Factors associated with attitudes toward U.S. immigration, 1996–2016

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Abstract

This study investigates political, socioeconomic, and demographic factors associated with attitudes toward U.S. immigration. We analyze cross-sectional data from the 1996–2016 General Social Survey. Results from multinomial logistic models suggest that support to immigration has been increasing over time. There is no difference by sex on attitudes toward immigration. Non-whites, those between 18 and 24 years of age, and college graduates are more likely to be pro-immigration. People working on sales and office occupations, as well as on natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations are less likely to support immigration, in comparison to people in management, business, science, and arts occupations. Strong Democrats, Democrats, Independents (near Democrats), Independents, and those in other parties are more likely to be in favor of an increase on the number of immigrants, compared to strong Republicans. Strong Democrats are increasingly pro-immigration over time and strong Republicans are stable anti-immigration over time.

1. Introduction and background

This study aims to investigate main factors associated with immigration attitudes in the United States. Our analysis contributes to the literature on attitudes toward immigration by investigating several years of data, as well as by exploring disaggregated information on age group, education degree, and political party identification. We analyze cross-sectional cumulative data from the 1996–2016 General Social Survey (GSS). This database allows us to investigate the association of attitudes toward immigration with several demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables over time. We take advantage of the detailed information about political party affiliation, available in GSS: (1) strong Democrat; (2) Democrat; (3) Independent, near Democrats; (4) Independent; (5) Independent, near Republicans; (6) Republican; (7) strong Republican; and (8) other party. Previous studies usually aggregate party identification into Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.

Immigration policy is a highly contested matter of public opinion. The proposal to build a wall along the US-Mexico border is currently driving the immigration public debate. However, a wide array of federal, state, and local policies centered on immigration have kept the matter salient since the 1990s (Chandler and Tsai 2001). What shapes individuals' views on immigration? What social characteristics are ascribed to those who are anti or pro-immigrant?

Based on the 1994 GSS, analyses about attitudes toward immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001) suggest that age is positively related to anti-legal immigration attitudes. Older respondents are more likely to want to decrease the number of legal immigrants. The relationship between age and anti-illegal immigration attitudes was not statistically significant. In terms of gender, females are more likely to be more anti-legal immigration than males, but this relationship is not statistically significant for anti-illegal immigration. Overall, age and sex have not been found to be consistent nor significant predictors of attitudes toward immigrants (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Fetzer 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001). Although age does not predict attitudes toward immigrants, birth cohort does. The millennial generation, those born from the early 1980s to the 2000s, have more positive views toward immigration than non-millennials, based on the 2008 American National Election Study (Ross and Rouse 2015).

Race did not have a statistically significant relationship with anti-legal or illegal immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001). However, 67% of whites did favor a decrease in immigration compared to Blacks (65%) and nonwhites (60%) in 1994. Nativity and immigrant background do play a role in

immigration attitudes (Haubert and Fussell 2006). More specifically, immigrants, those who have an immigrant parent, whites, and non-whites are more likely to score higher on the scale of perceptions of the impact of immigrants in the U.S. in 1996.

Although income did not have a statistically significant relationship with anti-legal or illegal immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001), occupation significantly predicted negative perceptions of immigrants. Blue-collar and service workers are more likely to hold negative perceptions, as they perceive immigrants as competitors in the labor market for low-skilled jobs (Haubert and Fussell 2006). In terms of education, those with a college degree tend to be more pro-immigrant compared to those with lower levels of education (Chandler and Tsai 2001). In general, college or graduate school degree holders have more positive views about immigrants (Haubert and Fussell 2006).

In terms of ideology, individuals who see newcomers as a threat to American culture, especially in relation to language, are more likely to favor a decrease in the number of immigrants (Chandler and Tsai 2001). In contrast, those who reject ethnocentrism or have experience living abroad have significantly more positive attitudes toward immigrants than those with ethnocentric views or without abroad experience (Haubert and Fussell 2006). In relation to political ideology, conservatives tend to hold more negative views toward immigration than liberals (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Haubert and Fussell 2006). However, the relationship between political partisanship and attitudes toward immigrants is not always straightforward (Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006). In California, Republicans are more likely to think that immigration has deleterious effects on social and policy outcomes, but Democrats shared the same concerns.

Attitudes toward a specific group of immigrants can also shape the overall views on the issue, according to the 2000 GSS (Shin, Leal, and Ellison 2015). This analysis included three measures of bias against Latinos: (1) derogation measured by negative stereotypes about Latinos; (2) disrespect or unfavorable views of Latino culture and its contributions to American society; and (3) discomfort, a preference to maintain social distance from Latinos. Prejudice against Latinos significantly shapes respondents' views on: (1) the number of immigrants who should be allowed to come to the U.S.; and (2) the consequences of immigration in relation to (a) higher crime rates, (b) job losses for the native-born population, and (c) opening up to new ideas and cultures.

2. Data and methods

We analyzed the cross-sectional cumulative data from the 1972–2016 General Social Survey (GSS). This survey has data representative to the adult population in the United States and allows us to investigate attitudes toward immigration from 1994 to 2016. For this paper, we concentrated the analysis on a variable that indicates the opinion of respondents about how should the number of immigrants to American be nowadays, which is available from 1996 to 2016. The original variable in GSS gives the following alternatives: (1) increased a lot; (2) increased a little; (3) remain the same as it is; (4) reduced a little; and (5) reduced a lot. Based on this variable, we generated a three-category variable that indicates if the respondent wants to: (1) reduce number of immigrants; (2) remain the same as it is; or (3) increase the number of immigrants.

We estimated a series of multinomial logistic regressions, which is appropriate for categorical dependent variables. Our models test the association of several independent variables with the opinion about the number of immigrants in the country (dependent variable). The multinomial logistic regression can be seen as an extension of the binary logistic model in situations in which the dependent variable has multiple categories. The variable about attitude toward immigration has a total of three categories ($J = 3$), which generates three different probabilities:

$$Pr(y_i = 1|x_i) = P_{i1} = \frac{1}{1+exp(x_i'\beta_2)+exp(x_i'\beta_3)}, \tag{1}$$

$$Pr(y_i = 2|x_i) = P_{i2} = \frac{exp(x_i'\beta_2)}{1+exp(x_i'\beta_2)+exp(x_i'\beta_3)}, \tag{2}$$

$$Pr(y_i = 3|x_i) = P_{i3} = \frac{exp(x_i'\beta_3)}{1+exp(x_i'\beta_2)+exp(x_i'\beta_3)}, \tag{3}$$

In Equations 1 to 3, β_2 and β_3 denote the specific effects of the independent variables for the second and third categories, taking the first category as the reference. In this case, we took respondents who would like to reduce the number of immigrants as the reference. Note that the equation for P_{i1} derives from the fact that the three possibilities add to one [$P_{i1}=1-(P_{i2}+P_{i3})$]. The probabilities of response of the dependent variable depend on the nonlinear transformations of the linear function $x_i'\beta_j = \sum_{k=0}^{K}\beta_{jk}x_{ik}$, where K is the number of independent variables.

Following strategies of previous studies, we controlled the models for a series of independent variables: year (1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016); sex (female, male); race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, other); age group (18–24, 25–44, 45–64, 65–89); and college completion (no college, at least college).

Occupations were aggregated according to the 2010 Census Occupation Codes:[1] (1) management, business, science, and arts occupations; (2) service occupations; (3) sales and office occupations; (4) natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations; (5) production, transportation, and material moving occupations; (6) military specific occupations; and (7) unspecified occupations; and (8) unemployed.

Political party affiliation was also included in the models: (1) strong Democrat; (2) Democrat; (3) Independent, near Democrats; (4) Independent; (5) Independent, near Republicans; (6) Republican; (7) strong Republican; and (8) other party.

We also included information on birth cohort, since age variable was not significant in previous studies. We generated a binary variable that indicates whether the respondent is part of the millennial generation (born in 1980 or after). Previous studies suggest that millennials are more in favor of immigration than non-millennials.

Models were also estimated using a disaggregated measure of education degree: (1) less than high school; (2) junior college; (3) bachelor; and (4) graduate. The intention was to better understand variations in the attitudes toward immigration by level of education, going beyond the binary information on whether the respondent completed college.

We took into account the GSS complex sample design for all estimates reported in this study. The National Frame Areas (NFAS) were taken as the stratum. Segments (block, group of blocks, or census tract) were taken as the primary sampling unit. For strata with one sampling unit, as the scaling factor, we used the option to average of the variances from the strata with multiple sampling units for each stratum with one sampling unit. We also informed the weight in GSS that considers: sub-sampling of non-respondents; the number of adults in the household; and applies an adult weight to years before

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[1] https://www.census.gov/people/io/files/2010_OccCodeswithCrosswalkfrom2002-2011nov04.xls

2004, which allows us to investigate data before and after that year. The sample size by year and opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays is reported on Table 1.

>>> Table 1 <<<

3. Results

The adult population in the United States who think immigration should be reduced changed from 64.6 percent in 1996 to 42.2 percent in 2016 (Figure 1). In the same period, the percent of those who think immigration should remain the same increased from 27.0 to 40.3 percent. Finally, those who are in favor of an increase of immigration rose from 8.4 to 17.5 percent.

>>> Figure 1 <<<

One of the main factors that we investigate the association with attitudes toward immigration is political party affiliation. In Figure 2, people who reported being a strong Democrat (dark blue line) oscillated through time: 17.2 percent in 1975, 13.2 percent in 1996, and 15.5 percent in 2016. Democrats (light blue line) decreased their participation over time: 23.8 percent in 1975, 19.3 percent in 1996, and 17.1 in 2016. Independents (purple line) increased over time from 13.6 percent in 1975 to 16.1 percent in 1996 and to 17.2 percent in 2016. Republicans (light red line) also oscillated through time: 15.9 percent in 1975, 17.6 percent in 1996, and 13 percent in 2016. People who reported being a strong Republican (dark red line) increased from 6.2 percent in 1975 to 10.7 percent in 1996, and decreased to 9.9 percent in 2016.

>>> Figure 2 <<<

Overall, Figure 3 illustrates that strong Democrats and Democrats have been more in favor of both immigration remaining at the same level and increasing immigration in recent years, compared to 1996. Those who think immigration should be reduced decreased over time. The same patterns are observed among independents, but this group has smaller levels of desire to increase immigration than strong Democrats. Among Republicans and strong Republicans, the percentage of those who wish to reduce immigration slightly decreased from 1996 to 2012, but increased at the end of the period, reaching 60.7 percent of Republicans and 67.2 percent of strong republicans in 2016. In general: (1)

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strong Republicans are stable anti-immigration over time; and (2) strong Democrats are increasingly pro-immigration over time.

The relative risks ratios estimated with multinomial logistic models are illustrated on Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c. ***Model 1*** simply estimates the trends over time related to opinion of the adult population about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays. We took those who are in favor to reduce immigrants as the reference category. Results indicate that respondents are less likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration and to be in favor of the current levels, compared to those who want to reduce immigration. However, these differentials are becoming less pronounced over time. The adult population was 68.6 percent ((0.314–1)*100) less likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration in 1996, compared to those in 2016 (reference category). In 2014, this differential decreased to 22.4 percent. The same happened for those who would prefer the immigration levels to remain the same. In 1996, respondents were 56.2 percent less likely to want the same level of immigration, compared to those in 2016. This differential was not significant anymore in 2014, which means the likelihood to want the same levels of immigration is the same as those who want to decrease immigration (reference category) in 2014 and 2016. Thus, support to immigration has been increasing over time.

Model 2 controls estimations for sex, age group, college completion, occupation, and political party affiliation. The decrease in magnitude for the year coefficients remained the same, as estimated by model 1. Women were 10.4 percent less likely to want immigration levels to remain the same than men (reference category). However, there was no different between women and men in relation to the opinion regarding increase in immigration, compared to decrease in immigration (reference category).

People between 18 and 24 years of age were 1.4 times more likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration compared to people between 45 and 64 years of age (reference category). The other age groups (25–44 and 65–89) were less likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration than those in the 45–64 age group.

People with at least a college degree were 2.4 times more likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration, compared to those without a college degree. Those with completed college were also 1.8 times more likely to want immigration levels to remain the same, compared to those with no college.

In relation to the occupation variables, those in sales and office occupations are 30.2 percent less likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than those in management, business, science and arts occupations (reference category). People in natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations are 25.2 percent less likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than the reference category. For the other occupations, there is no difference in their opinion about an increase in immigration, compared to the reference category. In addition to sales/office and construction occupations, two other groups of occupations present statistically significant lower chances to want immigration levels to remain the same, compared to the reference category: (1) production, transportation, and material moving occupations, and (2) military specific occupations.

Concerning political party affiliation, those who are self-described as strong Democrats are 4.6 more likely to be in favor of an increase in immigration than strong Republicans. These relative risks ratios are also statistically significant, compared to the reference category, among Democrats (2.6 times more likely), Independents, near Democrats (3.5 times more likely), Independents (2.8 times more likely), and those in other parties (3.8 times more likely). Independents, near Republicans and Republicans have the same view as strong Republicans in relation to an increase of immigrants. For those who agree that levels of immigrants should remain the same, relative risks ratios remain significant for the groups above and are also significant among Independents, near Republicans (1.4 times more likely), compared to strong Republicans. These strong differentials on attitudes toward immigration by political party affiliation are not so dubious as previous studies suggested (Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006).

Model 3 includes variable on race/ethnicity. This information is not available in the 1996 GSS, so there is a considerable drop in the number of observations. Coefficients for year, age group, college completion, occupation, and political party have the same overall trends as in model 2. Coefficients for sex are not statistically significant. In relation to race/ethnicity, non-Hispanic blacks are 1.6 times more likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than non-Hispanic whites (reference category). Hispanics are 3.7 times more likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than whites. Other races are 3.5 times more likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than the reference

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category. All these race/ethnicity groups are also more likely to want immigration levels to remain the same, compared to non-Hispanic whites.

Model 4 replaces the binary variable about college completion by education degree disaggregated into: (1) less than high school; (2) high school (reference category); (3) junior college; (4) bachelor degree; and (5) graduate degree. Coefficients for year, sex, race/ethnicity, age group, occupation, and political party have the same overall trends as in model 3. In terms of education, individuals with less than high school are 1.3 times more likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than those with a high school diploma. These relative risks ratios in favor of increasing immigration are even stronger among those with a bachelor degree (2.2 times more likely) and with a graduate degree (3.9 times more likely), compared to the reference category. Those with a bachelor degree and with a graduate degree are also more likely to agree with the current levels of immigration (1.7 and 2.1 time more likely, respectively) than those with a high school diploma. Finally, those with less than a high school degree are 17.2 percent less likely to agree with the current levels than the reference category. In general, the disaggregated education group variable is more informative than the binary college completion variable.

Model 5 replaces the age group variables by information on birth cohort, in order to measure differentials on attitudes toward immigration between millennials and non-millennials. Coefficients for year, sex, race/ethnicity, college completion, occupation, and political party have the same overall trends as in model 3. The birth cohort variable indicates that millennials are 1.7 times more likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than non-millennials. Moreover, millennials are 1.3 times more likely to agree to remain the current levels of immigrants, compared to non-millennials.

Model 6 tests the collinearity between age group and birth cohort variables. Coefficients for year, sex, race/ethnicity, college completion, occupation, and political party have the same overall trends as in models 3 and 5. Millennials are 1.5 times more likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration than non-millennials. The millennial variable includes those between 18 and 36 years of age (born between 1980 and 1998). As a result, the coefficient for the 18–24 age group is not statistically significant, since this group is part of the millennial binary variable. The 25–44 age group loses power, but remains statistically significant. This group is 16.4 percent less likely to be in favor of an increase on immigration, compared to 45–64 year olds. For those who agree that numbers of immigrants should remain the same, coefficients for 25–44 and 65–89 age groups remain statistically significant and

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consistent with results from models 2, 3, and 4. The millennial variable loses significance, since age for the "remain the same" category was capturing differentials among older age groups. In general, the disaggregated age group variable is more informative than the binary millennial variable.

4. Final considerations

We estimated the association of attitudes toward immigration with several demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors, based on the 1996–2016 General Social Survey (GSS). Our overall results suggest that support to immigration has been increasing over time. There is no difference by sex on attitudes toward immigration. Non-whites (blacks, Hispanic, and others) are more likely to be in favor of an increase on the number of immigrants than whites. The youngest age group (18–24 year olds) has the highest likelihood to want an increase on immigration. The disaggregated age group variable provided a deeper understanding on attitudes toward immigrants than the binary variable related to the millennial generation (suggested by Ross and Rouse 2015). People without a high school degree, with a college degree, or with a graduate degree are more likely to support immigration, compared to those with a high school degree.

People working on sales and office occupations, as well as on natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations are less likely to support immigration, in comparison to people in management, business, science, and arts occupations. People self-identified as strong Democrats, Democrats, Independents (near Democrats), Independents, and those in other parties are more likely to be in favor of an increase on the number of immigrants, compared to strong Republicans. Independents (near Republicans) and Republicans have the same attitudes toward immigration as strong Republicans. Based on descriptive trends, we also verify that strong Democrats are increasingly pro-immigration over time, and strong Republicans are stable anti-immigration over time. These strong differentials on attitudes toward immigration by political party affiliation are not so dubious as previous studies suggested (Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006).

The main specificities of this study that contribute to the literature about attitudes toward immigration are: (1) the use of several years of GSS from 1996 to 2016; (2) the inclusion of disaggregated information on age group, education degree, and political party affiliation (from strong Democrats to strong Republicans). The next steps of our analysis are to explore the association of several factors with other dependent variables related to attitudes toward immigration, available in GSS. We will also

explore more GSS data from cross-sectional cumulative data (1994 to 2016), as well as from merged single-year data with cross-sectional and all panels (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014).

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Table 1. Sample size of adult population by year and opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays, United States, 1996–2016

Year	Reduce immigration	Remain the same	Increase immigration	Total
1996	733	310	98	1,141
2004	1,094	684	205	1,983
2008	694	448	152	1,294
2010	704	489	200	1,393
2012	582	505	175	1,262
2014	728	654	242	1,624
2016	777	742	326	1,845
Total	**5,312**	**3,832**	**1,398**	**10,542**

Source: 1996–2016 General Social Survey.

Figure 1. Distribution of adult population by opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays, United States, 1996–2016

Source: 1996–2016 General Social Survey.

Figure 2. Distribution of adult population by political party affiliation, United States, 1975–2016


Source: 1975–2016 General Social Survey.

Figure 3. Distribution of adult population by opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays by political party affiliation, United States, 1996–2016

Source: 1996–2016 General Social Survey.

Table 2a. Relative risks ratios from multinomial logistic models predicting opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays (reduce immigrants as reference), United States, 1996–2016

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant
Year												
1996	0.438***	0.314***	0.428***	0.311***								
	(0.0418)	(0.0463)	(0.0419)	(0.0451)								
2004	0.673***	0.442***	0.662***	0.444***	0.691***	0.475***	0.692***	0.474***	0.752***	0.538***	0.709***	0.525***
	(0.0565)	(0.0581)	(0.0583)	(0.0592)	(0.0601)	(0.0626)	(0.0604)	(0.0622)	(0.0653)	(0.0730)	(0.0641)	(0.0725)
2008	0.682***	0.525***	0.679***	0.512***	0.689***	0.529***	0.691***	0.522***	0.725***	0.573***	0.700***	0.566***
	(0.0666)	(0.0792)	(0.0664)	(0.0800)	(0.0633)	(0.0805)	(0.0634)	(0.0804)	(0.0659)	(0.0878)	(0.0650)	(0.0881)
2010	0.746***	0.656***	0.745***	0.627***	0.753***	0.629***	0.756***	0.625***	0.783**	0.671***	0.762***	0.661***
	(0.0706)	(0.0820)	(0.0733)	(0.0794)	(0.0721)	(0.0807)	(0.0725)	(0.0803)	(0.0756)	(0.0873)	(0.0743)	(0.0865)
2012	0.946	0.750**	0.934	0.720**	0.925	0.709**	0.927	0.702***	0.955	0.741**	0.933	0.733**
	(0.0897)	(0.101)	(0.0938)	(0.0994)	(0.0918)	(0.0960)	(0.0920)	(0.0952)	(0.0943)	(0.101)	(0.0929)	(0.0987)
2014	0.941	0.776**	0.929	0.763**	0.905	0.733**	0.905	0.735**	0.916	0.744**	0.908	0.742**
	(0.0812)	(0.0975)	(0.0830)	(0.0966)	(0.0791)	(0.0921)	(0.0794)	(0.0932)	(0.0801)	(0.0944)	(0.0798)	(0.0942)
2016	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Sex												
Female			0.896**	0.891	0.935	0.914	0.935	0.911	0.939	0.925	0.937	0.923
			(0.0484)	(0.0717)	(0.0534)	(0.0787)	(0.0535)	(0.0789)	(0.0533)	(0.0798)	(0.0535)	(0.0797)
Male			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Race/Ethnicity												
White					ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Black					1.254***	1.588***	1.261***	1.582***	1.277***	1.578***	1.252***	1.586***
					(0.106)	(0.202)	(0.107)	(0.202)	(0.108)	(0.201)	(0.106)	(0.202)
Hispanic					2.487***	3.680***	2.576***	3.557***	2.577***	3.717***	2.491***	3.704***
					(0.237)	(0.429)	(0.249)	(0.422)	(0.242)	(0.432)	(0.237)	(0.433)
Other					2.750***	3.528***	2.743***	3.430***	2.834***	3.585***	2.758***	3.533***
					(0.413)	(0.667)	(0.408)	(0.647)	(0.420)	(0.680)	(0.414)	(0.672)

Note: *** Significant at $p<0.01$; ** Significant at $p<0.05$; * Significant at $p<0.1$. Exponential of standard errors reported in parentheses. (cont.)
Source: 1996–2016 General Social Survey.

Table 2b. Relative risks ratios from multinomial logistic models predicting opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays (reduce immigrants as reference), United States, 1996–2016

Independent variables	Model 1 Remain the same	Model 1 Increase immigrant	Model 2 Remain the same	Model 2 Increase immigrant	Model 3 Remain the same	Model 3 Increase immigrant	Model 4 Remain the same	Model 4 Increase immigrant	Model 5 Remain the same	Model 5 Increase immigrant	Model 6 Remain the same	Model 6 Increase immigrant
Age group												
18–24			1.148	1.414***	1.140	1.364**	1.137	1.395***			1.055	1.075
			(0.106)	(0.170)	(0.118)	(0.173)	(0.118)	(0.177)			(0.134)	(0.151)
25–44			0.722***	0.681***	0.780***	0.721***	0.780***	0.701***			0.808***	0.836*
			(0.0440)	(0.0574)	(0.0515)	(0.0649)	(0.0514)	(0.0635)			(0.0592)	(0.0886)
45–64			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.			ref.	ref.
65–89			0.674***	0.758***	0.759***	0.896	0.769***	0.850			0.786***	1.043
			(0.0498)	(0.0760)	(0.0603)	(0.0960)	(0.0614)	(0.0931)			(0.0663)	(0.129)
Birth cohort												
Millennials									1.338***	1.650***	1.121	1.478***
									(0.0900)	(0.148)	(0.111)	(0.194)
Non-Millennials									ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
College completion												
No college			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
At least college			1.747***	2.440***	1.768***	2.525***			1.786***	2.525***	1.771***	2.538***
			(0.113)	(0.219)	(0.126)	(0.241)			(0.127)	(0.243)	(0.126)	(0.244)
Education degree												
Less high school							0.828**	1.275**				
							(0.0720)	(0.148)				
High school							ref.	ref.				
Junior college							1.063	1.106				
							(0.108)	(0.173)				
Bachelor							1.651***	2.228***				
							(0.136)	(0.248)				
Graduate							2.046***	3.881***				
							(0.211)	(0.559)				

Note: *** Significant at p<0.01; ** Significant at p<0.05; * Significant at p<0.1. Exponential of standard errors reported in parentheses.   (cont.)
Source: 1996–2016 General Social Survey.

Table 2c. Relative risks ratios from multinomial logistic models predicting opinion about how should the number of immigrants to America be nowadays (reduce immigrants as reference), United States, 1996–2016

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant	Remain the same	Increase immigrant
Occupation												
Management			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Service			0.901	1.003	0.859*	0.900	0.892	0.923	0.867	0.899	0.857*	0.895
			(0.0739)	(0.121)	(0.0763)	(0.115)	(0.0807)	(0.122)	(0.0767)	(0.115)	(0.0760)	(0.114)
Sales, office			0.822***	0.698***	0.808***	0.660***	0.823**	0.709***	0.812***	0.662***	0.807***	0.660***
			(0.0619)	(0.0747)	(0.0648)	(0.0754)	(0.0676)	(0.0835)	(0.0654)	(0.0756)	(0.0649)	(0.0753)
Construction			0.681***	0.748*	0.675***	0.661**	0.710***	0.671**	0.684***	0.671**	0.677***	0.671**
			(0.0734)	(0.120)	(0.0787)	(0.114)	(0.0841)	(0.121)	(0.0795)	(0.115)	(0.0790)	(0.115)
Transportation			0.830**	1.080	0.813**	0.912	0.852	0.932	0.810**	0.918	0.814**	0.917
			(0.0746)	(0.147)	(0.0773)	(0.134)	(0.0837)	(0.141)	(0.0767)	(0.135)	(0.0774)	(0.135)
Military			0.525**	0.680	0.522**	0.682	0.526**	0.722	0.519**	0.677	0.520**	0.667
			(0.149)	(0.257)	(0.150)	(0.247)	(0.151)	(0.263)	(0.148)	(0.244)	(0.149)	(0.240)
Unspecified			1.000	1.282	0.969	1.231	0.977	1.282	0.978	1.231	0.964	1.227
			(0.303)	(0.529)	(0.300)	(0.527)	(0.304)	(0.553)	(0.304)	(0.527)	(0.299)	(0.523)
Unemployed			0.979	1.209	0.819	0.941	0.878	0.922	0.817	0.944	0.814	0.921
			(0.135)	(0.235)	(0.123)	(0.196)	(0.134)	(0.202)	(0.119)	(0.191)	(0.122)	(0.192)
Political party affiliation												
Strong Democrat			2.123***	4.560***	1.880***	4.354***	1.881***	4.256***	1.868***	4.379***	1.880***	4.345***
			(0.222)	(0.667)	(0.212)	(0.712)	(0.212)	(0.706)	(0.210)	(0.717)	(0.212)	(0.711)
Democrat			2.007***	2.592***	1.729***	2.321***	1.731***	2.314***	1.751***	2.314***	1.728***	2.299***
			(0.206)	(0.396)	(0.191)	(0.386)	(0.191)	(0.387)	(0.192)	(0.385)	(0.191)	(0.383)
Ind., near Dem.			2.171***	3.517***	1.995***	3.359***	2.003***	3.332***	2.008***	3.291***	1.985***	3.291***
			(0.233)	(0.511)	(0.228)	(0.525)	(0.229)	(0.524)	(0.229)	(0.516)	(0.228)	(0.516)
Independent			1.842***	2.766***	1.671***	2.585***	1.696***	2.515***	1.707***	2.567***	1.669***	2.559***
			(0.202)	(0.414)	(0.195)	(0.410)	(0.197)	(0.403)	(0.197)	(0.406)	(0.194)	(0.406)
Ind., near Rep.			1.345**	1.294	1.215	1.321	1.221	1.332	1.237*	1.326	1.216	1.322
			(0.155)	(0.251)	(0.149)	(0.275)	(0.150)	(0.278)	(0.150)	(0.276)	(0.149)	(0.276)
Republican			1.189	1.110	1.142	1.177	1.145	1.195	1.167	1.191	1.144	1.182
			(0.133)	(0.200)	(0.136)	(0.229)	(0.137)	(0.233)	(0.138)	(0.232)	(0.137)	(0.230)
Strong Republican			ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Other party			1.400*	3.765***	1.511*	4.561***	1.532**	4.647***	1.549**	4.581***	1.511*	4.582***
			(0.284)	(1.027)	(0.324)	(1.370)	(0.327)	(1.396)	(0.331)	(1.377)	(0.324)	(1.377)
Observations	10,542		10,452		9,301		9,301		9,301		9,301	

Note: *** Significant at p<0.01; ** Significant at p<0.05; * Significant at p<0.1. Exponential of standard errors reported in parentheses.
Source: 1996–2016 General Social Survey.