentric ideology	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans	2.78	1.07
Ever lived abroad	A non-immigrant who has ever lived abroad	0.15	—

Note: Dashes indicate that the variable is not included in the model.

on each of the four scale items, twelve is the mid-point on the additive scale. The respondents' mean score of 12.37 indicates that, on average, there is neither an overwhelmingly positive nor negative perception of immigrants.³ A normal distribution of scores around the mean tells us that while about half of the respondents hold negative views of immigrants' influence on U.S. society, a similar proportion hold a positive view.⁴

³Those above the scale mean are classified as pro-immigrant while those below the mean are anti-immigrant, although these respondents may embrace contrary views on particular items.

⁴The median score is 12.00. The measure of skewness is 0.007 indicating that there is only a very slight positive skew.

To show that cosmopolitanism provides additional explanatory power to the theories of group threat and labor market competition, we present a series of models in which sets of variables are added sequentially. The independent variables operationalize the theories discussed in the literature review. We include controls for age, gender, and region of residence in the baseline model (model 1).⁵ In model 2 we operationalize group threat theory with a combined measure of race and nativity. Eighty-three percent of the sample is white, making it difficult to find statistically significant differences between the remaining minority groups. Thus, we group respondents as white or non-white.⁶ Since both immigrants and their children have firsthand experience with immigration, we measure nativity by combining the foreign-born with those who had at least one parent born outside the U.S.⁷ We combine these measures to make four groups: native-born whites, foreign-born whites, native-born non-whites, and foreign-born non-whites.

We operationalize labor market competition theory with occupational classifications and education as a proxy for skill in models 3 and 4.⁸ Respondents employed in managerial, professional, and technical positions and sales and administrative support positions were grouped as white-collar workers. Blue-collar workers include respondents in manufacturing occupations (precision, production, craft, and repair workers, equipment operators, fabricators, and other laborers). Service workers include all service providers ranging from highly skilled (but not white-collar) professionals to those in low-skill service jobs, such as protective services, care workers, domestic workers, and consumer services. The unemployed and those not in the labor force make up only 3 percent of the sample. Education is grouped in three categories: those with less than a (four-year) college degree, those holding a college degree, and those holding an advanced degree.

⁵In earlier analyses not shown here, we tested multiple ways of coding the age variable looking for a cohort effect, however, none of the recodings were significant.

⁶The GSS interviewers coded all respondents as white, black, or other. In cases where the interviewer was unsure of the respondent's race, the respondents were asked what race they considered themselves. If they claimed to be Hispanic, Asian, black, Native American, of mixed ethnicity, or any other classification other than white, we coded them as non-white.

⁷Statistical analyses modeling first- and second-generation immigrants separately showed that they could be combined with a minimal loss of information.

⁸In analyses not presented here we used household income as an indicator of labor market competition. We tested the models with and without this variable. Overall, its exclusion did not have much effect on the direction or significance of the other variables in the model, while its inclusion considerably reduced the number of valid cases and may have introduced bias into the sample. Therefore, we did not include it in our analysis.

Cosmopolitanism/parochialism is measured with education and occupation plus three additional variables. Since education measures are associated with occupation, differentiation by education supports the theory of labor market competition as well as cosmopolitanism. The two theories predict the same direction of effect for education; therefore, we add education to the model in a separate step (model 4). We include political ideology based on the new class literature, which associates liberalism with the highly educated, whom Betts and Bean claim are the most cosmopolitan. The survey asked respondents to rate themselves on a seven-point scale from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). We collapsed these categories into liberals, who measured 1 or 2 on the scale; neutrals, who measured 3 to 5; and conservatives, who measured 6 or 7. Cosmopolitanism is also measured by a rejection of ethnocentrism. The GSS asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement that "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans." The responses ranged from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5) and averaged 2.78 with a standard deviation of 1.07. Our last measure of cosmopolitanism is having experience living outside the United States, which we measured for all but the foreign-born. We code the native-born who have ever lived abroad as "1" and everyone else is coded "0."

We test three general hypotheses that predict perceptions of immigrants. The group threat hypothesis tests differences by race and nativity combinations. We expect white and non-immigrant respondents to feel most threatened by immigrants and therefore have less favorable views of immigrants, while non-whites and immigrants are expected to have more favorable views. The labor market competition hypothesis focuses on differences between individuals in white-collar, blue-collar, and service occupations, as well as by skill level. We expect that blue-collar workers and low-skill service workers will have less favorable views of immigrants because they may feel immigrant laborers threaten their jobs. Conversely, the cosmopolitanism hypothesis argues that white-collar workers and those with advanced education may benefit from immigrant labor or benefit from globalization and therefore feel less threatened by foreigners; therefore, they will have more positive views of immigrants. Furthermore, the cosmopolitanism hypothesis proposes that respondents who hold liberal attitudes, reject ethnocentrism, or have ever lived abroad are predisposed to more favorable attitudes toward immigrants, since these values and experiences make them appreciate the contributions of foreigners. First we test each of these theories by adding variables to the regression model (models 1–5). Then we standardize the coefficients in the complete model to evaluate the

relative impact of each variable (model 6). In addition to regressing the additive scale on the independent variables, we also regress each of the individual scale items on the independent variables to evaluate whether they operate in consistent ways across each of the items in the scale.

RESULTS

The OLS regression results are presented in Table 2. Consistent with previous studies of attitudes toward immigrants in the U.S., Germany, and France, we find that age and sex are not significant predictors of perceptions of immigrants (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Fetzer, 2000; Chandler and Tsai, 2001). However, southerners appear to have more negative perceptions of immigrants than individuals from other U.S. regions. This effect diminishes as more independent variables are added to the model and disappears altogether in the final model, suggesting that southerners differ from other regions in the distribution of the independent variables, but that these variables operate similarly in the South as they do elsewhere.

Group threat theory is supported in model 2, which shows that both white and non-white respondents who are immigrants or who have an immigrant parent score higher on the scale of perceptions of the impact of immigrants on the U.S. This is consistent with the theory that those who are most threatened by immigrants, specifically the native-born, hold less favorable views of immigrants. We find statistically significant differences between the scores of the native-born and those with immigrant background, although the native-born are not differentiated with respect to minority or majority racial group identification. Note, however, that the minority racial group category may be too heterogeneous to be meaningful. These results persist throughout the series of models demonstrating that the native-born hold less favorable perceptions of immigrants than immigrants and their children, a finding consistent with group threat theory.

Labor market competition faced by those in low-skill jobs, for which immigrants often compete, is also predicted to negatively affect perceptions of immigrants. In model 3 we find that blue-collar and service workers hold significantly more negative perceptions of immigrants than white-collar workers. However, when education is added to distinguish between skill levels of workers within each of these broad occupational categories (model 4), the effect of being a service sector worker loses significance. In the case of blue-collar workers, the size of the coefficient is reduced, but the effect remains significant. As expected, workers with the least education perceive immigrants least favorably.

TABLE 2**REGRESSION OF THE SCALE OF PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Control Variables						
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00
Male	0.24 (0.19)	0.10 (0.18)	0.48 (0.20)	0.33 (0.19)	0.42 (0.19)	0.07
Northeast	-0.42 (0.29)	-0.46 (0.29)	-0.37 (0.28)	-0.36 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.27)	-0.04
South	-10.24 ^b (0.26)	-0.92 ^b (0.26)	-0.87 ^b (0.25)	-0.75 ^a (0.24)	-0.49 (0.24)	-0.08
Midwest	-0.75 ^a (0.27)	-0.44 (0.27)	-0.35 (0.26)	-0.30 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.25)	-0.02
West	—	—	—	—	—	—
Group Threat						
White native	—	—	—	—	—	—
White immigrant	—	1.57 ^b (0.29)	1.58 ^b (0.29)	1.53 ^b (0.28)	1.59 ^b (0.27)	0.17 ^b
Non-white immigrant	—	2.50 ^b (0.47)	2.67 ^b (0.46)	2.67 ^b (0.45)	2.83 ^b (0.43)	0.19 ^b
Non-white native	—	-0.34 (0.28)	-0.15 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.26)	-0.01
Labor Market Competition						
White-collar	—	—	—	—	—	—
Blue-collar	—	—	-10.48 ^b (0.23)	-0.78 ^b (0.25)	-0.69 ^a (0.24)	-0.10 ^a
Service	—	—	-0.76 ^a (0.25)	-0.17 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.25)	-0.01
Not working	—	—	-1.32 (0.54)	-0.65 (0.53)	-0.51 (0.51)	-0.03
Education						
No college	—	—	—	-1.36 ^b (0.25)	-1.04 ^b (0.25)	-0.15 ^b
College	—	—	—	—	—	—
Graduate school	—	—	—	0.92 (0.37)	0.88 (0.36)	0.08 ^a
Cosmopolitanism/Parochialism						
Liberal	—	—	—	—	0.62 (0.25)	0.07
Neutral	—	—	—	—	—	—
Conservative	—	—	—	—	0.24 (0.22)	0.03
Reject ethnocentrism	—	—	—	—	0.62 ^b (0.08)	0.21 ^b
Ever lived abroad (Natives)	—	—	—	—	0.65 ^a (0.25)	0.08 ^a
Intercept	13.18 ^b	12.86 ^b	13.13 ^b	13.74 ^b	11.09 ^b	—
Number of cases	1,083	1,083	1,083	1,083	1,083	—
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.07	0.11	0.15	0.21	—

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Dashes indicate that the variable is not included in the model.

^ap < 0.01.^bp < 0.001.

In other words, blue-collar workers and low-skill service sector workers are more likely to believe that immigrants negatively affect the nation.

These results also support the thesis that cosmopolitanism is associated with more favorable views of immigrants. Model 4 shows that both white-collar workers and respondents holding college or graduate school degrees hold

more positive views of immigrants. Indeed, cosmopolitanism complements labor market competition theory by arguing that symbolic analysts who are primarily in white-collar occupations and have advanced degrees hold class positions that predispose them to view immigrants, and globalization more generally, in a favorable light. However, additional variables which extend the concept of cosmopolitanism lend further support to this argument. In model 5 we add measures of political ideology, ethnocentrism, and experience living abroad and find that the latter two measures have significant positive effects. The more strongly a respondent rejects ethnocentrism, the more likely he or she is to perceive immigrants in a favorable light. This is likely a refinement of liberalism, since the coefficient for respondents' liberal political ideology is positive, but only significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. In addition, respondents who have experience living abroad hold significantly more positive views of immigrants than do those who have never lived abroad. These additional measures of cosmopolitanism do not diminish the effects of occupation or education; rather they improve the overall explanatory power of the model. Evidently, the cosmopolitan/parochial divide distinguishes social groups and their perceptions of immigrants in ways that add to the explanatory power of group threat and labor market competition theories.

To estimate the relative influence of each of the independent variables we standardized the OLS regression coefficients for the full model (model 6). The coefficient for rejection of ethnocentrism has the largest effect on the scale measure of respondents' perception of immigrants. Two measures of group threat, specifically being a white or non-white immigrant, follow rejection of ethnocentrism in terms of the size of their effect on the dependent variable. These variables all demonstrate positive effects on respondents' views of immigrants. These are followed in size by two indicators that have negative effects on perceptions of immigrants: having less than a college education and holding a blue-collar job. The standardized coefficients allow us to conclude that no single theory dominates in our model of perceptions of immigrants; rather each theory has a significant role to play in explaining the views of immigrants held by distinct groups within U.S. society.

Since the scale that we use to measure the overall perceptions of the impact of immigrants is a composite scale, we explore whether the model behaves differently when each of the component questions is modeled. In Table 3 we present the (unstandardized) coefficients for the regression of the individual scale items on the final model (model 5). Differences between the models of the individual scale items demonstrate the robustness of the different theories. In all of the models, group threat theory is supported with consistently

TABLE 3
REGRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL SCALE ITEMS ON THE FINAL MODEL

	Crime	Econ	Jobs	Ideas
Control Variables				
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Male	-0.02 (0.07)	0.16 ^a (0.06)	0.14 (0.07)	0.14 (0.06)
Northeast	0.02 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)
South	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.08)	-0.19 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.08)
Midwest	0.11 (0.09)	-0.48 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)
West	—	—	—	—
Group Threat				
White native	—	—	—	—
White immigrant	0.33 ^b (0.10)	0.52 ^b (0.09)	0.35 ^b (0.10)	0.39 ^b (0.09)
Non-white immigrant	0.61 ^b (0.16)	0.81 ^b (0.14)	0.87 ^b (0.16)	0.55 ^b (0.14)
Non-white native	-0.05 (0.09)	0.18 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)
Labor Market Competition				
White-collar	—	—	—	—
Blue-collar	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.20 (0.08)	-0.23 ^a (0.09)	-0.16 (0.08)
Service	0.00 (0.09)	0.00 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)
Not working	-0.15 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.17)
Education				
No college	-0.30 ^b (0.09)	-0.22 ^a (0.08)	-0.27 ^a (0.09)	-0.26 ^b (0.08)
College	—	—	—	—
Graduate school	0.31 (0.13)	0.18 (0.12)	0.23 (0.13)	0.15 (0.12)
Cosmopolitanism/Parochialism				
Liberal	0.12 (0.09)	0.17 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)	0.22 ^a (0.08)
Neutral	—	—	—	—
Conservative	0.03 (0.08)	0.12 (0.07)	0.11 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)
Reject ethnocentrism	0.22 ^b (0.03)	0.07 ^a (0.03)	0.20 ^b (0.03)	0.12 ^b (0.03)
Ever lived abroad (Natives)	0.00 (0.09)	0.30 ^b (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	0.26 ^b (0.08)
Intercept	2.62 ^b	2.69 ^b	2.45 ^b	3.33 ^b
Number of cases	1,083	1,083	1,083	1,083
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.11

Notes: Dashes indicate that the variable is not included in the model.

^a $p < 0.01$.

^b $p < 0.001$.

more negative perceptions of immigrants among the native-born regardless of racial group. In contrast labor market competition theory is most soundly supported in the regression modeling agreement or disagreement with the view that immigrants take jobs away from those born in the U.S. In this model only blue-collar workers are significantly less likely to agree with this statement, while in all the other models they are not significantly different from those in other occupations. The theory of cosmopolitanism receives the strongest support in the models of the agreement or disagreement with the statements that "immigrants are generally good for the U.S. economy" and "immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures." Respondents who hold more liberal views and those who have ever lived abroad score higher on the scale of agreement with the statement that immigrants make America more open to new ideas and culture. Respondents who have ever lived abroad are also more likely to agree with the statement that immigrants are generally good for the nation's economy. Indeed, these two statements are largely indicative of a worldview that sees the benefits of globalization. Clearly, breaking the scale into its component variables demonstrates its internal consistency.

CONCLUSIONS

Our research contributes to the literature on perceptions of immigrants by demonstrating that the cosmopolitan/parochial divide is theoretically and empirically relevant to views of immigrants in the U.S. Additionally, by broadening the operationalization of cosmopolitanism, we find that favorable views of immigrants are associated not only with class position, but also with larger ideological perspectives such as the acceptance or rejection of ethnocentrism and with life experiences such as having lived abroad. Furthermore, our study is the first analysis of U.S. data explicitly focused on explaining the social bases of pro-immigrant sentiment. Whereas most U.S. research in this area emphasizes group threat and labor market competition as explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment, our theoretical framework draws attention to how the material and social interests of knowledge workers explain pro-immigrant sentiment.

Much like labor market competition theory, the theory of a cosmopolitan-parochial divide posits that class position influences individuals' perceptions of the social and economic impact of immigration. However, unlike labor market competition theory, the theory of a cosmopolitan-parochial divide posits that material interests are reflected in the values and beliefs of cosmopolitans in that they generally support multiculturalism and reject ethnocentrism.

Moreover, it argues that adherence to this globally oriented ideology has become a way for cosmopolitans to socially distinguish themselves from parochials.

This analysis reveals that cosmopolitans – persons who are highly educated, those in white-collar occupations, those who have lived abroad, and those who reject ethnocentrism – are significantly more likely to believe that immigrants make a favorable contribution to the U.S. than persons without these characteristics. Cosmopolitanism, therefore, offers a complementary explanation to labor market competition theory: white-collar workers and those holding a college or advanced degree view globalization as beneficial while blue-collar and service workers without college degrees view globalization as economically and socially threatening. We have demonstrated that these general worldviews are associated with the way in which each group views immigrants and their impact on society.

Moving beyond our data, we speculate that as each subsequent cohort of people in the U.S. attends and completes college in greater numbers, they will be exposed to ideas and values that increase their appreciation of other cultures or at least provoke them to question negative stereotypes of foreigners and immigrants. Education, therefore, not only prepares future generations for employment as knowledge workers, but also encourages them to be less ethnocentric than previous generations. Furthermore, some of the fastest-growing employment sectors in the U.S. economy are precisely those that employ knowledge workers – information technologies, finance, insurance, real estate, and other white-collar workers. Insofar as our results show that college education, white-collar employment, and the rejection of ethnocentrism are related to more positive views of immigrants, we expect a growing number of people in the U.S. to hold favorable views of immigrants. In addition, high and increasing immigration rates since the 1970s, as well as relatively higher fertility rates among immigrants, have contributed to the growth of racial and ethnic minorities as a proportion of the U.S. population. Since our results show that individuals of recent immigrant origin view immigrants' social and economic impacts more favorably, it is probable that pro-immigrant sentiment will grow as the population with recent migration experience increases.

An alternative scenario is possible however. The demographic trends causing the immigrant-origin population to swell could strengthen social barriers between the native-born (third generation or more) and persons of more recent immigrant origin (first- or second-generation immigrants), would promote anti-immigrant sentiment. In addition, the persistence of high rates of undocumented immigration and fear of terrorism associated with some immigrant groups could result in a heightened sense of economic, cultural, or

national-security threat among the native-born and strengthen anti-immigrant sentiment. Finally, although demand in knowledge-based occupations is growing, so too is demand for low-skill service work for which immigrants and native-born workers may or may not compete. Altogether these trends may deepen anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly among parochial sectors of the population.

Still, we expect that increasing globalization in its many forms will mean that people in the U.S. as a whole have more opportunity to travel abroad, learn foreign languages, view foreign films and television, listen to music from different cultures, buy goods from around the world, and encounter people of various cultures in their neighborhood, school, or workplace. In conclusion, we expect that more people in the U.S. will come to hold cosmopolitan world-views as our economy becomes more globally integrated and more people come into contact with members of other cultures both at home and abroad. As long as this contact is generally positive in nature it will diminish negative stereotypes of immigrants and encourage recognition of common experiences across nations. Combined with the expansion of higher education and the growth of the information economy this translates into a likely expansion of cosmopolitan group membership and more favorable perceptions of immigrants in the U.S.

APPENDIX

PERCENTAGE OF MISSING VALUES FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

Dependent Variables	% Missing	N
Additive Scale	11.9	163
Immigrants increase crime	7.5	102
Immigrants are good for the economy	8.6	117
Immigrants take jobs away from natives	6.3	86
Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures	7.2	98
Independent Variables	12.1	165
Age	0.0	4
Male	0.0	0
Political ideology	5.0	68
Region	0.0	0
White	0.0	0
Immigrant origin	—	—
a) Born in this country?	0.1	2
b) Parents born in this country?	0.2	3
Occupational classification	0.0	0
Education	0.0	0
Ever lived abroad	2.0	27
Ethnocentric ideology	5.0	54
Total Valid Cases	79%	1,083
Total Missing Cases	21%	284

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